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The increasing influence of offensive shareholder activism driven by hedge funds has 
become a significant issue for corporate boards. The intervention of shareholder 
activists often challenges current strategies and the status quo of the corporate 
governance of publicly listed companies.  
Previous studies have utilised agency theory as a lens to explore and explain 
corporate governance issues. However, these studies have been unable to capture 
the complexity and the dynamics of Board interactions and provide a comprehensive 
view of the impact of shareholder activism. This thesis adopts complexity theory as an 
exploratory framework that views a Board as a complex co-evolving system and 
examines holistically its multiple interactions with shareholder activists and other 
stakeholders that together create the company’s social ecosystem.  
A multi-case study approach was chosen with three international hotel companies 
selected for analysis. The latter had all undergone one or more attacks from 
shareholder activists over the same period. Online documentary information was 
collected and used to construct three case studies. Template analysis was chosen as 
a tool to analyse the selected cases. A template framework was developed based on 
complexity concepts, principles and language to evaluate the impact of shareholder 
activism.   
The findings reveal that offensive shareholder activism influences the decision-making 
processes of the Boards of Directors. Macro-environmental conditions, a company’s 
vulnerabilities, shareholder activists’ attacks, Boards defence mechanisms and 
changes in a target company emerged from the analysis of the three cases. The thesis 
identified enabling conditions that facilitate effective corporate governance at a 
company level and collectively comprise an ‘enabling environment’. 
The main contribution of this study is the creation of an integrated model of 
shareholder activism that offers a chronological overview of the impact of shareholder 
activism and provides insights into the interactions of Boards with shareholder activists 
and other stakeholders. This model can be employed by researchers as a tool for 
analysing social dynamic phenomena and by practitioners to develop efficient and 
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PART 1 - BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
This study consists of three parts that allow the reader to understand the impact of 
shareholder activism in a company’s corporate governance ecosystem. Part 1 
presents the significance and relevance of this study; it reviews the theoretical work 
and discusses the methods used to undertake the research process.  
 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
The dynamic business environment where publicly listed companies operate is 
characterised by constant changes that influence their success. These changes 
influence the way these companies manage their relationships with their shareholders 
and stakeholders. Shareholders and stakeholder groups challenge the corporate 
boards of these companies on a wide range of matters such as their profitability, 
corporate governance, environmental impact and their impact on local communities. 
They expect the Boards of these companies to comply and meet their demands and 
expectations and will add significant pressure if their intentions are not followed. 
Although corporate social responsibility agendas are important for many stakeholder 
groups, financial performance and corporate governance matter for most shareholders 
in the business environment. All shareholders expect a return on their investments 
and some will react if a company does not generate positive results in the short-term. 
However, there are shareholders who employ a passive approach; they are patient 
and they are interested in long-term returns on their investments.  
 
The shareholders that tend to be impatient and more proactive when interacting with 
publicly listed companies are called shareholder activists. Shareholder activists are 
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investors who are looking to benefit financially in the short-term from their investments. 
They have been present in financial markets since the creation of the corporation and 
most of their practices have consistently remained the same over the years in order to 
attempt to generate a quick return on their investments. Shareholder activists attempt 
to bring about changes in companies that do not perform well from a financial 
perspective or those which have corporate governance weaknesses. They pressure 
their ‘targets’ to change their strategic direction and/or the structure of the company’s 
Board/Management with the intention of improving its performance.   
 
Based on their interests, shareholder activists may take either an active or a passive 
approach. An active approach indicates the dissatisfaction of a shareholder who has 
either a short-term or a long-term view of their investment and often results in an 
expression of the need for changes in a company. In a passive approach, regardless 
of a company’s performance, a shareholder will not intervene and will not push for any 
changes (Saft, 2016). The active approach of shareholder activism consists of 
‘defensive’ or ‘offensive’ motives that investors may demonstrate while owning a 
company’s stock (Cheffins and Armour, 2011).  
 
Shareholder activists primarily pursue ‘offensive’ motives. In the past they have 
targeted companies that are household names and have caused changes in these 
companies. High profile examples of shareholder activism have occurred in several 
industries. In April 2017, shareholder activist Jana Partners, bought a 9% stake in 
Whole Foods and suggested that the company should consider a sale (Daniels, 2017). 
Three months later, Amazon acquired the company and Jana Partners made a $300 
million profit (Morrell, 2017). In August 2013, Carl Icahn, a well-known shareholder 
activist, announced that he had purchased a stake in Apple and, by January 2014, he 
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increased his stake to 0.9% of the company’s outstanding shares at a total cost of $3.6 
billion (Lazonick, Hopkins and Jacobson, 2016). Two years later, he successfully 
pushed Apple to return $250 billion to its shareholders, a move in which he made a $2 
billion profit on his investment (The Telegraph, 2017). These examples and the 
incentives that shareholder activists gain in public interventions are the result of their 
motivation to constantly pursue targets that will enable them to increase the return on 
their investments.   
 
1.1 Rationale for this Study  
Corporate governance is a term which was initially discussed in 1776 with Adam Smith 
distinguishing the vigilance of ‘public company’ directors from that of owners in ‘private 
copartneries’ (McCreadie, 2009); it became a field of scholarly study in the 1960s with 
Eells (1960, p. 108) defining it as ‘the structure and functioning of the corporate polity’. 
However, it really gained prominence in the beginning of the new millennium after a 
series of financial scandals such as those involving Enron, WorldCom (Fearnley and 
Beattie, 2004) and Parmalat (D’Orio, 2005). The resulting losses of shareholders’ 
wealth (billions of dollars) and of thousands of jobs pushed governments and the 
business world to work together in developing regulatory schemes such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US, the Corporate Governance Code in the UK 
and Germany and the Financial Security Law in France (Bhasa, 2004). 
 
Company law typically views a publicly listed company as a legal entity subject to 
rights and liabilities (Tricker, 2012a). There is a formal separation of the company’s 
management (under the Board of Directors) from its owners. Tricker (2012a) further 
notes that in most jurisdictions, the law does not distinguish between different types of 
directors nor their separate roles and responsibilities. In practice, however, there are 
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two types of directors on a Board: ‘executive’ managers in the company and ‘non-
executives’ who are not involved in running the company and often do not have an 
affiliation with the company, other than the directorship. Figure 1.1 illustrates a 
comprehensive view of a publicly listed company’s governance which not only includes 
‘executive’ and ‘non-executive’ directors that are members of the Board of Directors, 
but also other managers who hold senior roles in the company without having a direct 
influence on the Board.  
 




            Outside, non-executive directors (who could be independent or connected) 
 
            Executive directors 
  
            Other managers not on the board 
 
Adapted from: Tricker B. (2012a) Corporate Governance, Principles, Policies and Practices, 2nd Edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p.36. 
 
 
At the core of corporate governance sits the Board (Haspeslagh, 2010). Board 





management and for evaluating and implementing effective systems of controls 
(Pergola and Joseph, 2011) that best serve the stakeholders’ interests and most 
importantly the company’s shareholders.  
 
Hedge funds are strong advocates of offensive shareholder activism; however, other 
institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, and private equity funds 
may occasionally adopt an aggressive approach too, although they mostly work 
‘defensively’ to protect the value of their investments (Cheffins and Armour, 2011). 
Unlike mutual funds, pension funds and private equity funds, hedge funds are highly 
motivated by increasing their returns on investments on publicly listed companies. The 
impact of shareholder activism has been investigated by various scholars (Bebchuk, 
Brav and Jiang, 2015; Boyson and Mooradian, 2012; Ferri and Sandino, 2009). There 
are streams of studies that have investigated the impact of shareholder activism on 
their ‘targets’. These studies have explored the operating performance of a company; 
other studies have looked at a company’s share price performance and others have 
looked at the investment returns of hedge funds because of their engagement with 
shareholder activism. In addition, the extant academic research has examined the 
types of investments and campaigns that shareholder activists conduct within the 
corporate environment and the effects they have on other investors (Bebchuk et al., 
2015; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Gantchev et al., 2017; Schneider and Ryan, 
2011). Another stream of research (Becht, Frank, Mayer and Rossi, 2010; Mahlendorf, 
2013; Sudarsanam and Broadhurst, 2012) has looked at the impact of shareholder 
activism on corporate behaviour (corporate governance convergence, changes in 




It is suggested that the new era of hedge fund activism began approximately two 
decades ago, and several scholars have therefore conducted research using data 
spanning the period from the late 1990s through to 2007 (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and 
Thomas, 2015). For example, Klein and Zur (2006) used a sample of activism events 
from 2003 to 2005 whilst Boyson and Mooradian (2012) studied a sample of 269 
events from 1994 to 2005. Schor and Greenwood (2007) examined a large sample of 
events between 1993 and 2006 that included a total of 20,771 filings, while Bebchuk 
et al. (2015) studied a much larger sample of approximately 2,000 interventions by 
activist hedge funds.  
 
Although the focus of practitioner and scholarly analysis of the phenomenon of 
shareholder activism has often varied from financial performance to governance 
performance and operational performance, it is clear that the impact of shareholder 
activist interventions is not limited to certain aspects of the organisation but 
fundamentally changes its entire corporate governance ecosystem. What is missing 
from these studies is a comprehensive view of the impact of shareholder activism that 
simultaneously looks at the interaction of Boards with their stakeholders.  
 
For this reason, this study employs complexity theory because it enables the 
complexity and dynamics of a Board’s interactions and inter-relations to be captured. 
Therefore, in an organisational context, it provides an explanatory framework of inter-
relationships: of how individuals and organisations interact, relate and evolve within a 
larger social ecosystem (Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 2002). Complexity theory 
also provides a rigorous approach to study some of the key aspects of organisations 
and examines, the unpredictable, disorderly and unstable organisational aspects and 
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complements the traditional understanding of organisations to provide a more 
complete picture (Kernick, 2004; Zimmerman, Lindberg and Plsek, 1998).  
 
In addition, complexity theory offers a way of understanding and identifying underlying 
patterns of order, therefore providing a richer understanding and appreciation of 
situations or processes. It introduces potentiality (possible future emergences) by 
demonstrating how simple recurrent rules lead to complex behaviour. While systems 
or entities - people and/or organisations - may exist in various states (having multiple 
potentialities), complexity illustrates how the state that unfolds is the result of 
interactive local relationships (Kuhn, 2009, p.12). The understanding of organisational 
life is facilitated by the fact that complexity theory offers a new imagery and a rich 
vocabulary that enables researchers to pursue more meaningful, open-ended, and 
systemic modes of inquiry (Prigogine, 1997). With a range of complexity principles and 
concepts that according to Mason (2007) have relevance to business, it gives the 
opportunity to researchers to study corporate governance mechanisms such as 
shareholder activism.  
 
Complexity theory studies complex social systems comprehensively by looking at the 
multiple, interacting dimensions that collectively create the social ecosystem 
(Goergen, Mallin, Mitleton-Kelly, Al-Hawamdeh and Hse-Yu Chiu, 2010). It can view 
a Board as a complex system that is part of a company’s wider corporate governance 
ecosystem. A complex system, such as the Board, comprises a number of agents that 
are independent, interact with each other and whose behaviour is difficult to predict. 
The outcome of their interactions may have a larger impact affecting the entire 
corporate governance ecosystem. A corporate governance ecosystem consists of 
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shareholder activists, other shareholders/investors and other stakeholders such as 
financial media, financial analysts, regulators, enforcement agencies and investment 
banks that are also viewed as complex systems. Within a company’s corporate 
governance ecosystem, these agents interact with the Board and with each other and 
influence their evolution. Although complexity theory has been used on some 
occasions as a lens to explore and understand corporate governance, the studies 
using this lens on corporate governance to date are very limited (Goergen et al., 2010).  
 
In conclusion, the extant literature reveals a gap in the corporate governance 
discipline. This study identifies complexity theory as a lens through which to explore 
the phenomenon of ‘offensive’ shareholder activism comprehensively by considering 
the multiple interacting dimensions of the ‘new order’ that Boards create in companies 
because of this type of activism. Using a complexity theory lens, it looks at all corporate 
governance agents and pursues novel insights and interpretations on the impact of 
shareholder activism on them.  
 
As a result of the gap in the corporate governance discipline, a number of research 
questions have emerged:  
1. How are corporate boards influenced by agents in a corporate governance 
ecosystem?  
2. What is the reaction of corporate boards to ‘offensive’ shareholder activism? 
3. What is the outcome of the impact of shareholder activism on corporate 
boards? 




5. To what extent did the initial conditions and enabling conditions, enable 
corporate boards to fend off ‘offensive’ shareholder activism?  
 
1.2 Aim and Objectives 
Given the above discussion, the overall aim of this study is:  
 
To provide novel insights and interpretations of the impact of ‘offensive’ shareholder 
activism on a company’s corporate governance ecosystem utilising a complexity 
theory lens.  
 
This aim of this study will be achieved by the following objectives: 
 
1. Understand corporate boards as complex co-evolving systems, taking into 
consideration all agents that interact with and influence each other within the 
corporate governance ecosystem.  
2. Develop multiple cases of ‘offensive’ shareholder activism, interrogate the 
reaction of corporate boards and gauge the impact it has had on the specific 
corporate governance ecosystem through the collection and qualitative 
analysis of data gathered from online documentary information (documentation 
and archival records).   
3. Evaluate through a complexity theory lens the multiple interacting dimensions 
of the ‘new order’ created by corporate boards because of shareholder 
activism.  
4. Identify possible enablers and inhibitors in the corporate boards’ trajectories 
that together create a co-evolving enabling environment that supports and 
encourages good governance practices. 
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5. Propose an integrated model of shareholder activism that will enable corporate 
boards and corporate governance ecosystems to implement practices that 
prevent and withstand activist shareholder ‘offensives’.  
 
1.3 Research Context  
Corporate governance and the shareholder activism phenomenon are ubiquitous 
across all industries and shareholder activists have attacked big companies such as 
IBM, Apple, Pepsico, General Motors, eBay and Dell, to name a few (Deveau, 2018; 
Picker, 2016; Waldmeir, 2017). A review of the extant research on corporate 
governance showed that the subject has been researched in the hospitality industry 
by a number of scholars who have investigated whether corporate governance 
mechanisms are different in hospitality companies compared to other industries. Other 
scholars have examined the degree to which the quality of mechanisms and growth 
opportunities affect agency problems in hotel companies and others have explored the 
effect of the deviation from optimal franchising on the relationship between corporate 
governance provisions and firm financial performance in restaurant companies (Altin, 
Kizildag and Ozdemir, 2016; Dogru, 2018; Dogru and Sirakaya, 2018; Logan, Gooden 
and Simon, 2013; Madanoglu and Karadag, 2016; Oak and Iyengar, 2009).    
 
However, there appears to be a lack of academic research on shareholder activism in 
the hospitality industry despite the trade publications coverage of a number of cases. 
A review of trade publications and analyst reports has shown that the hospitality 
industry has gained the attention of shareholder activists on several occasions and 
there have been activists’ interventions over the last 10 years in both the hotel and the 
restaurant sectors. For example, in the hotel sector, shareholder activists have 
intervened in companies such as Chatham Lodging, Extended Stay America, 
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Intercontinental Hotels and Resorts, Marriott International Inc., Morgans Hotel Group, 
Starwood Hotels and Resorts and Strategic Hotels and Resorts (Brandt, 2013; 
Lombardo and Al-Muslim, 2019). In the restaurant sector, they have targeted 
companies such as Darden Restaurants, Chipotle, Fiesta Restaurant Group and 
Buffalo Wild Wings (Maze, 2017). This study intends to fill this gap in the literature by 
looking at shareholder activism targeting three hotel companies. This context-specific 
approach will enable the researcher to acquire knowledge from individual case studies 
and increase the comparability from one sector. In addition, it will allow this study to 
examine newer social dynamic phenomena such as the impact of shareholder activism 
in the hotel sector.  
 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
As shown in Figure 1.2, this study consists of nine chapters. This first chapter has 
outlined gaps in the existing literature in corporate governance and shareholder 
activism. This chapter also sets out the aim, objectives and research questions of this 
study.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 critically review the relevant literature associated with this study. The 
chapters identify and review the literature on corporate governance, the Board of 
Directors, shareholder activism and agency theory. They also evaluate and review the 
literature on complexity theory including complexity principles and its relationship to 
corporate governance.  
 
Chapter 4 evaluates the research design chosen. This chapter describes and justifies 
the research approaches and methods that this study has employed. The chapter also 
provides a rationale for choosing a multi-case study strategy as well as how the sample 
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selection has been made. In addition, this chapter discusses the data collection 
methods employed leading to a justification about the application of data collection 
analysis methods adopted in this research. The chapter concludes with a reflection on 
the limitations of the research design.  
   
Based on secondary research, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 provide in detail the background 
information gathered on each case study and present information about each hotel 
company and all shareholder activists. These chapters also present the research 
findings of the selected case studies and offer a detailed context for analysis and 
discussion in the following chapters.  
 
Chapter 8 brings together and offers an analysis of the research findings. This chapter 
compares and contrasts the findings gathered within the corporate governance and 
complexity theory literature. This chapter also discusses the importance of complexity 
theory in corporate governance research. Finally, Chapter 9 presents the contribution 
of this research study to the body of knowledge and provides implications for 













Figure 1.2 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1: Introduction                 
Research rationale and literature gaps, research aim and 
objectives, originality of the study, research context 
 
 
PART 1 - BACKGROUND TO THE 
STUDY 
↓ 
Chapters 2 and 3: Literature Review              
Corporate governance, shareholder activism, hedge 
funds, agency theory, complexity theory                       
↓ 
Chapter 4: Methodology             
Research approach, research design research strategy, 
data collection methods, data collection analysis 
↓     
Chapter 5: Findings of Case Study I                                                                            
The target, the activist, shareholder activism events 
PART 2 - FINDINGS 
↓ 
Chapter 6: Findings of Case Study II                                                                           
The target, the activists, shareholder activism events 
↓ 
Chapter 7: Findings of Case Study III                                                                            
The target, the activists, shareholder activism events  
↓    
Chapter 8: Discussion              
Analysis of the research findings 
PART 3 - CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
↓ 
Chapter 9: Conclusion   
Conclusions, contributions, recommendations for theory 
and practice, recommendations for future research 
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The following two chapters review the theoretical work of this study which consists of 
the academic subject areas of corporate governance and complexity theory. Chapter 
2 discusses the phenomenon of shareholder activism and examines its impact on the 
corporate governance structure of publicly listed companies, as well as the emergence 
of hedge fund activists in the corporate landscape and the strategies they employ in 
the marketplace in order to influence their targets. In addition, this chapter reviews the 
literature on corporate governance and agency theory and their relationship with 
shareholder activism. Chapter 3 discusses and evaluates complexity theory and 
reviews its extensive vocabulary that comprises several principles.  
 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
Changes in the listing standards of stock exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ Stock 
Market, Inc.), corporate scandals, and the emergence of shareholder activists have 
prioritised the scrutiny of corporate governance structures and activities (Rubach and 
Sebora, 2009). Organisations such as the G20, OECD, IMF and World Bank have 
adopted higher corporate governance standards primarily to manage the risk of 
corporate failures, to improve economic performance, to enable capital access, and 
enhance the investment climate (Clarke and Branson, 2012).  
 
The need to increase capital and to enter capital markets has led to the growth of 
demand for capital in global economies and as a consequence establishing good 
governance practices has gained momentum (Bhasa, 2004). Although the 20th century 
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experienced growth in management and organisation theories, the 21st century will 
primarily focus on corporate governance (Tricker, 2012b). This is apparent nowadays 
as, in the business vocabulary, corporate governance has become one of the most 
commonly used phrases (Solomon, 2013a).   
 
Various theories and approaches use corporate governance differently, and the term 
appears in different concepts with distinctive meanings (Schneider, 2012). Therefore, 
there is no a single, accepted definition of the term, but authorities that focus on 
corporate governance have adopted a number of definitions. Lessambo (2014, p.3) 
defines corporate governance as the material obligations that a corporation has 
towards its shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, tax and other 
supervisory authorities. This definition demonstrates the relationship between the 
Board of Directors and the company’s management with several stakeholders and 
indicates the rules and regulations that they should follow in order to successfully run 
a publicly listed company.  
 
Corporate governance provides the structure through which the company’s objectives 
are set, and the means of achieving these objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined (OECD, 2004,). Monitoring performance can expose the management’s 
behaviour to shareholders, while incentives serve to align the management’s interest 
with those of the shareholders to urge desired behaviour (Anderson, Melanson and 
Maly, 2007). OECD has worked extensively on corporate governance issues leading 
to the emergence of six principles. These principles enable companies to improve the 
standards and policies on the way they operate. The six principles are: 1) ensuring the 
basis for an effective corporate governance framework, 2) the rights of shareholders 
16 
 
and key ownership functions, 3) the equitable treatment of shareholders, 4) the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, 5) disclosure and transparency and 6) the 
responsibilities of the Board (Lessambo, 2014, p.11).  
 
From a scholarly perspective, corporate governance has predominantly been studied 
through an agency theory lens, with Jensen and Meckling (1976) being the first to 
suggest that managers are self-interested agents who act on behalf of the 
shareholders (principals). Their approach largely builds on earlier ideas by Berle and 
Means (1932) on the key problems associated with the separation of ownership and 
control. Agency theory argues that the conflicts of interest usually occur between an 
agent (manager) and the agent’s principal (shareholder). The principal asks the agent 
to carry out a specific duty on behalf of their interests, although sometimes the agent 
may not act in the best interest of the principal and may prefer to pursue his/her own 
interests. The repercussions of this act/separation are the agency costs, and agency 
theory has been the main paradigm for understanding and explaining corporate 
governance (Rubach and Sebora, 2009). 
 
Since Jensen’s and Meckling’s use of agency theory, numerous studies (see 
comprehensive literature reviews by Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya (2003) and 
Dalton, Hill, Certo and Daily (2007)) have used this lens to explore and explain 
corporate governance issues and topics mainly focusing on: a company’s financial 
performance and its relationship with Board structures and equity ownership; 





There have also been studies on corporate governance that have taken other 
theoretical perspectives. For example, there is a stream of studies (Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999; Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003) that use the theoretical foundation of resource dependence theory for 
evaluating directors' roles in providing access to resources needed by the company to 
enhance its functioning, performance, and survival. Other researchers have 
considered cognitive and behavioural approaches by studying the cognitive 
contribution of Board members and the impact of boardroom dynamics on strategic 
decision-making (Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Pye and 
Camm, 2003). Another group of researchers (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 
1997; Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois and Jegers, 
2012) have used stewardship theory and stakeholder theory as a contrast (and 
complement) to agency theory and believe that managers frequently have similar 
interests to those of owners and/or shareholders and therefore, by protecting their 
interests, they will have to take certain decisions on their behalf.  
 
Two main structures of corporate governance exist globally: i) the concentrated 
corporate structure and ii) the diluted corporate structure. Within the concentrated 
corporate structure, which is more common in countries such as Germany, France and 
Japan, a small group (family or a group of families) controls the company’s ownership 
and runs the company. This structure can offer stability in the long run as the family 
group that controls a company has fewer debates in decision-making processes. On 
the other hand, within the diluted structure, ownership and/or control is dispersed 
among shareholders. It is common in countries such as the United States (US) and 
the United Kingdom (UK), where most companies raise their capital by selling their 
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shares in financial markets. As such, shareholders rely on the Board of Directors to 
manage the company and maximise its profits (Lessambo, 2014).  
 
One of the most important goals of corporate governance is the protection of 
stakeholder interests (Garcia-Torea, Fernandez-Feijoo and De La Cuesta, 2016). 
These interests may be i) financial in the case of investors, ii) quality in the case of 
customers, iii) well-being in the case of employees and iv) environmental in the case 
of the community or activist groups. According to Mainardes, Alves and Raposo 
(2011), Pesqueux and Damak-Ayadi (2005) and Ranangen (2017) there are two 
stakeholder groups – primary and secondary stakeholders (see Figure 2.1).  
 
 
Figure 2.1 The Basis Two-Tier Stakeholder Map  
 
Source: Ranangen, H. (2017) Stakeholder Management Theory Meets CSR Practice in Swedish Mining. Mineral 




Primary stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, employees and shareholders 
have formal contractual relationships with the company. Ranangen (2017) argues that 
primary stakeholders are essential to the continuous growth and survival of any 
company. In contrast, secondary stakeholders are those without any contractual 
relationships, such as government authorities, the local community, activists and 
media. Secondary stakeholders can influence the primary relationships of a business; 
e.g., regulatory changes in the business environment can influence how shareholders 
such as shareholder activists conduct their practices in the market.  
 
The emergence of stakeholder theory triggered the attention of scholars to look at 
stakeholders’ interests and not only the shareholders of a company (Argandona, 1998; 
Gibson, 2000). Stakeholder interests are protected in the following ways: i) ensuring 
compliance with laws and regulations, ii) making sure of fair allocation of economic 
rents, iii) monitoring the decisions made by the company’s management to ensure 
they will create long-term value for the company and iv) confirming the relevance and 
objective information prepared and provided by the company’s management (Monks 
and Minow, 2008; Pergola and Joseph, 2011). The Board of Directors plays an 
important role in the governance of a company by protecting the above interests and 
ensuring that all practices followed by itself and the management are transparent.   
 
2.1.2 Board of Directors 
Research on the Boards of Directors is a vital area within the corporate governance 
discipline, because their main responsibility is to ensure that they govern a publicly 
listed company properly (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). It is nowadays more important 
to govern companies than manage them and some people fail to differentiate 
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governance from management (Tricker, 2012b). Sir Adrian Cadbury’s Report on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) describes the Boards of Directors’ 
responsibility to govern their companies, whereas the shareholders’ role is to appoint 
the directors and the auditors (Pergola and Joseph, 2011). Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005), Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Garrat (1997) describe the Board’s 
function as a collective responsibility that: i) determines the company’s ethics and 
purpose, ii) decides about the company’s overall business strategy, iii) plans, iv) 
monitors and controls the CEO and management and v) reports and makes 
recommendations. 
 
The Board is an intermediary that must ensure the alignment between the managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders and it is responsible for monitoring corporate 
managers and their performance (Gramm, 2015). Shareholders who are dissatisfied 
with the Board’s performance have three choices: i) ‘vote with their feet’, e.g., sell their 
shares, ii) hold their shares and demonstrate their dissatisfaction, and iii) keep their 
shares and not react, also known as exit, voice and loyalty (Gillan and Starks, 2003).  
 
The Boards of most publicly listed companies consist of inside and outside directors. 
‘Insiders’ are officers or executives employed by the company, whereas ‘outsiders’ are 
executives of other companies (Wheelen and Hunger, 2010). Legislation demands 
from Boards’ that they mainly have outside directors and audit committees within a 
company to have three independent directors (Pergola and Joseph, 2011). Empirical 
evidence shows that independent or outside directors are believed to be better able to 
monitor managers by protecting the interests of shareholders by requesting and 
evaluating past and current business information (Bonazzi and Islam, 2007; Brenner 
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and Schwalbach, 2009). In addition, Boards that consist of more independent 
members have a lower occurrence of accounting fraud and earnings management 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005).  
 
A country’s government can influence the Board of Directors. For example, the court 
system (federal courts, state courts), regulation, enforcement bodies (SEC), 
lawmakers (federal and state legislation), and stock markets shape how companies 
organise and disclose their information. Furthermore, other influences include media 
such as business press (The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, Forbes, The 
Economist, and Fortune) as well as academics and think tanks. Finally, another group 
that can influence the Board includes auditors’ (such as KPMG, PwC, Deloitte and 
Ernst & Young) who conduct audits on a company’s financial statements, and proxy 
advisors such as Glass Lewis and ISS who advise a company on how to structure a 
proxy or advise a shareholder on how to vote.  
 
McNulty (2013) points out that despite the efficiency of their governance arrangements 
there have been examples of Boards that were involved in cases of governance 
failures. Such failures were related to monitoring events and led researchers to 
propose that the problem’s causes were the Boards’ structure and the processes they 
followed (Anderson et al., 2007). Consequently, with more companies raising public 
funds, the US has developed a corporate governance structure based on a theoretical 
and legal principal-agent concept, despite the drawbacks and insufficiencies of such 




2.1.3 Agency Theory  
Most of the corporate governance literature has its roots in agency theory and links 
different governance aspects with a company’s performance in order to minimise 
management conflicts and maximise shareholders’ value (Filatotchev and Boyd, 
2009). The conflicts can be even more complex as, despite the existence of 
gatekeepers such as independent auditors and rating agencies, corporate governance 
in the US has poorly delivered on its promises (Lessambo, 2014). Despite the above, 
most of the corporate governance research is based on the assumptions of agency 
theory, is quantitative in approach, and analyses US corporate databases or large 
companies (Pye, 2013).  
 
Pirson and Lawrence (2010) claim that agency theory looks at corporate governance 
practices and behaviours through the agency dilemma lens and it is based on a 
reductionist perspective of a self-interested individual that must be monitored to enact 
management responsibilities for the shareholders’ benefit. The theory views the 
governance relationship as a contract between shareholders (principals) and directors 
(agents) (Tricker, 2012b). The separation of ownership and control results in ‘agency 
costs’ for the principal, thus increasing the costs of controlling and monitoring (Cuevas-
Rodriguez, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2012). Monitoring consists of regular reviews 
of management prerequisites, financial audits, and placing limitations on management 
decision-making (Bonazzi and Islam, 2007). Hedge fund activism as the main area of 





There have been critics of the agency theory approach who have characterised it as 
narrow, as it does not take into consideration other stakeholders’ views that may 
indicate different interests among shareholders (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Cuevas-
Rodriguez et al. (2012) argue that agency theory does not acknowledge the social 
context in which the principal-agent contract takes place and how that context can 
affect both the interests and mechanisms for aligning the interests of principals and 
agents. In addition, Eisenhardt (1989) criticises agency theory for presenting the 
partial view that, although it is valid, it disregards part of an organisation’s complexity. 
Corporate governance and agency theory are associated with the theoretical 
framework of shareholder activism (Lantz, Montandrau and Sahut 2010).  
 
2.2 Shareholder Activism 
The phenomenon of shareholder activism is not new in the corporate landscape and 
over the years it has evolved to a political model of corporate governance that has 
been the result of targeting corporate governance performance (Goranova and Ryan, 
2014). Dating back to the late 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, known as the ‘Deal 
Decade’, shareholder activists were known as ‘corporate raiders’, ‘bust-up artists’ and 
‘greenmailers’ (Nathan, 2013). Shareholder activists have been characterised by The 
Economist (2015) as the ‘jackals of capitalism’ and ‘outcasts’ who, despite extensive 
disapproval in the past, attack weak companies. Often criticised as being short-term 
shareholders who buy stakes in companies and demand money, or some type of 
settlement, they have rebranded themselves as ‘constructive activists’ or ‘highly 




Within the last 20 years, institutional investors and other groups have engaged in all 
forms of shareholder activism, also known as ‘relationship investing’ (Dai, 2013; Gillan 
and Starks, 2000). During the 20th century, the ownership pattern continued to change 
and in countries such as the US and the UK it led to the increase of institutional share 
ownership (Malin, 2013). This increase is addressed by Gillan and Starks (2003) who 
refer to the evolution of shareholder activism in the US and the growth of investment 
from 6.1% of institutional share ownership in 1950 to over 50% by 2002. Since the 
2000s, shareholder activism has been an established corporate governance 
mechanism and received an increased interest from activist hedge funds and other 
shareholder activists who are able to influence corporate governance in organisations 
with small stakes (Katelouzou, 2015). 
 
A report by the Boston Consulting Group presented the global increase in institutional 
ownership and showed that the assets managed by shareholder activists had 
increased over 2004-2014, from $12 billion to $85 billion. Since 2005, the number of 
activist campaigns in the US has increased 15% per year, reaching 144 campaigns in 
2012 (Hammoud, Shandal, Hansell and Roos, 2014). Additionally, from 2013 to 2019 
the number of companies that were publicly subjected to shareholder activist demands 
worldwide had grown from 609 to 839 respectively, although the number of demands 
fell to a four-year low (Activist Insight, 2017; Activist Insight, 2020).  
 
Well-known corporations such as the Boston Consulting Group, Deloitte, J.P. Morgan, 
McKinsey & Company and PricewaterhouseCoopers as well as a vast array of media 
sources such as Activist Insight (industry media and data company), Bloomberg 
Business, The Wall Street Journal and The Economist have published articles and 
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reports that address the impact of shareholder activism in financial markets. The 
growth of shareholder activism is evident nowadays when leading CFOs admit that 
activist threats are ‘now what keeps them awake at night’. It is also evident when 
activist interventions at corporations in excess of more than $100 million had grown 
nearly fourfold over the three-year period 2012-2015 (Foldesy, Hansell, Friedman, 
Janda, Kotzen and Hammoud, 2015). As a result, it is of no surprise that shareholder 
activism is regarded as the biggest concern in America’s boardrooms (The Economist, 
2015).  
 
However, shareholder activism also grows in markets outside the US where 
shareholder activists pursue higher investment returns and less competition within the 
US market (Flaherty and Cruise, 2015). Although the European market may be 
attractive for activists, it provides challenges for them as it is smaller compared to the 
US market and hedge fund activists in the region face difficulties when intervening in 
companies (Kutay, 2014; Marriage, 2013). Bill Ackman from Pershing Square, a well-
known US activist hedge fund declared in a conference in Oxford, UK, that Europe 
was 10 years behind the US in terms of the degree of shareholder activism and in 
terms of how Boards of Directors respond to activists (Foley, 2015). However, at the 
same conference, Ackman announced that shareholder activism ‘is going to happen’ 
in Europe. Ackman’s statement followed rumours that Pershing Square was raising 
money for a fund that could possibly list in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) on the 
summer of 2014, a listing that came to fruition when, in May 2017, his fund made its 




2.2.1 The Nature of Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activism is not a homogenous practice. It comes in various forms, 
different actors and agendas drive it and its impact is different depending on the target 
(Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao, 2012). Several definitions demonstrate its relationship 
with the corporate governance of companies with one of them by Judge et al. (2010, 
p.260) defining it as ‘the use of ownership to actively influence company policy and 
practise’. The main intention of shareholder activists is to shake up the Boards of 
publicly listed companies that look attractive to their investments. They primarily focus 
on poorly performing companies and pressure their management to improve their 
performance in order to increase shareholder value (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Jiang 
and Anandarajan, 2009). Shareholder activists usually invest in companies that are 
undervalued and demand changes such as higher dividends, share buybacks, cost 
effective practices, management changes, and sometimes the break-up of companies 
(Lachapelle and Jinks, 2014). Other tactics that they adopt include Board restructuring, 
the restriction of executive compensation and confidential voting (Martin and Nisar, 
2007). Consequently, the continuous and increased interest of shareholder activists in 
publicly listed companies is the result of identifying certain vulnerabilities within their 
Boards.  
 
Croci (2007) argues that the media have mixed feelings about shareholder activists, 
because they are only interested in short-term investment returns. Although their 
short-term interest may be damaging for Boards and may disadvantage long-term 
investors, advocates believe that all shareholders could benefit from an increasing 
share price (Tricker, 2012b). The Head of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) believes that shareholder activists may be a force for good by 
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making improvements in how public companies run (The Economist, 2014). However, 
the management of many publicly listed companies believe that activists lack the 
expertise to understand their targets and view activism as a threat to their jobs or 
independence. Even US Presidential contender Hilary Clinton has criticised them as 
‘hit-and-run activists whose goal is to force an immediate payout’ (Sorkin, 2015). 
Consequently, the aim and the form of activism varies, as it ranges from cooperative 
to hostile represented by hedge funds (Ghahramani, 2013; Ryan and Schneider, 
2002).  
 
2.2.2 Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists 
Hedge funds have emerged as aggressive shareholder activists at corporate markets 
pursuing offensive shareholder activism that is primarily performance-driven activism 
(Bratton, 2010; Cheffins and Armour, 2011). Their hostile engagements can be 
disruptive for companies and as Damien Park, founding and managing partner of 
Hedge Fund Solutions, states, ‘it wreaks havoc’. Nevertheless, they are a small 
proportion of the hedge fund industry. In 2015, of a total number of 8,000 hedge funds, 
activists numbered only 71, less than 1%, and they were larger than most as they 
managed $120 billion (The Economist, 2015).  
 
Under pressure to perform in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, 
hedge funds have turned to shareholder activism as a way to maximise their profits 
and increase their returns on investment, looking to influence corporate policies and 
hold the management of underperforming companies accountable (Hilldrup, 2013). 
Consequently, they became a leading force in the shareholder activism industry and 
an increasing number of them increased their share in their investments (Zur, 2008). 
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Not surprisingly, The Wall Street Journal calls them the ‘new leader’ on the list of 
activists attacking corporate boards (Dai, 2013).  
 
Activist hedge funds aim to achieve four things in their targets: 1) potential sale of the 
company, 2) potential sale of a company’s parts, 3) free cash and 4) reducing a 
company’s operating costs. Additionally, they may propose that a target company 
change their investment or payout levels, alter their capital structures and/or replace 
their CEO (Bebchuk et al., 2015). Figure 2.2 illustrates the top value and governance 
demands by shareholder activists during the period 2014-2016. During this period, 
activists focused on acquiring Board seats, seeking sale or merging their targets and 
reviewing strategic alternatives. Acquiring Board seats enables activists to exert 
significant pressure on their targets, as they are likely to influence the views of Board 
members and investors. Their presence on a company’s Board may allow them to 





Figure 2.2 Total Activist Demands 2014-2016 (% of Total Demands) 
Source: Birstingl, A. (2016) 2016 Shareholder Activism Trends. Available at: https://insight.factset.com/2016-
shareholder-activism-trends [Accessed: 18 March 2017].  
 
Hedge fund activism has been related to high rates of organisational change, as 60% 
of the campaigns are successful in obtaining significant changes in a company (Klein 
and Zur, 2009). Moreover, hedge fund activists increase the Board’s size in 76% of 
their targets, they obtain Board representation in 69% of their targets, and promote 
mergers in 66% of the targets (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011). 
 
Although there is not one accepted definition of the term ‘hedge fund’, the SEC (2003) 
defines it as: 
‘an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose 
interests are not sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered 




Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) argue that hedge funds usually display four 
characteristics: 1) they are private investment companies, 2) they are run by 
investment managers with performance-based incentives who may have invested in 
the fund, 3) they are not available to the public and 4) they operate outside of 
regulations and registration requirements. Therefore, they are attractive investment 
companies for wealthy investors who want to benefit in the short-term and can operate 
flexibly in the financial markets.  
 
Hedge funds act as a vehicle, helping investors to turn opportunities into investment 
returns and are subject to fewer restrictions compared to other institutional investors 
(Boss, Connelly, Hoskisson and Tihanyi, 2013; Nicholas, 1999). Their structure differs 
from that of other institutional investors. Their manager’s ability to earn performance-
based pay and lock-up capital investment may increase their incentives to monitor and 
influence their targets (Clifford, 2008). Dai (2003) compares them to pension funds 
and argues that hedge funds are not subject to extensive public influence, or political 
control. Compared to other types of engaged investors, hedge funds have important 
three advantages for investors:  
 
1. They usually charge investors a fixed annual fee of two per cent of their 
investments and a twenty per cent performance fee based on the fund’s annual 
return.  
2. They typically lock-up investor capital for six months, although some request 
lock-up of capital for two years or longer. As a result, hedge funds’ shorter lock-




3. They are not regulated, and they typically suffer fewer conflicts of interest than 
managers at other institutions. These factors give hedge fund managers more 
freedom to engage in shareholder activism than other institutional investors 
(Brav et al., 2008; Bratton, 2010).  
 
The investments of activist hedge funds are not random, but they are the result of 
systematic research on their targets. Brav et al. (2008) argue that they tend to aim at 
companies that are ‘value’ firms with low market value compared to book value, 
although they are profitable with sound operating cash flows and pay their CEOs more 
than their peer companies before their interventions. Boyson and Mooradian (2012) 
also stress that their targets have also worse operating performance, lower sales, 
smaller size, and higher expenses in the year prior to the attack. Furthermore, they 
tend to target companies whose stock prices have slowed down compared to those of 
competitors (Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Muhtaseb and Grover, 2012).  
 
Each hedge fund’s approach may be different. They may ask their targets to consider 
alternatives such as financial restructuring or selling a business unit or the entire 
company for a premium (Muhtaseb and Grover, 2012). They do not always aim to 
control their targets. Instead, they depend on management cooperation or, in its 
absence, support from other shareholders to promote their agendas (Dai, 2013). For 
example, when a company’s management implements minimum changes, activists 
will usually soften their approach; however, if they resist, the activists will employ a 




From a regulatory perspective, activist hedge funds must comply with general rules 
that seek to protect investors. Hilldrup (2013) and Zur (2008) point out that these 
include disclosure requirements under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. The Act requires public disclosure by individuals who own more than 5% of 
the shares of a publicly listed company within ten days of acquiring the shares (Brav 
et al., 2008; Levin and Masterson, 2006). Hedge funds generally seek to exceed that 
level of ownership for two reasons: 1) Schedule 13D filings generate media interest 
and publicity and 2) the act of filing, and the potential legal liability associated with any 
disclosures made, support a hedge fund’s trustworthiness with investors (Brav et al., 
2008). In contrast, there are also hedge funds that do not exceed the 5% threshold 
because, by disclosing their ownership, they expose themselves and the plans they 
have for their targets (Levine, 2015).  
 
Research evidence suggests that hedge fund activism creates value. Activist 
interventions follow a decrease of about $1 million on CEO pay, CEO turnover goes 
up by 10% and their interventions usually generate improved shareholder returns 
(Cheffins and Armour, 2011; Gantchev et al., 2017). By reducing agency costs through 
the reduction of excess cash and overpay to CEOs, it increases payouts, improves 
operating performance and tends to increase share prices (Dai, 2013; Levine, 2015). 
Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to judge activism based on only share performance. 
Many interventions may result in a company’s sale resulting in positive share returns; 
however, the impact of a sale on long-term shareholders is unclear. Shareholders will 
usually benefit if hostile activism separates underperforming managers from a 




Critics of hedge fund activists have claimed that their actions overall or on average 
decrease the organisation’s value in the long term even if they are profitable in the 
short term. Other critics refer to the pressure they exert on their targets to reduce 
research and development expenses and capital expenditures because they promise 
to pay off only in the long term (Bebchuk et al., 2015). Despite academic research that 
supports the effectiveness of activism, target companies do not usually embrace the 
advent of activists in their companies, as it is costly to deal with them, it can be time 
consuming and can lead to disruptive operating changes (Boyson and Pichler, 2017).  
 
During the period 1994-2005, a sample including 418 separate activist events 
involving 111 hedge funds and 397 target companies, demonstrated that the average 
activism period was slightly over two years in length (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011). 
However, a hedge fund activist usually owns shares in a company for almost a year. 
The most patient activists will own a company’s shares for a sufficiently long period – 
SEC rules prescribe three years to benefit from proxy access – (Cheffins and Armour, 
2011). Running proxy fights and serving on Boards can tie up capital leading to 
inconsistencies between the duration of the fund’s investment and liquidity terms. 
Many hedge funds will inform their investors about their long-term commitment, but 
this will not occur if their performance becomes weak (Gramm, 2015).  
 
Over the years, changes in the regulatory environment have enabled hedge funds to 
grow and attack publicly listed companies. The increase in institutional shareholding 
of companies forced the US government to implement regulatory changes that 
benefited the evolution of hedge funds. In 1985, Robert Monks set up Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), the first proxy advisory firm and in 1988, proxy voting was 
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established as a fiduciary duty of pension funds. In 2003, proxy voting was also applied 
to all institutional investors including hedge funds. In 1992 and 1999, the second set 
of regulatory changes (proxy rule changes) allowed shareholders and the 
management of publicly listed companies to communicate and engage. Shareholder 
activists could publicly criticise a company’s management if their statements were 
false. Finally, the 1996 National Securities Markets Improvement Act allowed hedge 
funds to generate resources from institutional investors without requiring disclosure of 
their structures. This regulatory change allowed co-investments between activist 
hedge funds and institutional investors who invested in hedge funds as ‘alternative 
investment’ (Shin, 2018). Consequently, their evolution and their importance in the 
corporate landscape has led researchers to a new stream of research focusing on 
hedge fund activism (Bratton, 2010; Brav et al., 2008; Briggs, 2007; Clifford, 2008; 
Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Katelouzou, 2015; Klein and Zur, 2009). 
 
Hedge funds are different compared to other institutional investors in the form of the 
intervention – defensive and offensive – they employ. ‘Defensive’ shareholder activism 
occurs when an investor becomes dissatisfied with the company’s corporate 
performance or governance and reacts by seeking change, whether by negotiating 
directly with the management or engaging publicly, such as through a public contest. 
Mutual funds and pension funds usually pursue this type of activism by becoming 
active in order to protect their investments. On the other side, ‘offensive’ shareholder 
activism appeals to investors, such as hedge funds, that pursue activism as a profit-
making strategy. Hedge fund managers first determine whether a company would 




Since strategic activism is expensive, it requires a hedge fund to invest heavily in a 
few companies, anticipating that the benefits derived will outweigh the costs (Armour 
and Cheffins, 2009). An offensive activist is usually responsible for all the costs 
associated with the intervention while receiving a return proportional to its stake in the 
company (Hilldrup, 2013). However, there is a belief that hedge fund activism is not 
always hostile. In their study, Brav et al. (2015) characterise only 30% of hedge fund 
interventions as ‘openly hostile’, requiring an actual or threatened proxy contest, a 
takeover threat, litigation, or public statements. This mode of engagement, note the 
authors, forms part of their tactics to influence investors, stakeholders and the 
investment community.  
 
Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Pearson and Altman (2006) suggest that an 
activist’s demands fall into nine categories: 1) engage with the management because 
of the share’s low value, 2) capital structure issues, 3) corporate governance issues, 
4) business strategy issues, 5) ‘strategic alternatives’, 6) demanding the sale or part 
of the company, 7) blocking a proposed merger or acquisition because of unfavourable 
pricing, 8) financing for a firm in distress, or other bankruptcy-related issues and 9) the 
intention to engage in a proxy contest.  
 
Cheffins and Armour (2011) note that a hedge fund’s strategy will depend on their 
target, although hedge funds usually aim to challenge management to adopt financial 
changes. Proactive hedge fund activists initially contact management with a phone 
call, e-mail or letter, urging them to agree to implement their proposal designed to 
increase shareholder value. Following the initial contact, hedge funds usually focus on 
exerting pressure on a company by demanding changes. If their interventions are 
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successful, hedge funds will increase the balance sheet of companies by demanding 
the sale of non-core assets or a change in management if the company is 
underperforming (Armour and Cheffins, 2009). In situations where the company has 
excessive cash resources, they will pressure the company to engage in stock 
repurchases or return dividends to their shareholders (Kahan and Rock, 2009). In 
addition, when the company has assets such as real estate, they lobby to monetise 
those assets (Cheffins and Armour, 2011). 
 
One of the tactics of hedge fund activists is running proxy contests to gain seats on 
the Board of Directors when they are unable to influence management decisions. 
Proxy fights can challenge the corporate governance of an organisation as 
shareholder activists publicly contest against their targets. According to Goldberg and 
Nathan (2017), proxy fights are distractive and expensive and the average median 
cost of defending against an activist has doubled in the last five years. A proxy fight is 
a crisis and a crisis response team should be in place, including legal counsels, 
investment bankers, proxy solicitors and communications specialists to assist 
management in engaging with the activist (Nathan, 2013). Previous successes of 
activists have even made the most confident CEO’s engage with them leading to 










2.2.3 Hedge Fund Activism Research  
Hedge fund activism has been researched extensively over the last 15 years and it is 
based on assumptions of agency theory. Scholars have examined numerous hedge 
fund campaigns that occurred in the past and included hedge fund interventions in 
publicly listed companies. Table 2.1 presents an overview of these studies including 
the sample, data collection techniques, data analysis techniques and the findings in 
























Table 2.1 Hedge Fund Activism Research  





159 U.S. public 
companies. 
Hand-collected dataset  
Descriptive 
statistics 
Governance characteristics are unrelated to the 
probability of a company restating earnings.  
Klein and Zur 
(2006)  
194 13D filings 
between 1 January, 
2003 and 31 
December, 2005. 






Target companies earn significantly higher 
abnormal stock returns around the initial 13D filing 
date than a sample of control company.  
Croci (2007) 
136 block purchases 
by 15 shareholder 
activists during the 
period January 1990 
to December 2001. 
National daily 






A positive market reaction to the first public 
announcement of purchases. In the long-run, 
activists earn an abnormal profit when they sell 
their stakes.  
Donaldson and 
Davis (2007)  
321 U.S. companies  
Compensation survey 





Shareholder returns, in terms of ROE, are superior 
when there is CEO duality. 
Brav et al 
(2008) 
236 hedge funds and 
their 1,059 events 
involving 882 target 
companies between 







U.S. activist hedge funds propose strategic, 
operational, and financial remedies and attain 
success or partial success in two-thirds of the 
cases.  
Zur (2008)  
Activism campaigns 
by 117 hedge funds 
that engaged in 695 
active investments 
during the years 




Schedule 13D announcement premium is 
significantly higher when the target firm’s prior 





27 developed and 
some developing 
countries observed 
over the period of 
1995 to 2005, 
encompassing 216 
observations. 
Remuneration data that 




 Independent of managerial risk-aversion, CEO 
pay is always less generous under stricter anti-





13D and DFAN 
filings between 1993 
and 2006. 




Abnormal returns surrounding investor activism 




499 publicly traded 
companies. 
A governance index was 
calculated and the 
relative power of equity 
ownership and 
governance was 




Both independent and insider board members 
become entrenched, negatively impacting reported 





269 activist events 





Targets of experienced hedge fund activists earn 
higher long-term stock returns than targets of less 
experienced activists.  
Bebchuk et al 
(2015) 
2,000 interventions 
by activist hedge 








No evidence were found that interventions are 
followed by declines in operating performance in 
the long term. Activist interventions are followed 
by improved operating performance during the 
five-year period following the intervention.  
Katelouzou 
(2015) 
432 activist hedge 
fund campaigns 
during the period of 
2000-2010 across 25 
countries. 
The Dow Jones Factiva 
and regulatory filings for 
the countries whose 







 Mandatory disclosure and rights bestowed on 
shareholders by corporate law are found to dictate 
how commonplace hedge fund activism will be in a 
particular country.  




2000-2012 and a 










Activism is associated with a substantially higher 
probability of subsequent merger activity and that 
this effect is driven by the intensity of the activists’ 
engagement with management and their prior 
experience in activism mergers. 
Boyson and 
Pichler (2017) 
Hedge fund activist 
campaigns for the 
period 2001-2012; 
about 1,200 activism 
campaigns.  
Data comes from Shark 
Repellant. The data is 
supplemented with 




The stock market responds unfavorably to 
resistance, reducing the initial positive stock 
market reaction to activism for cases in which 
hedge funds do not counter-resist. 
Gantchev et al 
(2017) 
1,034 hedge fund 
activist campaigns 





Peers with fundamentals similar to those of 
previous targets feel threatened by activism 
activity in their industry and respond by reducing 
agency costs and improving operating 
performance in the same way as the targets.  
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These studies consist of large samples of activist hedge funds interventions that have 
been collected primarily by Schedule 13D filings and data available on hedge funds 
from financial data companies. In addition, scholars have focused on formal 
quantitative accounts based on accounting data such as monthly net-of-fee returns. In 
view of previous research, there is a need to focus on an approach which enables an 
understanding of the complexity of organisations and the Board’s interactions with 
shareholder activists and other stakeholders rather than only focus on financial 
outcomes.   
 
2.2.4 Activist Hedge Fund Tactics 
Figure 2.3 presents the tactics that an activist hedge fund implements when it aims to 
intervene on the Board of a publicly listed company.  
Figure 2.3 The Tactics of an Activist Hedge Fund 
 
 
Source: Muhtaseb M.R. & Grover K.K. (2012) Hedge Fund Activism: Cases, Analysis and Corporate Governance, 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 264-283. 
• Select the company 
whose price is perceived 
as undervalued.
• Acquire a stake, usually 
around 5 per cent, in 
target company.
File Schedule 13D with the 
Securities and Commission 
Exchange.




• Continues to apply 
pressure.
Publicly apply pressure on 
the target company to take 
actions to improve 
shareholder value.
• Eventually share price 
reacts favorably to the 
interaction between the 
hedge fund and the 
company's management.
Target company gives in 
and is compelled to 




Activist hedge funds adopt certain tactics during their intervention in the target 
company. After identifying a company’s vulnerability/ies, they will usually take a 
position in their target and file their share acquisition with the SEC. Once they have 
completed the accumulation of shares, the intervention begins with the activist having 
private discussions (telephone call, letter or e-mail) with the target’s Board. Target 
companies frequently engage in private negotiations with activist hedge funds. These 
negotiations are an essential component of the activism process, and they usually 
result in some form of compromise between activists and target companies (Boyson 
and Pichler, 2017). If a private negotiation fails, an activist hedge fund will intensify the 
pressure by criticising the company publicly or by threatening a lawsuit against the 
Board (Cheffins and Armour, 2011). 
 
Pressure by shareholder activists may lead the incumbent Board to adopt certain 
governance mechanisms such as poison pills and staggered boards. Corporate 
boards may sometimes adopt poison pills (also known as Shareholders Rights Plans) 
in response to shareholders who seek to gain control. The poison pill is a form of 
defence tactic that makes it very costly to acquire control of a target company (Lu, 
2016). Poison pills are usually triggered when the company receives a hostile offer to 
acquire shares from shareholders at a specified price, typically at a significant 
premium to market price (Hilldrup, 2013). It attaches dormant rights to each share of 
a company’s stock and these rights are activated when an investor acquires a certain 
percentage of a company’s outstanding shares, usually 15%-20%.  
 
Even after the adoption of a governance mechanism, a shareholder activist may 
continue to apply pressure by protesting publicly to attract media attention. Activists 
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adopt sophisticated public relations, social media and traditional media campaigns to 
demonstrate their arguments (WLRK, 2019). Sometimes activists may release a 
presentation to the public and to investors where they present their views about their 
target. In this case, an activist’s public protest may increase the share price of the 
target company, thus, benefiting the company, the activist and other shareholders. In 
the event of no financial gains, the target company may seek to settle their debate with 
the activist and consider their demand for changes (WLRK, 2019).    
 
2.3 Corporate Governance and Complexity Theory 
The relationship between the Board and the stakeholders of a company’s corporate 
governance ecosystem contribute to the growing complexity of the target company. 
Agency theory has been popular in corporate governance research and offers a 
convincing justification for the survival and even the prosperity of a publicly listed 
company (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). In the relevant literature, good corporate 
governance provides all the mechanisms that can deter this managerial self-interest. 
However, it is the very simplicity of this theory and the reductionist (‘cause-and-effect’) 
approach it takes that has instigated a call by scholars (Daily et al, 2003; Hambrick, 
Von Werder and Zajac, 2008; Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni and Vigano, 2011) to move 
beyond its almost exclusive use, to pursue broader conceptualisations of corporate 
governance.  
 
Goergen et al. (2010) have argued that agency theory as an analytical framework 
cannot capture the Board’s complexity and can only focus on one aspect of the 
corporate governance ecosystem such as the financial framework. Complexity theory 
offers a new imagery and a vocabulary that enables researchers to pursue more 
42 
 
meaningful, open-ended, and systemic modes of inquiry (Prigogine, 1997). In this way, 
Boards dynamics may be understood as dynamic systems operating within complex 
political, economic, sociocultural, technological and legal environments. In other 
words, complexity theory studies social systems comprehensively by looking at the 
multiple, interacting dimensions that together create the social ecosystem (Goergen 
et al., 2010). With this new imagery and vocabulary, complexity theory raises an 
awareness of dynamic processes, unpredictability, novelty and emergence, leading to 
what Kellert (1993, p. 114) calls ‘dynamic understanding’.  
 
Goergen et al. (2010) stressed the relationship of corporate governance and 
complexity by viewing corporate governance as a complex social system with specific 
inter-related characteristics. In this study, a complex social system is the Board of 
Directors that has its own agenda and supports a specific function of the system 
(shareholder interests). However, while complexity theory has the potential for being 
a very powerful tool to further the study of corporate governance, the literature on 
corporate governance using complexity theory is still very limited and none of the 
existing studies use more than a few complexity principles in their analysis (Goergen 
et al., 2010). The application of complexity theory also has limited application in the 
hospitality and tourism industries. There are studies that focus on concepts such as 
the happiness of frontline service employees in the hospitality industry (Hsiao, Jaw, 
Huan and Woodside, 2015), on complex and chaotic tourism systems (Baggio and 
Sainaghi, 2011) and on customers’ purchasing intentions in peer-to-peer 




Despite the limited use of complexity theory to corporate governance studies, there is 
a growing application of complexity principles and models applied in healthcare 
studies and in military studies. For example, there are studies that have addressed 
complexity in health care (Begun, Zimmerman and Dooley, 2003; Edgren and Barnard, 
2012; McDaniel and Driebe, 2001; Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001), in health systems 
(Caffrey, Wolfe and McKevitt, 2016), in emergency departments (Smith and Feied, 
1999), in health care research (Kernick, 2006) and in health care leadership 
(Zimmerman, Lindberg and Plsek, 1998). In addition, there are military studies that 
have addressed complexity in areas such as war zones (Blakesley, 2005; Hendrick, 
2009; Moffat, 2003).  
 
Extending complexity theory to the notion of corporate governance is appropriate, as 
increased complexity not only affects managers but also Board members (Pirson and 
Turnbull, 2012). However, the literature applying complexity theory to corporate 
governance has two major weaknesses. One is that most authors focus on one or very 
few complexity principles, whereas the other is that most of the work reported is 
theoretical rather than practical (Goergen et al., 2010). In both cases, this study will i) 
fill the gap by applying several complexity principles and ii) analyse the findings 
focusing on real life events.  
 
2.4 Summary 
The review of the literature in this chapter has identified and discussed one of the main 
subject areas in this study, corporate governance. In this chapter, shareholder activism 
and the Board of Directors have been reviewed and analysed as important corporate 
governance mechanisms. Research into shareholder activism has indicated that 
changing ownership patterns throughout the 20th century have led to the growth of the 
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phenomenon evidenced in the number of activist campaigns, assets managed by 
shareholder activists and the number of companies that were publicly subjected to 
shareholder activists’ demands. Over the last decade, hedge funds are the driving and 
leading force in ‘offensive’ shareholder activism and their engagements are highly 
disruptive for a target company. The review of shareholder activism concludes that the 
phenomenon is relevant for hedge funds which aim to drive changes, and this is 
achieved by following several steps when targeting the Board of a publicly listed 
company.  
 
Although shareholder activism is an important corporate governance mechanism, the 
Board of Directors represents the most important area within corporate governance 
research. The subject areas of corporate governance and shareholder activism are 
strongly associated with agency theory and have been employed extensively in the 
relevant academic research. Agency theory looks at corporate governance practices 
and behaviours through the lens of the agency dilemma; it is based on a reductionist 












CHAPTER THREE - COMPLEXITY THEORY 
 
3.1 Complexity Theory  
It is widely accepted that complexity theory represents a recognition of the limitations 
of the Newtonian linear approach when applied to complex systems (Hendrick, 2009). 
Newtonian thinking views the world as a machine that is based on simple principles 
and several disciplines such as biology, psychology and economics have adopted this 
view. It remains valid if someone can predict an eclipse involving the planets 
(Grobman, 2005). However, this perspective does not work for many aspects of 
human behaviour that are representative of human systems such as organisations 
(Zimmerman et al., 1998). Newtonian thinking is based on the assumptions of: i) 
linearity and proportionality of cause and effect (small inputs have small effects, large 
inputs have large effects), ii) the whole being the sum of its parts (reductionism), iii) 
the belief in a possible prediction having perfect measurements, iv) impartiality – an 
individual can be outside the system without being influenced by it and v) the idea that 
the natural state of the system is in equilibrium (Blakesley, 2005; Kernick, 2004).  
 
These assumptions are characteristics of complicated systems, where there may be 
various interacting parts, for example, wiring in an aircraft. However, no amount of 
studying the parts will allow us to predict what will happen in the system, indicating 
that linear thinking is often superficial and simplistic (Hendrick, 2009). On the other 
hand, nonlinear thinking is more sophisticated and often requires someone to spend 




Johnson (2007) argues that complexity theory focuses on the emergence of new 
phenomena from the collection of components that interact in a simple way but may 
lead to a rich variety of outcomes. These components, according to Burnes (2005), 
are non-linear systems that are at the edge of chaos, systems that are constantly 
changing and lead to the emergence of new order. Complexity theory also addresses 
aspects of living systems that are neglected or understated in traditional approaches 
(Chadwick, 2010). Within the aspect of living systems, complexity allows researchers 
to look at problems from numerous perspectives, by studying the micro and macro 
issues and understanding how they are interdependent (Zimmerman et al., 1998).  
 
Burnes (2005) notes that academics and practitioners are increasingly seeing 
complexity theories as a way of understanding changing and complex organisations. 
The world is seen as a complex system (a network of elements that interact with each 
other and their environment) that is non-linear (there is not a straightforward 
relationship between cause and effect and non-linear systems are unpredictable) and 
dynamic (changing continually with time and influenced by what has happened before) 
(Burnes, 2005; Kernick, 2004) or the system is always in a state of change, leading to 
emergent order (Black, 2000). The order discovered by complexity theorists is alleged 
to be ‘emergent’ as it integrally depends on the use of a level of description to capture 
the behaviour of the system that is not obscured by one’s efforts to comprehend 
(McIntyre, 1997, p. 2).  
 
Complex systems have elements that exchange information in such a way that a 
change in the context of one element changes the context for all others, but it is the 
interdependencies and interactions among the elements that create the whole 
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(Anderson, Crabtree, Steele and McDaniel, 2005). In a company, the interactions 
between the Board, shareholders and other stakeholders often may result in tensions 
and can create a complex environment that can lead to uncertainty and 
unpredictability. The uncertainty and unpredictability then lead to a future that is 
unknown, as emergent properties cannot be predicted from the system’s individual 
parts due to the non-linear interactions. Therefore, we can never be certain what the 
result of any intervention of shift will be (Begun et al, 2003; Boulton, Allen and 
Bowman, 2015).  
 
Complexity theory studies social systems holistically. It looks at all related elements or 
all corporate governance agents that interact and influence each other, within the 
entire corporate governance environment of the social ecosystem (Mitleton-Kelly, 
2011). The use of complexity as a metaphor may offer interesting insights into the way 
that companies operate. This leads to an argument suggesting that complexity does 
not offer companies a picture of ‘what is’ or ‘what will be’ but instead of ‘what might be’ 
(Burnes, 2005). Therefore, complexity looks at the behaviour of complex systems – 
this is the intention of this study – rather than how they should behave (Zimmerman et 
al, 1998).  
 
3.1.1 Complexity Theory Research  
Complexity theory is identified as providing a new perspective and a new method of 
theorising that can be practiced by disciplines within the social sciences (Turner and 
Baker, 2019). Previous studies have adopted complexity theory as a framework and 
used its extensive language to understand organisational practices and processes 
among different disciplines such as education studies, organisational studies, military 
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studies and health care studies. Table 3.1 presents an overview of previous studies 
that include the sample, data collection techniques and the findings in each case. 
These studies comprise relatively small samples of companies that are used as cases 
and data that have been collected by interviews, observations and secondary data 
methods. Considering previous research in corporate governance studies and hedge 
fund activism studies, there is a need to focus on an approach that will challenge 
traditional approaches (reductionism) such as agency theory that these studies have 
















Table 3.1 Complexity Theory Research  







International organizations need to support adaptiveness in 
action, using an informal cooperative networking approach, 






Case study - primary 
research 
The complexity approach to managing is one of fostering, of 
creating enabling conditions of recognising that excessive 
control and intervention can be counterproductive. When 
enabling conditions permit an organisation to explore its 
space of possibilities, the organisation can take risks and 
try new ideas. 
Paraskevas 
(2006)  
A hotel chain 




Identifications of weaknesses in the chain's crisis response 
and complexity theory provided a good theoretical 
foundation of the proposals to overcome them. 
Mason 
(2007) 
2 companies in the 




More successful companies in turbulent environments 
would use radical, fast and disruptive strategies. Strategy 
making should be a democratic, bottom-up process and 
should be organic, self-organising, adaptive and emergent. 
More successful companies in stable environments would 
use more traditional management and strategies and more 
formal strategy planning activities. 
Palmberg 
(2009)  
1 company in the 
education sector 
Case study - 
interviews 
The identified management principles in the case study are: 
a clearly formulated mission, delegation of responsibility 
and authority, diversity and competition, and follow-up and 
feedback. A tentative conceptual model for managing 
organizations as CAS - system management - is presented 
including; metaphor, components and approaches. 
Chadwick 
(2010) 
96 staff members 
employed in surgical 
services. 
Observations 
Establishing baseline data related to the perception of 
collaboration between physicians and nurses in the surgical 
arena is an important first step for nurse leaders to 
determine the best course of action in the change 
management process. Nurse leaders face the challenge of 
bridging the generation gap between older nurses and 
physicians and the younger generation, which expects 
everyone to be treated as equals.  
Barasa et 
al (2016)  
2 public hospitals in 
coastal Kenya. 





PSRA practices in the case hospitals were influenced by,1) 
inadequate financing level and poorly designed financing 
arrangements, 2) limited hospital autonomy and decision 
space, and 3) inadequate management and leadership 
capacity in the hospital. The case study hospitals exhibited 
properties of complex adaptive systems (CASs) that exist in 
a dynamic state with multiple interacting agents. 
Caffrey et 
al (2016) 
NHS Trust - 40 staff 
members 
Case study - email 
collection 
Conventional ways of thinking about organisations suggest 
that change happens when leaders and managers change 
the strategic vision, structure or procedures in an 
organisation and then persuade others to rationally 
implement the strategy. Health research systems are 
complex adaptive systems characterised by high levels of 
unpredictability due to self-organisation and systemic 
interactions, which give rise to ‘emergent’ properties. 
Burrows et 




across 13 hospitals 
and 6 family 
medicine clinics in 
Ontario, Canada. 
Multiple-case study 
Findings represent the experiences of PAs (Physician 
assistants) and other healthcare providers, and 
demonstrate how the PAs willingness to work and ability to 
build relationships allows for the establishment of 
interprofessional, collaborative, and person-centred care. A 
PAs role exploration revealed patterns of team behaviour, 
non-linear interconnections, open relationships, dynamic 
systems, and the legacy of role implementation as defined 






There are also studies that adopted complexity theory to acknowledge and explain the 
complex nature of several disciplines without the use of case studies and collection of 
primary data. These studies examine the complexity of health care (Plsek and 
Greenhalgh), they provide ways to approach educational leadership research through 
the use of strange attractor metaphors (Gilstrap, 2005), develop an understanding of 
what is required for sustaining organisational life by understanding complex systems 
(Black and Edwards, 2000). Other scholars such as Anderson et al (2005) have 
suggested new ways to study health care organisations by bringing together the case 
study method and complexity science, whereas, Goldstein, Hazy and Silberband 
(2008) looks at how ideas, constructs, methods and insights from complex systems 
can be applied to the study of social entrepreneurship.  
 
3.2 The Evolution of Complexity Systems Thinking 
A complex system consists of many parts or agents that must act individually 
according to their own circumstances. Agents are autonomous, interdependent, 
diverse, and capable of rule-oriented behaviour and they represent individuals, 
organisations, governments, and even societies (Caffrey et al., 2016). Agents can vary 
in different respects: i) they may differ in power and status, ii) they can perceive their 
environment according to specific belief systems, iii) they may apply a range of action 
principles and decision-making criteria and iv) may be more or less constrained by 
differential access to information (Schneider, 2012). 
 
In order to understand the nature of complex systems, Cilliers (1998) argues that  
complex systems display the following characteristics: i) they consist of a large number 
of elements that interact in a non-linear fashion – small causes can have large results 
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and vice versa –, ii) they are open systems that interact with the environment, iii) they 
operate under far from equilibrium conditions, iv) they have a history; they not only 
evolve through time, but their past has an influence on their present behaviour, v) their 
elements can interact with many others; they can influence and be influenced, vi) their 
interactions usually have a fairly short range, but, given the richness of the 
interactions, influence can be wide-ranging, vii) some interactions will involve positive 
and negative feedback loops, viii) the system’s behaviour is the result of interactions 
between the elements, ix) their structure is maintained, even though the elements may 
be replaced and x) each element in the system is ignorant of the behaviour of the 
whole system; it can only act locally (Cilliers, 1998, p. 6).  
 
Unlike traditional management theories that provide only a partial explanation of the 
reality of organisations, complexity theory examines the unpredictable, disorderly and 
unstable aspects of organisations and complements the traditional understanding of 
organisations by providing a more complete picture (Zimmerman et al., 1998). The 
most widely known approaches to complexity, depending on the focus of an 
investigation, are the following: simple complex systems, complex adaptive systems, 
complex cognitive systems, complex social systems and complex responsive 
processes (Kernick, 2004), complex evolving systems and complex co-evolving 








Table 3.2 The Evolution of Complexity Systems Thinking 
Systems Approach Example 
Simple complex systems 
Manner in which information is 
processed by individual elements 
does not change with time. 
Biochemical reaction 
Complex adaptive systems 
Processing of information by 
elements changes with time as 
they learn and adapt in response 
to other elements or their 
environment. 
Evolutionary computer programs, 
biological systems, stock market 
Complex cognitive systems 
This approaches complexity from 
a psychological perspective and 
offers a useful organisational 
definition of a complex system. 
Brain, neural systems 
Complex social systems 
Organisations are studied as 
complex social systems in their 
own right, not as metaphors or 
analogies of physical, chemical or 
biological systems. 
Families, nations 
Complex responsive processes 
Interaction between individuals at 
the local level from which an 
unpredictable future emerges. 
Human organisation 
Complex evolving systems  
Complex evolving systems co-
evolve within a social ecosystem. 
Emergence would be facilitated 
and not actively inhibited; self-
organisation would be 




Complex co-evolving systems 
CCES not only adapt to changes 
in their environment or 
ecosystem, but also influence and 
affect that ecosystem. They have 
a set of characteristics that 
influence each other and enable 
them to create new order.   
Organisations 
Source: Kernick D. (2004) Complexity and the Healthcare Organisation, Oxon: Radcliffe Medical Press Ltd; 
Mitleton-Kelly E. (2003) Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Organisations: The Application of 
Complexity Theory to Organisations, Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited; Mitleton-Kelly E. (2006) A 
Complexity Approach to Co-Creating an Innovative Environment. World Futures; The Journal of New Paradigm 
Research, 62(3), pp. 223-239. 
 
While all the above approaches display specific characteristics and can be applied to 
certain complex systems, this study focuses on complex co-evolving systems (CCES) 




3.3 The Board as a Complex Co-Evolving System (CCES) 
There are theorists that make the distinction between ‘complex adaptive systems’ that 
constantly adapt to the changes around them but do not learn from the process, and 
‘complex evolving systems’, which learn and evolve from every change and thus 
influence their environment (The Health Foundation, 2010). Peter Allen introduced 
Complex Evolving Systems, a term that was subsequently developed by Mitleton-Kelly 
to CCES, a world more exciting than the one related to mechanical motion (Allen, 
2009).  
 
Complex systems consist of social units or agents that are processing information 
obtained through their interaction with each other and with the environment and, based 
on this information, modify their behaviour (Cilliers, 1998). The Board is a complex 
system that comprises directors that they interact with each other and with shareholder 
activists and stakeholders and as a result they may change their behaviour. As the 
Board modifies its behaviour in response to internal and/or external multidimensional 
(political, economic, sociocultural, environmental, legal) stimuli it also influences its 
corporate governance ecosystem (other companies, their shareholders, regulators, 
analysts, media, etc.) giving life to a continuous reciprocal influence and change that 
can be described as ‘co-evolution’ (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). The force that encourages 
or demands the agents in a complex social system to change their behaviour is called 
‘selective pressure’ (Pascale, Millemann and Gioja, 2000, p.27). It is a force that often 
challenges the agents’ ‘status’ within the system and requires small or large changes 
in the actions and behaviours of individual agents. Depending on the conditions under 
which the system is operating at that point the change may be amplified throughout 
the system or dampened. These adaptive tensions give rise to non-linear instabilities 
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within the system which often lead to novelty and innovation and make the behaviour 
of the system unpredictable (Pascale, Millemann and Gioja, 2000).  
 
This unpredictability in the behaviour of complex systems was first explained by Ilya 
Prigogine (1997) in his study of thermodynamic systems. Prigogine distinguished 
within thermodynamics, the state between ‘equilibrium’ and ‘far from equilibrium’. In 
equilibrium dynamics, the state of a thermodynamic system that stabilises in or around 
an equilibrium displays a linear cause-and-effect behaviour which is largely predictable 
and can be explained by deterministic equations. However, when the system is 
pushed away from equilibrium, its behaviour starts becoming increasingly non-linear, 
unstable and unpredictable, able to be explained only statistically, in terms of 
probability.   
 
For the purpose of this study, the Boards will be explored and studied as CCESs and 
will not be studied as a metaphor of another system (biological, chemical or physical). 
Boards as CCESs not only adapt to changes in their environment, but also influence 
and affect the environment and the social ecosystem they operate, a process that is 
reciprocal or co-evolutionary. CCESs also have a set of interrelated characteristics 
that influence each other and enable them to create new order (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006). 
In a corporate governance ecosystem, the Board influences and is influenced by all 
agents that are part of that ecosystem, in this case, shareholder activists, other 
shareholders, media, market analysts, proxy advisory firms, investment banks, stock 




Mitleton-Kelly (2003) identifies six areas in the field of complexity research under the 
umbrella of complex evolving systems (CES): 1) Far-from-equilibrium conditions and 
dissipative structures in chemistry and physics – the work of Ilya Prigogine and his co-
authors, 2) Complex adaptive systems (CAS) in evolutionary biology – the work of 
Stuart Kauffman, 3) autopoiesis (self-generation) in biological systems – on the work 
of Maturana in biology and its application to social systems by Luhman, 4) chaos 
theory, 5) increasing returns and path dependence by Brian Arthur and other 
economists and 6) systems theory, cybernetics, social network theory and other work 
in social systems and management.  
 
These research areas create the background to the following generic complexity 
principles in developing a theory of complex social systems that enable the creation 
of new order: connectivity, interdependence, feedback, fitness landscapes, far from 
equilibrium, dissipative structures, self-organisation, space of possibilities and 
emergence (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). As Mitleton-Kelly (2003, p.3) further suggests: ‘it is 
not enough to isolate one principle or characteristic such as emergence and 
concentrate on it in exclusion of the others’. This study will adopt these generic 
complexity principles and the concepts of initial conditions and strange attractors.  
 
3.4 Complexity Principles 
One of the advantages of complexity theory is that it connects contrasting/different 
ideas and develops core concepts (Caffrey et al., 2016). As a metaphor, complexity 
and its principles provide a lens through which to observe and understand 
organisational activity (Smith, 2005). From the management perspective, in order to 
survive, an organisation must find ways to interpret events to maintain a stable 
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environment and become more predictable. From the complexity perspective, 
organisations must ascertain what their environment is and find ways to interpret 
events in their environment, in order to enable action (Letiche, Lissack and Schultz, 
2011). The vocabulary of complexity enables this study to analyse the findings yielded 
by interpreting shareholder activism events.  
 
3.4.1 Connectivity and Interdependence 
The critical aspects of a system’s survival are the ways in which agents connect and 
relate to each other. When systems become connected, they start to display non-linear 
behaviours and these connections lead to the formation of patterns and the 
dissemination of feedback. In increasingly connected systems of great importance are 
the relationships between the agents and the richness of their connections rather than 
the agents themselves (McDaniel and Driebe, 2001; Meyer and Davis, 2003). In a 
human system, an individual’s (organisation, human system) decision or action will 
possibly affect all related individuals and systems. However, that affect will have an 
unequal impact, and will change over time with the state of each related individual and 
system, at the time (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006).  
 
Increased connectivity in complex systems provides more opportunities for information 
exchange and options for change and development (Hendrick, 2009). The degree of 
their connectivity, as well as time and context may influence the actions and 
behaviours of individuals (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). Variety in behaviour depends on how 
strong and how many the connections are. Few and strong connections produce 
stable behaviour and many and weak connections produce unstable behaviour 
(Coleman, 1999). In a corporate governance social ecosystem, connectivity appears 
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in both formal and informal processes. Formal processes may include voting, the 
financial press and financial analysts and corporate governance ratings agencies (rate 
companies on their corporate governance). On the other hand, informal processes of 
connectivity include talking with shareholders or stakeholders such as employees 
(Goergen et al., 2010).  
 
Interdependence arises when different components of the same system become so 
intricately interconnected that changes in one component usually result in unexpected 
consequences in other components of the same system. For example, in a corporate 
governance ecosystem, interdependence occurs between ownership and control 
systems, and the stock market, but also between financial policies such as dividend 
policies and mergers and acquisitions (Goergen et al., 2010). All complex systems 
consist of elements, but the interdependencies and interactions among these 
elements create the whole (Anderson et al., 2005). Pushing a complex system to one 
side often has effects on another because its parts are interdependent. Sometimes 
the effect may be unimportant and sometimes it may be great (Bar-Yam, 2002).  
 
According to Mitleton-Kelly (2006), in complexity theory, high connectivity implies a 
greater degree of interdependence. If elements are interdependent, then the world’s 
complexity at larger scales has increased (Bar-Yam, 2002). A greater degree of 
dependence may not always be beneficial for an ecosystem. The attempt to improve 
an entity’s fitness or position may result in a disadvantaged position for other entities 
(Mitleton-Kelly, 2006). If a pattern of interdependency in a network is disrupted, other 
units can still respond because they are interdependent with the disrupted unit. A 
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complex system may become resilient and adapt to a range of environmental changes 
if it provides a robust response to other systems (Zimmerman et al., 1998).  
 
3.4.2 Initial Conditions  
The evolution of a complex system is sensitive to initial conditions or to perturbations 
(Baianu, 2011). A small change in the initial conditions at which the system’s 
evolutionary process begins can influence its evolutionary trajectory (Mitleton-Kelly, 
2003). The Board can attempt to set-up initial conditions that are conducive for the 
agents in the system (e.g., set up audit committees and establish code of ethics) but 
none can ever predict if these processes will work when the system is brought far-
from-equilibrium and what the results will be. Systems will produce different solutions 
of initial states that are initially very close together; e.g., a ball falling on a razor blade 
is an example of the importance of initial conditions to a dynamic system. This is due 
to the reason that a very slight change in the ball’s initial conditions can result in it 
falling to the right or left of the blade (Kellert, 1993). 
 
An organisation will be influenced by what has occurred in the past – it must know 
where it has been before to see where it might go in the future. Organisations reflect 
past processes through which problems have been addressed (Kernick, 2004). 
Although initial conditions are considered important for the system’s evolution, 
complexity theory acknowledges their importance but also perceives that a complex 
system always consists of a large number of interacting components that are not 




In stable systems, small changes are equal to small effects, whereas in complex 
systems, a number of smaller changes can grow quickly and in large amounts with 
each iteration, until no prediction accuracy is possible (Mason, 2007). In the business 
world, a company would ignore small changes. However, the right kind of ‘nudge’ at 
the right time (initial condition) can lead a complex system to major changes (Hendrick, 
2009; Nilson, 1995). This is the so-called ‘butterfly effect’ and emphasises the effect 
of initial conditions and small perturbations on forming the emergence of a complex 
system. For example, the financial crisis in 2007 started in a small sector of the global 
economy, ‘the U.S. real estate market’. The crisis started locally (in the U.S.) and 
spread globally with unpredictable intensity (Choi and Douady, 2009).  
 
According to Kuhn (2009), the history of a phenomenon should be taken into account 
in deciding what should be focused upon as the initial conditions. Kuhn (2009, p.58) 
further suggests that it is important to take into consideration the presenting 
circumstances of concern as the starting point and then track back into the history of 
this concern, as within lie the signs to why things have emerged in the way that they 
have. For example, it would be unwise to plan a new corporate governance structure 
without considering what has happened previously. Gleick (1990, p.15) cited in Kuhn 
(2009, p.57) found that an estimated knowledge of a system’s initial conditions and an 
understanding of natural law can enable the calculation of the system’s approximate 
behaviour. However, complexity theory is more concerned about the huge number of 
interacting components and their unpredictable outcomes rather than with initial 




3.4.3 Strange Attractors 
A complex system such as the Board of Directors is drawn to attractors, which are 
another significant characteristic of complex systems. Attractors are areas within a 
particular phase space (a space in which all possible states of a system are 
represented) that operate as ‘magnets’ drawing a complex social system towards a 
particular direction (Medd and Haynes, 1998; Pascale, et al, 2000) and are described 
by Kuhn (2009) as organising forces that guide behaviour or energies that motivate. 
When a complex system is driven far from equilibrium, the attractor that dominates the 
system’s behaviour near equilibrium may become unstable, because of the flow of 
matter and energy, which is directed at the system (Prigogine, 1987). Desire to make 
a profit acts as an attractor in shaping money movements in the stock exchange (Kuhn, 
2009).  
 
Strange attractors are of particular interest because their form can correspond to the 
way in which we describe the system (Byrne and Gallaghan, 2014). The attractors of 
a complex system can be strange due to the reason that they may have an overall 
shape and boundaries that cannot be predicted with precision in terms of how or where 
the shape will form (Gilstrap, 2005; Zimmerman et al., 1998). The system will not go 
outside limits; in other words, it will allow change while maintaining some order 
(Mason, 2007). Pascale et al. (2000) assert that strange attractors do not occur in a 
complex system in isolation, but they arise from the interaction between an agent and 
its environment. In this case an agent is the Board of Directors and its environment is 
the company’s corporate governance ecosystem. When a complex system is close to 





Strange attractors are often related to an organisation’s principles and values, a 
condition to which the organisation always returns, and which serves as an anchor in 
the midst of chaos (Muller, Jooste and Bezuidenhout, 2005). In business and 
organisations, examples of strange attractors include the corporate vision, mission and 
values, corporate or organisational culture, market entry and development activities 
(Mason, 2007). If an organisation’s corporate vision, mission and values demonstrate 
order and clarity, the work force might feel confident (Muller, Jooste and Bezuidenhout, 
2005). Understanding attractors is critically important for organisations as getting it 
wrong can often lead to failure, in the form of a loss of a positive working culture or 
loss of market share (Kuhn, 2009). 
 
3.4.4 Feedback 
An important element that determines the behaviour of a CCES is feedback (Goergen 
et al., 2010). According to Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou (2002) feedback is seen 
as including processes that influence change in decisions, actions and behaviours 
between multiple elements. These processes operate at different levels: i) an 
individual agent, ii) a group, iii) an organisation, iv) an industry and v) the economy. In 
human systems, the strength of feedback is determined by the degree of connectivity 
(Hendrick, 2009). In these systems, agents connect to one another by feedback loops. 
Agents act on information exchanged within their environment and derived from other 
agents to whom they are connected. Systems where all of their elements are 
connected to each other in feedback loops are unstable (Anderson, 1999).  
Richardson (2008) argues that it is not just the existence of feedback loops that leads 
to complex behaviour. These loops must themselves interact with each other. In a 
relatively simple complex system containing ten parts/components there can be 
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hundreds of interacting feedback loops that vary in their intensity and influence 
(Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 2002).  
 
Feedback is viewed in terms of positive and negative feedback processes, that are 
described as reinforcing and balancing respectively (Pascale et al., 2000). Collectively 
positive and negative feedback can act as a counterbalance force on a complex 
system. Positive feedback drives change pushing the system towards instability while 
negative feedback maintains stability in a system (Blakesley, 2005; Mason, 2007). The 
reinforcement of positive feedback at a complex system will cause the system to move 
further away from equilibrium at an increased rate leading to an unstable state 
(Hendrick, 2009). In human organisations, unstable behaviour may take the form of 
excessive decentralisation, powerless hierarchy and refusal to conform to any rules 
and procedures (Smith and Stacey, 1997). 
 
Interventions that create far-from-equilibrium conditions occur when feedback 
processes (negative) no longer work. Negative feedback processes can adjust or 
influence an organisation’s behaviour and are able to produce the desired outcome 
(Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). Negative feedback controls in complex systems will generate 
behaviour which is regular and predictable (Beckencamp, 2006; Gilstrap, 2005; 
Stacey, 1995). In organisations, stable equilibrium takes the form of systems such as 
centralised hierarchical structures, control systems using negative feedback 
procedures (policies, rules and budgets) and informal negative feedback control 
systems based on visions and missions (Smith and Stacey, 1997). In complex 
systems, it is the presence of feedback that enables emergence, self-organisation, 
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adaptation, learning and other key complexity concepts (Palmberg, 2009; Richardson, 
2008). 
 
3.4.5 Fitness Landscapes 
Fitness landscapes can track a complex system’s development within the environment 
and in relation to other complex systems. A fitness landscape is a ‘mountainous terrain 
showing the locations of the global maximum (highest peak) and global minimum 
(lowest valley) [and] the height of a feature is a measure of its fitness’ (Coveney and 
Highfield, 1995, p. 108). In a business environment, the fitness landscape is rugged, 
as there are peaks and valleys. High peaks would represent great fitness for an 
organisation (e.g. increasing sales, profitability, and market share) and deep valleys 
would represent almost certain extinction (e.g. low sales, low profitability). The 
purpose of life is to avoid valleys and climb peaks seeking a point of maximum fitness 
in the environment (Kauffman, 1993). Landscapes vary in their ruggedness and there 
are differences in the efficiency with which an agent can attain some point of improved 
fitness (McDaniel and Driebe, 2001). 
 
Kauffman (1993) uses the concept of fitness landscapes, to explore how co-evolution 
occurs. As the agents within the environment act and change, they in turn alter and 
deform the landscape, therefore altering the conditions for these agents (Hendrick, 
2009). In an ecosystem, the fitness landscape suggests that animals and their 
environment constantly interact. For example, when animals develop better eyesight 
and catch their prey more easily, then the prey will attempt to find ways of defending 




A complex system that adapts and co-evolves with the environment and continuously 
learns new strategies that are effective will eventually reach high peaks on the fitness 
landscape, indicating greater success (Zimmerman et al., 1998). In an organisational 
context, managers consider that their organisations should always adapt to the 
environment. However, every adaptive move they make creates another move by 
another organisation/s, and they can see that adaptation is not sufficient (Kauffman, 
1993). In sectors such as health care, systems constantly attempt to improve the way 
they operate by seeking new peaks or fitness. They pursue new ways to accomplish 
better results given the circumstances they find themselves in (McDaniel and Driebe, 
2001). 
 
If a competitor within the same industry develops better technology, it has an 
evolutionary advantage over other companies. It is not enough for other companies to 
do the same; to win they have to be more innovative. This suggests that the most 
cutting-edge companies have strong competitive rivals forcing innovation (Lewis, 
1994). On the other hand, fitness landscapes are also dangerous places for complex 
systems – one mistake can influence their evolution. To prevent this, a complex 
system looks for a secure niche within a fitness landscape that is their home 
(Frederick, 1998).  
 
3.4.6 Far from Equilibrium and Dissipative Structures 
Far from equilibrium is a key concept in complexity theory. Prigogine developed the 
concept of ‘far from equilibrium’ conditions and his work was applied to physical and 
chemical systems, however, because of its importance in explaining complex 
behaviour, his concept has been adopted in other fields e.g., corporations (Goergen 
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et al., 2010). Prigogine distinguished the state between ‘equilibrium’ and ‘far from 
equilibrium’ (see Figure 3.4). The model represents a two-dimension view showing the 
operation of a system in the environment (Blakesley, 2005).  
   
Figure 3.1 The Position of a System in the Environment 
 
Source: Blakesley, P.J. (2005) Operational Shock and Complexity Theory. Available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA437516 [Accessed: 7 June 2016].  
 
The left side of the model illustrates the equilibrium zone where the system is not 
capable of developing into a more complex state. The right side shows the zone of 
chaos where the system generates activity with no purpose or direction, or it is 
destroyed. The area in the middle of the model where each system wishes to operate 
is the complexity zone or ‘edge of chaos’. This area protects the system from the forces 
of chaos or equilibrium that can pull it towards them (Blakesley, 2005). In equilibrium 
conditions, the system’s state stabilises around equilibrium. Variations may 
temporarily disturb the equilibrium, and its behaviour may become unpredictable, but 
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it then returns to equilibrium and becomes predictable again (Hodge and Coronado, 
2007). The Board of Directors of a publicly listed company attempts to operate near 
equilibrium conditions; however, when shareholder activists acquire for the first time 
the company’s shares, they will briefly disturb the Board’s function. Following the initial 
perturbations, the Board will return to near equilibrium conditions.  
 
In human systems, far from equilibrium conditions exist when a system is moved away 
from its established norms or away from its usual ways of working. When the system 
is disturbed, it may reach a bifurcation point which either leads into disorder such as 
loss of productivity or creates a new order and organisation e.g., finds new ways of 
working and relating, thus creates a new coherence (Goergen et al., 2010; Mitleton-
Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 2002). Before the system’s journey into disorder or creation 
of new order, several alternatives are possible (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006). An extensive 
number of tipping points can result in more complex and potentially catastrophic 
changes for an organisation such as decline and disorder (Frederick, 1998). In an 
organisational context, bifurcation may occur when a company is divided into two 
separate divisions, therefore creating two new companies that can each issue shares 
to shareholders. Shareholders in the initial company are given shares in the new 
company through a corporate reorganisation (Investopedia, 2017).  
 
By continuously disturbing the equilibrium of a living system, the system’s state moves 
to a far from equilibrium state known as ‘the edge of chaos’. Operating near the edge 
of chaos without moving outside this zone increases the chances of survival (Meyer 
and Davis, 2003). The system’s interaction with the outside world and its existence in 
non-equilibrium conditions may become the starting point for the formation of 
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dissipative structures (Hodge and Coronado, 2007). A dissipative structure is “an 
organised state that arises when a system is maintained far from equilibrium because 
energy is constantly injected into it” (Anderson, 1999, p.222). This energy is fed in 
from outside to maintain the system’s structure (Burnes, 2005) and when information 
is exchanged with the external environment (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). Anderson (1999) 
argues that organisations are examples of dissipative structures that can only be 
maintained when their members are encouraged to import energy to them e.g. work 
productivity. When the system stops to exchange energy and information with its 
external environment, it become ineffective and it disintegrates. In order to avoid the 
disintegration, the system’s agents attempt to self-organise to create a new order.  
 
3.4.7 Self-Organisation  
The focus on local connections and relationships between agents, instead of 
addressing different agents individually, provides information on system capacity for 
self-organisation (Edgren and Barnard, 2012; Kernick, 2004). Self-organisation within 
complex systems usually takes place when a system is far from equilibrium, or at the 
edge of chaos (Espinosa and Porter, 2011). It is a process that occurs spontaneously, 
and it involves the system or group organising itself to produce a new pattern or 
perform a task without any blueprint or external direction (Stacey, 2000 p. 264). In 
simple terms, ‘it is the means by which a system talks to itself’ (Pascale et al., 2000, 
p. 93).  
 
In non-human complex systems, self-organisation is observed in flocks of birds and 
fish as well as whole rainforests. In the case of birds and fish, there is no ‘smart’ bird 
or fish that gets things organised. Instead, the pattern of organisation develops from 
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local interactions among agents, following simple rules (Caffrey et al., 2016; McDaniel 
and Driebe, 2001). In a human context, self-organisation means that the group 
members of a department in a company decide what they need to do (what), how their 
plan will be executed (how) and the correct timing (when), with no external direction 
(Hendrick, 2009).  
 
Self-organisation is characterised by multiple non-linear feedback loops (Mennin, 
2010). In education, teachers, learners and curriculum planners promote conditions 
for self-organisation through dialogue, problems, unresolved situations and questions 
that aim to disturb the status quo and encourage interaction and exchange (Mennin, 
2010). On the other hand, an economic system is self-organising when it changes its 
internal structure in response to many factors (money supply, growth rate, political 
stability, natural disasters etc.) (Cilliers, 1998).  
 
There are several necessary conditions for self-organisation to occur. One prerequisite 
is an organisational structure that can alter/change and is flexible in terms of being 
supervised (Edgren and Barnard, 2012). Other features include dynamic and 
interactive behaviour as well as many components within the system (Haynes, 2014). 
Self-organisation can happen in open systems that have the ability to import energy 
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), in other words systems that exchange information 
with their environment. An organisation that operates in a turbulent environment, must 
import energy to sustain self-organisation (Anderson, 1999).  
 
When change is introduced from outside, the system self-organises around the 
disturbance that is created (Kernick, 2004). Because the systems in which self-
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organisation emerges are typically open to the influence of changes appearing in their 
territories, it is only by means of feedback mechanisms that these patterns survive. 
Even in the face of neighbouring turbulence feedback mechanisms display resilience, 
working to sustain their organisation (Smith and Stevens, 1994). Self-organising 
practices can allow a system to be innovative as it allows for experimentation and the 
exploration of alternatives. Some experiments will flourish because they are suitable 
to the new environment or social ecosystem and because they are able to evolve with 
their related systems within that social ecosystem (Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 
2002).  
 
3.4.8 Exploration of the Space of Possibilities 
When a complex system faces a critical situation and past solutions do not work, it 
searches for new options, new solutions and attempts to create alternatives to solve 
the problem (Mitleton-Kelly, 2011). In order to survive and succeed, a system must 
explore its space of possibilities. Searching for a single optimum solution may be not 
be possible or desirable. A solution can only be optimum under certain conditions, but 
if they change, the solution may no longer be optimal. However, the existence of 
various solutions, will allow a system in a changing environment to draw on these 
alternatives that may have become relevant under the new conditions (Mitleton-Kelly, 
2006).  
 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis is an example of a system being pushed far from 
equilibrium. The attempts of different countries to respond to the crisis are an example 
of exploration of the space of possibilities, as they were exploring different options in 
their attempt to create new order. These attempts had an influence on other countries 
70 
 
and the entire financial social ecosystem co-evolved through reciprocal influence and 
changed its way of operating (Goergen et al., 2010). Exploration of different alternative 
solutions also means that when the environment changes, the organisation can 
respond flexibly and innovatively to the new conditions (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006).  
 
3.4.9 Emergence of New Order 
Emergence requires complex systems to have at least the following characteristics: 
nonlinearity, self-organisation, far from equilibrium, attractors, instability and feedback 
loops (Goldstein, 1999; Medd and Haynes, 1998). It is a process where a system 
develops a complex structure from unstructured early stages (Cilliers, 1998) and it 
operates at the micro-macro interaction between complex systems (Mitleton-Kelly and 
Papaefthimiou, 2002). Non-linear interactions between different agents result in the 
emergence of patterns which inform and change the agents’ behaviour and the system 
itself (The Health Foundation, 2010). The system’s new structure also influences the 
individual agents, resulting in further changes to the overall system. Thus, the system 
continually evolves in hard-to-predict ways through a cycle of local interactions, 
emergence and feedback (Reeves, Levin and Ueda, 2016). In business, we see 
workers and management, through their local actions and interactions, shaping the 
overall structure, behaviour and performance of a firm (Reeves et al., 2016). 
 
Emergence in human systems tends to create irreversible structures, relationships and 
organisational forms, which become part of the individuals’ history and institutions and 
in turn, affect their evolution (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006). However, individual agents cannot 
control the system’s emergence because they are unaware and ignorant of its overall 
behaviour (McDaniel and Driebe, 2001). Examples of emergent properties in complex 
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social systems include structure, processes, functions, creativity, novelty and meaning 
(Hendrick, 2009). In human systems, the creation of new order is the ability to create 
and innovate, within a broad range, by including new ideas, artefacts and cultures to 
name a few (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006).  
 
If an organisation is managed as a complex evolving system that co-evolves in a social 
ecosystem, self-organisation and the exploration of the space of possibilities would be 
encouraged and the emergence of new order would be facilitated. The management 
would comprehend that, as an entity, the organisation would be capable of creating 
new order and have the capability to recreate itself. Managers would then emphasise 
the creation of conditions that would enable continuous co-evolution within a changing 
environment and would urge the co-creation of new organisational form with those 
directly affected (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003, p.23).  
 
From a complexity perspective, the application of emergence to corporate behaviour 
is important as it points out the role of the interaction between different components in 
a complex system – in this case executive agents and the corporate environment – in 
explaining outcomes. In a corporate governance environment, emergence of new 
order can take the form of new rules, regulations, governance frameworks, or a new 
culture (Goergen et al., 2010). Some examples of emergence and self-organisation 
are: i) new strategic developments, ii) marketing tactic developments, iii) self-directed 
teams and iv) growth of strategic alliances (Mason, 2007). Emergence may also 
include the creation of an enabling environment that facilitates good corporate 
governance within organisations as well as within industries and economies (Mitleton-
Kelly, 2011).  
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3.4.10 Enabling Environment 
The evolutionary trajectory of a complex system will be influenced by a number of 
factors that will enable it to take or inhibit it from taking a desirable course (Mitleton-
Kelly, 2003). A specific direction may be desirable, but in order to achieve it the 
organisation may have to elaborate new behaviours. These behaviours and structures 
need to emerge from within the system and to be suitable to the new conditions. 
Consequently, the right enablers must be in place, whereas inhibitors of the desired 
changes and learning must be identified and reduced or even removed (Goergen et 
al, 2010; Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 2002).  
 
Some of the enablers that Mitleton-Kelly (2003) identified in a case study involving the 
European operations of an international bank which had to upgrade its information 
systems included: new procedures, autonomy, stability and the support of a senior 
manager without interfering in the process. On the other hand, inhibitors included 
management discontinuity, differing perceptions, loss of system expertise and lack of 
adequate documentation. The set of enablers and inhibitors are referred to as the 
‘enabling conditions’ that collectively make up an ‘enabling infrastructure’ (Goergen et 
al, 2010; Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 2002).  
 
Goergen et al. (2010) state that there is no need to use complexity theory as an 
exploratory and descriptive framework. Instead, it can be used for understanding the 
problem space to creating an Enabling Environment that addresses the problem in a 
sustainable way. The corporate governance of a publicly listed company demonstrates 
characteristics of a complex system that respond to different triggers that form the 
environment of the corporation – internal and external. The enabling environment 
consists of the set of cultural, social, legal, political, economic and other conditions 
73 
 
that create that environment and enable the daily running of an organisation or the 
creation of a new organisational form. These conditions interact and influence each 
other and enable the co-evolution of the internal environment with the external, 
broader social ecosystem (companies, regulators, shareholders and stakeholders) 
(Mitleton-Kelly, 2003 cited in Goergen et al., 2010).  
 
3.5 Summary 
The review of the literature in this chapter has identified and discussed one of the main 
subject areas in this study, complexity theory. Although agency theory is associated 
extensively with corporate governance and shareholder activism, its reductionist 
approach and partial view of the world, ignores the complexity of organisations. 
Complexity theory will bridge the gap in the existing corporate governance and 
shareholder activism literature in the hotel industry that this research aims to fill. 
Therefore, the Board of Directors is viewed as a complex co-evolving system that has 
its own agenda and supports a specific function in the corporate governance system 
of each company.  
 
Complexity theory studies social systems holistically and they look at all related 
elements or all corporate governance agents that interact and influence each other, 
within the entire corporate governance environment of the social ecosystem. It will 
enable this research to study all related systems comprehensively by looking at the 
interaction and influence of all related entities in a company’s corporate governance 
ecosystem. The use of complexity theory as a metaphor may offer interesting insights 
into the way that companies operate.  
The following chapter outlines the methodology employed for this study.  
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research design of this study. It begins by evaluating the 
research philosophy adopted and provides a rationale for the choice of the research 
strategy, which is a multi-case study, and the sample selected. It then addresses the 
data collection techniques employed which are online documentation and archival 
records and presents the data collection process, including the time frame of the 
research and the number of sources used for data collection. Following this 
discussion, the chapter presents the rationale for the choice of the template analysis. 
Ethical standards have also been considered in order to produce a study that complies 
with UWL’s ethical research guidelines. Finally, this chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the criteria utilised to assess and judge qualitative research and the 
limitations that have influenced the interpretations of the research findings.   
 
4.1 The Philosophical Approach of this Study  
The choice of research approach has been debated in the social sciences (Bowling, 
2009). Researchers adopt a research philosophy for a study depending on the way 
they view the world. Their viewpoint supports the research strategy and the methods 
chosen as part of that strategy (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). There are 
several research paradigms for someone who embarks a research project: positivism, 
interpretivism, phenomenology, action or participatory research (Kumar, 2005).  
 
The aim of this study was to provide novel insights and interpretations of the impact of 
‘offensive’ shareholder activism on a company’s corporate governance ecosystem 
utilising a complexity theory lens. It employed the phenomenological approach as, 
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unlike other philosophies such as positivism, Seale et al (2004) argue that 
phenomenology looks at the interaction, between individuals or within groups and 
emphasises subjectivity rather than objectivity, description rather than analysis and 
interpretation instead of measurement. In order to explore the impact of shareholder 
activism, this study looked at cases of shareholder activism and how various 
interacting agents such as Board members and shareholder activists influenced each 
other. The researcher chose to interpret shareholder activism events based on 
personal perceptions and particular viewpoints that were related to the data collection 
techniques.   
 
Collecting data in phenomenology can be achieved by using either mixed methods or 
focusing just on qualitative techniques. The phenomenological research philosophy is 
associated with the inductive research processes that focus on exploratory and 
qualitative techniques (Sekaran and Bougie, 2016). The process of induction begins 
with facts (collecting data) to explore the impact of a phenomenon (Birks, 2014; Brown 
and Hale, 2014; Miller, Strang and Miller, 2010) and generate or build theory often in 
the form of a conceptual framework (Saunders et al, 2012). During the research 
process, the study began with the data collection that enabled the exploration of the 
shareholder activism phenomenon. Then, the researcher arranged all data in a 
chronological order to simplify the analysis process and provide more clarity. Following 
the analysis of the data, a research study can establish meanings, identify patterns 
and consistencies relevant to the phenomenon under investigation, and produce new 




A small sample of shareholder activism cases was chosen as opposed to a large 
sample that would yield extensive data and would challenge the analysis of the 
findings. The selection of a small sample is likely to question the value of the data and 
to what extent it is justifiable to generalise from the findings (Denscombe, 2010). 
However, Saunders et al (2012) argue that when adopting an inductive approach, a 
small sample may be more appropriate than a large sample and specific observations 
can be generalised. The above determined the choice of the research strategy 
adopted which is the case study approach. 
 
4.2 Research Strategy  
The aim of the study was to provide novel insights and interpretations of the impact of 
shareholder activism on a company’s corporate governance ecosystem utilising 
complexity theory. In order to achieve the above, the case study approach was chosen 
as the main research strategy. Case study methods are often characterised as 
exploratory and are regarded as exploring a case or multiple cases over a certain 
period that involve detailed and in-depth data collection that include multiple sources 
of rich information in context (Brown and Hale, 2014; Shaughnessy, Zechmeister and 
Zechmeister, 2015; Stake, 1995). The study explored the phenomenon of shareholder 
activism through past events and this was accomplished by the application of 
qualitative collection techniques. These techniques yield rich data and allow for 
particularisation, getting to know the uniqueness of the case and its context (Adams, 
Khan and Raeside, 2014).  
 
Case studies are particularly effective when researchers study a complex 
phenomenon and are useful for answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Barone, 2000; 
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Stewart, 2014). Questions such as ‘how’ shareholder activists target corporate boards, 
‘how’ the Boards resist shareholder activism and ‘why’ both corporate boards and 
shareholder activists make certain choices were critical in understanding in depth of 
the impact of shareholder activism. Two advantages of case studies that were applied 
in this study were i) their ability to illustrate complex, multi-faceted events and identify 
processes over time and ii) explain in greater detail an entire situation or process and 
allow the incorporation of numerous perspectives (Neuman, 2014). The study 
recorded past events and followed a chronological order. The sequence of these 
events allowed an in-depth exploration of the cases with a comprehensive view and 
examined the behaviour of all interacting agents in the company’s corporate 
governance ecosystem.  
  
Despite the advantages that the case study approach offers to a research study, Yin 
(2018) is concerned about the inability of a researcher to generalise from a single case 
study. In short, case studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations. A single case study would limit the focus of the investigation even with an 
in-depth research design and would not allow shareholder activism to be viewed from 
different perspectives (Yin, 2018). Therefore, in order to avoid the limitations of a 
single case study, a multi-case study approach was preferred because it allowed for 
generalisation from the findings.  
 
Multi-Case Study Approach  
This study investigated corporate governance structures such as the Boards of 
publicly listed companies. Therefore, it attempts to understand patterns across 
organisational boundaries (Stewart, 2014). The findings yielded during the research 
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process, allowed this study to retain comprehensive and important characteristics of 
real-life events such as organisational and managerial processes (Kumar, 2014; 
Polonsky and Waller, 2011). These events are related to the interactions between 
Boards and shareholder activists. Furthermore, this study evaluated real-life events 
such as annual general meetings where shareholders discuss and vote on a 
company’s related matters such as the election of a new governance structure.  
 
The purpose of a case study is to replicate and to compare in a systematic way an 
organisation that is under study with others and to explore different views on the issues 
under examination (Adams et al., 2014; McBurney & White, 2010). Each case serves 
a specific purpose within the overall investigation thus following a ‘replication’ design 
rather than a ‘sampling’ design (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler, 2014; Yin, 2018). 
The selected cases have the same structure and are divided into the following parts: 
the target company, background information of shareholder activists and the unfolding 
of shareholder activism events in a chronological order. The consistency of the 
structure of the multi-cases facilitated the collection and analysis processes in this 
study. Rowley (2002) and Yin (2018) suggest that evidence from multi-cases is often 
considered more convincing, and the overall study is regarded more robust (Herriott 
and Firestone, 1983).  
 
Multi-case studies reveal exploration, description and explanation within each case 
and perform some comparison and contrast in all cases (Bryman and Bell, 2011). This 
study compares and contrasts the findings from the selected cases in the following 
areas: i) the business environment for each targeted company, ii) the Boards’ 
vulnerabilities, which triggered the interest of shareholder activists, iii) the tactics 
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employed by shareholder activists to influence the Board of each company and iv) the 
Boards’ defence mechanisms to withstand shareholder activism. 
 
4.2.1 Selection of Case Studies 
In order to make appropriate choices for cases in this study, a preliminary literature 
review showed that shareholder activists have targeted several companies in the 
hospitality industry with the main intention of initially influencing their Boards.  An initial 
investigation identified 24 cases of shareholder activism in the hospitality industry in 
the US and Canada (see Table 4.1). Although shareholder activism has increasingly 
expanded in Europe over the last ten years, with the exemption of IHG there are no 





























Table 4.1 Shareholder Activism in the Hospitality Industry 
Hotel sector companies Country 
Extended Stay America US 
IHG UK 
Morgans Hotel Group US 
Strategic Hotels & Resorts US 
Great Wolf Resorts, Inc US 
Chatham Lodging US 
InnVest Real Estate Investment Trust Canada 
Starwood Hotels US 
Restaurant sector companies   
Darden Restaurants Inc. US 
BJ’s Restaurants Inc. US 
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc. US 
Bob Evans Farms Inc. US 
Famous Dave’s of America US 
J. Alexander’s Corporation US 
Benihana Inc. US 
Ruby Tuesday Inc. US 
McCormick & Schmick’s Seafood Restaurants Inc.  US 
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers Inc. US 
Denny’s Corporation US 
Kona Grill Inc. US 
Buffalo Wild Wings Inc US 
Bravo Brio Restaurant Group Inc US 
Chipotle US 
Fiesta Restaurant Group US 
Sources: Alliance Advisors (n.d.) Shareholder Activism Industry Report: Restaurants. Available from: 
https://allianceadvisors.com/whitepapers/shareholder-activism-industry-report-restaurants/ Accessed: [10 
November 2018]. Foley, S. (2015) Hedge Funds Add to Pressure on Starwood Hotels & Resorts. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/85ce566a-4433-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22 [Accessed: 10 November 2018]. Maze, J. 
(2017) Why Activists are Targeting Restaurants. Available from: https://www.nrn.com/stock-data/why-activists-are-
targeting-restaurants Accessed: [10 November 2018].  
 
 
The study employed a purposive or judgemental approach. The logic of purposive 
sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for an in-depth study (Patton, 2015; 
Saunders et al., 2012). The initial emphasis was to decide on which sector the study 
would focus. Although it is useful to compare and contrast findings from both the hotel 
and restaurant sectors, it was decided to focus on the hotel sector. Therefore, despite 
16 cases of shareholder activism in the restaurant sector, there was lack of ‘rich’ 
information that could yield in-depth findings. On the other hand, a preliminary analysis 
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of eight cases in the hotel sector revealed that there was ‘rich’ information which would 
therefore yield in-depth insights and allow an in-depth understanding of the 
shareholder activism phenomenon.  
 
Critical case sampling was used to select a small number of cases to ‘yield the most 
important information and have the greatest impact on the development of knowledge’ 
(Patton, 2015, p. 276). Three international publicly listed companies from the hotel 
sector comprised the selected sample cases. In order to achieve this, the study 
established a number of criteria that were critical for the selection of the cases. The 
first criterion was to select companies that had an international presence so the 
sample would be representative of the international hotel industry. The study would 
then be able to collect sufficient information about the selected cases. Typically, unlike 
national companies, international hotel companies have brands that are more 
reputable and inevitably attract more publicity from the media. This criterion allowed 
the study to shortlist four hotel companies – InterContinental Hotel Group, Morgans 
Hotel Group, Strategic Hotels and Resorts and Starwood Hotels and Resorts – that 
had an international presence during the research process.  
 
The second criterion that enabled the study to further shortlist the cases was 
associated with the availability of information. In all cases, sufficient information was 
available; however, in the case of Starwood Hotel and Resorts there was not as much 
information available compared to the other three companies. Consequently, 
Starwood Hotel and Resorts was eliminated from the shortlisting process and the final 
sample consisted of Strategic Hotels and Resorts, InterContinental Hotel Group and 
Morgans Hotel Group.  
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In further analysing the three cases, an additional criterion that was not considered 
during the selection of the cases emerged. This was related to the different number of 
shareholder activists that were present in each case during the activism period. 
Consequently, one shareholder activist was present in Strategic Hotels and Resorts, 
there were two shareholder activists in the InterContinental Hotel Group and four 
shareholder activists in Morgans Hotel Group. Although, the final criterion was 
unintended, it gave the benefit of allowing investigation of how different numbers of 
shareholder activists could influence to a different extent the Board of a publicly listed 
company.  
 
4.3 Data Collection Techniques 
The most commonly used methods in case study approach are interviews and archival 
records (Gill and Johnson, 2010). Although, the complexity of case studies allows the 
use of multiple sources of data (Compton-Lilly, 2013), this study focuses on online 
documentary information. Due to the ‘historical’ nature of the study, observation would 
not be possible, even if access was granted. Similarly, examples of physical artefacts 
or objects such as flyers, agendas and training materials within the setting of the study 
were not relevant to the nature of the investigation.  
 
The study took into consideration the possibility of conducting interviews alongside 
online documentary information. Despite the advantages the interviews can offer, it 
was not possible to use this technique. In March 2015, while initialising the secondary 
data collection process, the intention was to conduct interviews with financial analysts 
and senior executives from the selected cases. Initially, an effort was made to 
communicate with key people in the Strategic Hotels and Resorts case. However, all 
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attempts to communicate were unsuccessful and it was decided to relinquish the 
interview process. This challenge can be attributed to the fact that interviews may 
prompt recipients not to reply because they may be worried about the information they 
are likely to share and may not be comfortable with interviews (Basu, 2008). The 
disclosure of sensitive information regarding a publicly listed company may not occur 
because of differing levels of trust or other factors that are outside the control of the 
researcher (Best, 2012). Sharing views about shareholder activism with someone that 
individuals did not know could put into jeopardy their companies’ reputation. Taking 
into consideration the non-response from SHR’s key people, it was decided not to 
contact other individuals from the other two cases.   
 
Consequently, documentation and archival records were collected to develop the case 
studies. Documentation and archival records create a rich source of evidence and play 
a crucial role in a multi-case study research (Blumberg et al., 2014). The strengths of 
documentary information were evident in this study: i) they were stable (the information 
was reviewed repeatedly), ii) the information was not created because of the case 
study, iii) they were specific (contained exact names, references and details of all 
cases studies and events which had taken place) and iv) broad (covered a long span 
of time, events from the entry of shareholder activists to their exit in a company). In 
addition, documentary information is also an essential source of evidence and appears 
to be objective and truthful (Yin, 2018).  
 
Document analysis was used to analyse the various documents collected from 
publications related to the case companies (See 4.3.1). It is a form of qualitative 
research in which all documents are examined and interpreted by the researcher to 
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give meaning to the topic under investigation (Frey, 2018). Document analysis can 
also point to questions that need to be asked and it enables a research to be critical 
and comprehensive (Bowen, 2009a). The initial analysis of the documents resulted in 
the need to identify further certain aspects of the impact of shareholder activism in the 
selected case companies.  
 
4.3.1 Data Collection Process 
Most documents accessed were written with a specific purpose in mind, which was to 
portray events of shareholder activism, and were addressed to a specific audience 
such as financial analysts, investors, senior executives, shareholders and 
researchers. However, documentary information has two potential flaws. It does not 
provide sufficient detail to answer research questions and can result in biased 
selectivity, if the collection is incomplete (Bowen, 2009a; Yin, 2018). To overcome the 
above flaws, a thorough research process was conducted by collecting all available 
documents from different sources.  
 
The documentary information was collected from various online sources. The Internet 
and the digitalisation of governmental, organisational and media documents 
(Saunders et al., 2012) enabled this study to collect data only from US and UK online 
sources. Despite the risks associated with its usage, the internet is a good source of 
information as the only problem relates to the verification of the accuracy of the 
collected information since often it is unedited (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). The online 
data collected included articles, minutes of Board meetings, reports of shareholder 
activism events, media reviews of each case, press releases and annual reports from 
the targeted companies. Online sources that were accessed, included established 
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websites from newspapers, magazines, financial media, legal news, a company 
disseminating press releases for publicly listed companies, news in the hotel industry, 
the global travel industry, the hotel investment community and from hotel companies.  
 
The archival records collected were in the form of qualitative information that contained 
some quantitative information and were available from a US independent federal 
government agency, the SEC. The SEC’s responsibility is to protect investors and 
maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets. The agency also promotes full public 
disclosure, protects investors against fraudulent and manipulative market practices 
and monitors corporate takeovers. Through the EDGAR database (a SEC tool), the 
study accessed free corporate information for all companies and reviewed the filings 
that each company and shareholder activists made in regular periods. In addition, the 
EDGAR database allowed the study to gather information in relation to each 
company’s financial and operating performance, Board meetings and quarterly as well 
as annual reports (SEC, n.d.). Finally, the EDGAR database enabled the study to 
overcome another flaw of documentary analysis, which is the low retrievability of data 
(Bowen, 2009b).  
 
The collection of the documentary information occurred over a three-year period. 
However, 80% of all documents were collected during the first six months of the data 
collection process. As a strategy, both data collection techniques allowed the study to 
generate a rich description of past events, the corporate governance context within 
which these events occurred, the roles of all agents involved, and the influence of 
other external agents that were related to each company’s corporate governance 
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ecosystem. The study also analysed decision-making processes and evaluated tactics 
from shareholder activists and Boards (Saunders et al., 2012).  
 
‘Rich’ information from many sources was collected over the six-month period and 
then the writing up of each case began to take form. During the data collection process 
and the data analysis process, the documents accessed were reviewed repeatedly to 
establish the exact causes of the impact of shareholder activism in corporate boards 
and examine further influences that triggered shareholder activism. After the main 
collection process and up to a year before (July 2019) the completion of this study, 
certain sources were revisited to identify new information. This process did not yield 
new findings but enabled the study to find existing information from different sources 
that corroborated the initial findings. Table 4.2 presents the documentary information 

















Table 4.2 Data Collected for Each Case 










The Guardian, Bloomberg, 
The Independent, Wall 
Street Journal, BBC, 
Telegraph, CNN, Business 
Wire, Hotel Management, 
Reuters, Hotel News 
Resource, Strategic Hotels 
& Resorts, Chicago 
Business, The New York 










Independent, Value Walk, 
The New York Times, 
Insider Monkey, Financial 
Times, City A.M., The 
Guardian, Law360, CNBC, 
Skift, Hotel Analyst, 
Reuters, Bloomberg, Hotel 
Owner, InterContinental 
Hotels Group, Market 
Realist, Seeking Alpha, 
Hotel Management, Sky 










Reuters, Law360, Morgans 
Hotel Group, Hotel News 
Now, Bloomberg, The Real 
Deal, Seeking Alpha, Travel 
Weekly, Business Wire, 
Hotel News Resource, New 
York Post, Skift, The Street, 
Hotel Management, Dow 






SEC  185 (filings) 2006-2016 
Total number of 




The documentary information for each case was collected from online sources that 
often cover shareholder activism in their news headlines. Overall, 175 online 
documents were reviewed and were used to evaluate the impact of shareholder 
activism on each case. The documents were collected from established online 
newspapers such as The Guardian, The Telegraph, The Independent, The New York 
Times, The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal, from online news providers 
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such as BBC, Bloomberg, CNBC, CNN and Reuters and from the websites of the 
targeted hotel companies.    
 
Moreover, the study reviewed 244 archival records from the SEC. These records 
enabled the researcher to access ‘raw’ information that was in the form of filings made 
by the selected hotel companies such as annual general meetings, quarterly and 
annual reports. In addition, the study accessed filings made by shareholder activists 
that were associated with the reporting of their investments. The study investigated 
online documents for each case from the time that a shareholder activist entered each 
company until their exit as recorded in these sources. The documents collected in this 
study provided a historical insight in all cases, as the events unfolded chronologically. 
This insight enabled the study to understand the origins of shareholder activism in 
each case.  
 
4.4 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics refer to ‘the moral values or principles that form the basis of a code of conduct’ 
(Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 30). Qualitative researchers face ethical issues 
throughout each stage of the research cycle (Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, 2020) that 
can become a challenge when planning and conducting the research process (Flick, 
2014). Researchers have attempted to overcome ethical dilemmas that occur from 
different social norms and contrasting philosophical approaches and have led to the 
development of codes of ethics. These include principles that outline the nature of 
ethical research and ethical standards to accompany these principles that are intended 
to guide researchers conduct (Saunders et al, 2012). A good case study will strive for 
the highest ethical standards – avoiding poor practice such as plagiarising, falsifying 
89 
 
information, deception and encouraging honesty and acceptance of responsibility for 
one’s work – (Yin, 2018) and promote ethical practice (Saunders et al, 2012).  
 
This study did not involve human participants, but it was subject to minimal ethical 
concerns that were taken into consideration during the collection and analysis of the 
data, therefore contributing to the body of knowledge. During the planning process, 
the researcher submitted a research ethics proposal that was approved by UWL’s 
research ethics committee. During the collection process, documentary information 
was collected from the Internet as it provided easy access to the data required. Despite 
facilitating access, Saunders et al (2012) believe that the Internet raises several issues 
and dilemmas about the applicability of ethical principles. A general ethical principle is 
related to the maintenance of objectivity, ensuring that the data are collected 
accurately and fully (Saunders et al, 2012). The data was collected from websites that 
are reliable (see Table 4.2) and are trusted by business professionals. In addition, the 
information was presented in an honest and transparent way, exercising objectivity.  
 
Other ethical concerns were associated with the use of document analysis. An initial 
concern of this data collection method is that documents will not provide all necessary 
information – some will provide a small amount of valuable data and others may be 
incomplete or their data may be inaccurate – required to answer the research 
questions and require some investigation (Bowen, 2009a). In some cases, articles 
from online sources provided a small amount of data, however, the investigation on 
SEC’s archival records yielded rich data and allowed to cross-check the relevance and 
quality of all collected information. O’Leary (2014) also argues that another concern is 
associated with the potential presence of biases, both in a document and from the 
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researcher. There are documents related to the performance of a company, that may 
be written to influence a specific audience and exert pressure in the company. O’Leary 
(2014) suggests investigating the subjectivity of documents to gain an understanding 
of the collected data in order to maintain the credibility of the research process. 
Documents from various sources with similar content were investigated thoroughly to 
ensure that there was not any conflicting information that was likely to influence the 
reliability and validity of the research process. Overall, the approach taken during the 
data collection and data analysis processes was unbiased and followed accepted 
ethical principles.  
 
4.5 Analysis of Findings  
Template analysis, which is a form of thematic analysis, was chosen as the most 
appropriate analysis tool because it enabled this study to compare and contrast with 
ease data across the three cases as well as within each individual case. It is a method 
of thematically organising and analysing qualitative data (King, 2012) that have been 
widely used in organisational and management research, as well as across other 
disciplines (Brooks et al, 2015). It emphasises the use of hierarchical coding but 
balances a high degree of structure in the process of analysing textual data (Brooks 
et al, 2015, p. 203).  
 
There are a number of reasons that template analysis is an appealing choice for 
qualitative researchers. It is a flexible approach that can be modified for the needs of 
a research study and compared with other methods of qualitative data analysis, it can 
offer a flexible technique with less specific procedures, thus, enabling researchers to 
tailor the approach to the requirements of their own project (Brooks and King, 2014). 
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Central to the template analysis is the development of a coding template that is based 
on the basis of a subset of data, that is then applied to additional data, revised and 
refined (Brooks et al, 2015). The main stages in template analysis that have been 
adopted in this study are the following. 
 
Familiarisation  
In this stage, all documentary information was read and key ideas and recurring 
themes of shareholder activism that began to emerge were noted down. Thus, the 
study became familiar with the content of all documentary information, therefore 
gaining an overview of the data collected (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). For example, 
the overview of the data allowed the researcher to have a clear picture of the targets 
(hotel companies), the shareholder activists and the state of the business environment 
in each case.  
 
A Priory Themes 
After familiarisation with key issues, concepts and themes are recognised and form 
the thematic framework to filter and classify the data collected (Ritchie and Spencer, 
1994). However, in template analysis it is acceptable to start with some a priori themes 
that are identified in advance and are likely to be helpful and relevant to the analysis 
(Brooks et al, 2015). In this study, instead of identifying themes through the collected 
data, the researcher created a priori themes in the form of a template that was based 
on complexity theory in order to analyse the selected case studies. The template 
framework consists of four stages: 1) initial conditions, 2) from near to far from 
equilibrium, 3) edge of chaos and beyond and 4) emergence of new order. The stages 
followed a chronological order of the events that occurred during shareholder activism 
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in each case study. At each stage, the complexity principles were used to form 
questions that acted as the coding index of themes. These questions were then used 
to label the data in the next stage (see Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3 Template Framework 
Complexity Stages 
Stage 1 Initial 
Conditions 
Stage 2                                      
From Near to Far From 
Equilibrium 
Stage 3                  
Edge of Chaos and 
Beyond 
Stage 4       
Emergence of New 
Order  
        
What were the 
initial conditions in 
the business 
environment? 
What was each system doing near 
equilibrium?  
What were the tipping 
points in the Board? 




emergence of new 
order?  





Who were the strange attractors?  
What were the factors 
that guided each 
system at the edge of 
chaos? 
What is the 
emergence of new 
order?  
What was the role 
of other primary 
and secondary 
stakeholders? 
Who and when used positive and 
negative feedback processes? How each system self-
organised?   
  
Were feedback processes 
influential in leading the Board far 
from equilibrium? 
What influenced the 
Board during the self-
organisation 
processes?   
  
What strategies the Board used in 
order to reach peaks in a fitness 
landscape? Did the Board reach 
valleys? 
What alternatives the 
Board explored (space 
of possibilities)?  
  
  
When the dissipative structure of 










Organise the A Priory Themes 
This was a challenging and time-consuming task as the researcher did not employ 
software such as NVIVO to store the data and manually handled the process using 
Excel. The template framework was copied in three different spreadsheets and acted 
as the main source for all the answers (textual data) on the questions addressed. 
Sections of data that corresponded to each theme were then placed on each stage, 
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including the author of that source. Each stage had a number of similar answers from 
different articles that covered particular events from shareholder activism.  
 
Charting 
In this stage, the specific pieces of data can be arranged in charts of the predetermined 
themes (Srivastava and Thomson, 2009). The charts consisted of themes that 
illustrate the stages of the template and of sub-themes that showed the complexity 
principles and corresponded to each stage. This was an important task as some 
‘answers’ from various sources were similar and therefore had similar interpretations. 
In this stage, it was decided not to repeat the text in the question, but rather to add the 
name of the author of the source.  
 
Interpretation 
The final stage of the framework method involved the analysis of the themes and sub-
themes as presented in the charts. The analysis allowed this study to identify 
similarities and differences between the data in all cases in the impact of shareholder 
activism. For example, all shareholder activists identified similar weaknesses that 
made the targeted Boards’ vulnerable. In all cases, Boards used similar processes to 
defend their companies from shareholder activists. The rich data allowed the study to 
go beyond description and explain in-depth how Boards’ self-organised beyond the 
edge of chaos, how they moved to far from equilibrium conditions and what the 




4.6 Reliability and Validity  
One of the main differences between quantitative and qualitative research is in the use 
of and importance given to the concepts of validity and reliability (Kumar, 2014). 
Instead of these terms, alternative criteria for assessing qualitative research are used 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). One of these criteria is the trustworthiness criterion in terms 
of how good a qualitative study is. Each aspect of trustworthiness has a parallel with 
the previous quantitative research criteria (see Table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4 Criteria for Judging Research 
Criteria for judging quantitative research 
Alternative criteria for judging qualitative 
research 
Internal validity  Credibility 
External validity  Transferability 
Reliability Dependability 
Objectivity Confirmability 
Adapted from: Trochim, W.M.K. and Donnelly, J. (2007) The Research Methods Knowledge Base. 3rd ed. Mason, 
OH: Thomson Custom Publishing. 
 
Credibility is similar to internal validity (how believable or credible the findings are. The 
establishment of credible findings involved ensuring that this study was carried out 
according to the standards of good practice and that the researcher had correctly 
understood the social world (Bryman and Bell, 2011). According to Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) a number of strategies can increase the credibility of a research study (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). Two of these strategies used, were prolonged engagement and peer 
debriefing that complemented each other (Flick, 2014). While there were no 
participants who could be defined as experts during the research process, sufficient 
time was spent in the field learning and understanding the shareholder activism 
phenomenon. Peer debriefing provided the opportunity to test and defend the research 
design and the yielded findings. The above areas were discussed with peers whose 
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views and feedback proved critical for the progression of this study. The supervisors 
of this study were the first peer group who provided regular feedback to the researcher 
about the progress of the work. Another peer group that challenged the study and 
provided substantial feedback was the audience at UWL’s Annual PhD conference 
where parts of this study were presented. Feedback from peers can also improve the 
quality of the inquiry findings (Anney, 2014). Finally, a major triangulation technique – 
data triangulation – was used to increase the credibility of this study. The research of 
multiple authors and researchers investigating the impact of shareholder activism in 
the selected hotel cases were cross-examined in order to strengthen the integrity of 
the findings.  
 
The second criterion for evaluating the validity and reliability of the research design is 
transferability. Rather than trying to demonstrate that the results generalise to all other 
contexts, the research design provides enough details about the specific cases that 
the reader can judge what other contexts might be informed by the findings (Symon 
and Cassell, 2012; Trochim and Donnelly, 2007). Primarily it is difficult to establish 
transferability because of the approach adopted in qualitative research. However, to a 
certain extent, this can be achieved if a researcher thoroughly describes the process 
adopted for others to follow and replicate (Kumar, 2014). Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
coined this strategy as thick description as by describing a phenomenon in detail a 
researcher can begin to evaluate which conclusion is transferable to the settings. The 
study did not only focus on describing shareholder activism in detail, but it presented 




The third criterion is dependability, which is the stability of findings over time, in other 
words it is the aspect of consistency (Korstjens and Moser, 2018). Guba and Lincoln 
(1989, p. 242) argue that in order to ‘establish the merit of research in terms of this 
criterion of trustworthiness, researchers should adopt an ‘auditing’ approach’. 
Dependability can be established by using an audit trail that involves an examination 
of the research process to validate the data and the study shows how the data are 
collected, recorded and analysed (Bowen, 2009b). In order to conduct a thorough 
audit, this study developed a trail that provided a clear description of the research path 
that included the research design, data collection decisions and the steps taken to 
manage, analyse and report the data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The study facilitated 
the auditing process by providing a rationale for all decisions that surrounded the 
research design process.  
 
The last criterion is confirmability, which parallels objectivity – i.e., has the investigator 
allowed his or her values to intrude to a high degree? (Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
Confirmability is also similar to reliability in quantitative research and it refers to the 
degree to which a study’s results can be confirmed or corroborated by other 
researchers (Anney, 2014). The interpretation of the findings in this study has been 
shaped by the data and was not related to bias and/or interests, by the fact that all 
inferences, categorisation and analyses were confirmed by the researcher’s 
supervisory team and by the provision in the form of information within the main body 
of the study. Several researchers also suggest that confirmability of a qualitative study 
is achieved through an audit trail, reflexive journal and triangulation (Bowen, 2009b; 




4.7 Reflection on the Limitations of the Research Design 
Like other exploratory studies, this study is subject to limitations associated with the 
methodology and the research process. Firstly, the lack of rich data in the restaurant 
sector limited the scope of the analysis. None of the 16 cases of shareholder activism 
in the restaurant sector could form a case study with the content and the structure of 
the existing cases. This is because of the lack of attention given to the restaurant 
sector compared to the hotel sector by online or printed media sources. However, the 
study drew general conclusions about the impact of shareholder activism in corporate 
boards in the hotel sector. A future study that could combine restaurant and hotel 
companies would provide insights into different sectors with different core products 
and services. 
 
Another limitation was the result of the data collection techniques used. The data from 
online secondary sources, documentary information was obtained in a relatively short 
period. The unsuccessful attempt to conduct interviews with hotel executives and 
financial analysts restricted the provision of viewing the impact of shareholder activism 
from a different perspective. However, interviews with hotel executives would have 
increased the respondents’ bias, as employees of a company under investigation may 
not disclose relevant information regarding shareholder activism. Compared to hotel 
executives and financial analysts, journalists were ‘outsiders’ on the cases 
investigated, as they did not have access to each company. This led to a different 
interpretation of shareholder activism interventions between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ 
in each case. Therefore, journalists might have been biased as to what events to report 
and what opinions to express about shareholder activism. Conducting interviews 
would allow data triangulation as the findings from the interviews would be compared 
and contrasted to secondary sources.  
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An additional limitation is the scarcity of archival records. The only source from which 
this study was able to access archival records was the SEC. SEC’s online archives 
were comprehensive and included detailed information that was useful for the 
presentation of each case study but did not cover shareholder activism as a 
standalone topic. The records uploaded in SEC were filings made by all companies 
and shareholder activists including quarterly and annual reports. With the exemption 
of SEC, there were not any other available public archives where shareholder activism 
facts and events could be obtained. Having said that, the study managed to access a 
great number of online sources such as newspapers, magazines and the websites of 
the selected companies.   
 
4.8 Summary 
This study aims to provide novel insights and interpretations of the impact of ‘offensive’ 
shareholder activism on a company’s corporate governance ecosystem utilising a 
complexity theory lens. Phenomenology is associated with this study as it looked at 
the interaction of actors among the cases investigated and focused on interpreting 
events of shareholder activism over certain past periods. The phenomenological 
research philosophy was supported by qualitative data collection techniques such as 
documentary information. The application of a multiple-case research design and the 
collection of rich data enabled this study to investigate a contemporary phenomenon, 
the emergence of shareholder activism within its natural setting. The three companies 
that comprised the sample of this study were selected through the logic of purposive 
sampling and through the application of a number of criteria. 
  
The analysis of the findings collected was accomplished by the framework method 
and its five interconnected stages. This method provided a number of advantages to 
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this study such as data comparison on the cases investigated, description and 
interpretation of shareholder activism events, therefore, allowing the researcher to be 
systematic and structured. Rather than identifying themes from the findings, this study 
created a template that consisted of four stages/themes before beginning the 
interpretation of events in all cases. Each stage/theme was based on complexity 
theory and contained questions that included complexity principles. The chapter 
concludes with a number of different criteria suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
that are utilised to judge or evaluate a qualitative study. Finally, this chapter addresses 
ethical issues and limitations associated with this study. 
 
The next chapter presents the three cases selected, Strategic Hotels and Resorts, the 
InterContinental Hotel Group and Morgans Hotel Group. The chapter presents the 
findings for each case and follows a chronological order that spans from the entry of 










PART 2 - FINDINGS 
The second part of this study examines the shareholder activism phenomenon and 
presents the secondary data obtained from three international hotel companies. 
Chapters 5,6 and 7 present the impact of shareholder activism in Strategic Hotels and 
Resorts, Intercontinental Hotels and Resorts and Morgans Hotel Group respectively. 
The case studies follow the same format in presenting the data and facts to ensure 
consistency and provide an understanding of the research problem with greater clarity. 
Each case study begins with background information such as financial and corporate 
governance for the key players (target company and shareholder activists) and it is 
followed by a presentation of key events that took place during the shareholder 
activism period. The discussion of these key events begins with the entry of 
















CHAPTER FIVE - CASE STUDY I STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS 
5.0 Introduction  
The aim of this case study is to analyse Orange Capital’s (OC) investment and activism 
targeting Strategic Hotels and Resorts (SHR). Their relationship was challenged after 
OC made several interventions in SHR’s Board of Directors over a 14-month period 
(January 2013–May 2014). During their activism, OC urged SHR’s sale with the 
ultimate intention of generating a premium price per share ($11-$14). The allegations 
it levelled at the company included: i) poor corporate governance, ii) undervalued 
portfolio and iii) financial instability.  
 
After a series of events throughout the activism period, OC sold their shares in SHR 
in May 2014. On 8 September 2015, the Blackstone Group (a Private Equity Firm) 
acquired SHR for approximately $6 billion. However, almost a year later on 27 
September 2016, Blackstone sold the company to Anbang Insurance Group (Chinese 
holding company) for approximately $6.5 billion.  
 
5.1 The Players 
The Target 
SHR was a real estate investment trust (REIT) founded in 1997 by Laurence Geller, a 
hotel veteran, with the name at the time of Strategic Hotel Capital, L.L.C. The company 
was incorporated in Maryland in 2004 to acquire and asset-manage upper upscale 
and luxury hotels that were subject to long-term management contracts. SHR 
completed its IPO on 24 June 2004 raising approximately $246.4 million by selling 
17,600,000 shares at $14 per share (Crain’s Chicago Business, 2004). In 2004, SHR’s 
business strategy focused on building a portfolio of hotel properties and becoming a 
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preeminent owner of upper upscale and luxury branded hotels primarily in the United 
States with selected international presence. SHR believed that its future growth would 
be driven by executing a two-fold business strategy, focusing on maximising asset 
values and operating results through systematic asset management and research-
driven capital deployment through acquisitions (SEC, 2004a)1. 
 
Before its IPO, as of 31 December 2003, SHR had an interest in 14 properties (see 
Table 5.1) that were acquired between 1997 and 2001. The majority of the acquisitions 
occurred in the first two years since the REIT’s inception. SHR’s interest in each 
property is summarised as follows: i) 12 properties of the company’s portfolio in 2003 
were subject to mortgages, ii) in two properties, the company was restricted from 
selling these properties, iii) in one property, SHR had a ground lease interest and iv) 
in one property, SHR had a 35% join venture interest, and two of its properties were 
acquired on the dates indicated in Table 5.1, but were subsequently sold to a third 









1 SEC (2004a) Form S-11 - Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1993 [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000112528204000516/b329974_s11.htm [Accessed 16 March 2017].  
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Table 5.1 SHR Hotel Portfolio as of 31 December 2003 
Hotel  Location 
Number of 
Rooms Date Acquired 
Hyatt Regency (1)(*) New Orleans, LA 1,184 Sep-97 
Embassy Suites(*) Lake Buena Vista, FL 333 Sep-97 
Marriott Lincolnshire Resort(2)(*) Lincolnshire, IL 390 Sep-97 
Four Seasons Mexico City(*) Mexico City, Mexico 240 Dec-97 
Hyatt Regency (*) Phoenix, AZ 712 Jan-98 
Hilton Burbank Airport and Convention 
Center(*) Burbank, CA 488 Jan-98 
Marriott Rancho Las Palmas Resort(*) Rancho Mirage, CA 444 Jan-98 
Paris Marriott Champs Elysées(4) Paris, France 192 Feb-98 
Loews Santa Monica Beach Hotel(1)(*) Santa Monica, CA 342 Mar-98 
Marriott Chicago Schaumburg(*) Schaumburg, IL 398 May-98 
Hyatt Regency La Jolla at Aventine(*) La Jolla, CA 419 Jul-99 
InterContinental Prague(3)(*) 
Prague, Czech 
Republic 372 Aug-99 
Marriott Hamburg(4) Hamburg, Germany 277 Jun-00 
Four Seasons Punta Mita Resort(*) Punta Mita, Mexico 140 Feb-01 
(1) We are restricted by agreement from selling 
these properties other than in a transaction that 
will qualify as a tax deferred exchange for 
varying periods and must maintain a specific 
minimum level of indebtedness encumbering 
the Loews Santa Monica Beach Hotel until a 
future date.       
(2) We have a ground lease interest in this 
property.       
(3) We have a 35% joint venture interest in this 
property.       
(4) These properties were originally acquired on 
the dates indicated in the table, but were 
subsequently sold to a third party and leased 
back by us in transactions that are more fully 
described below under “Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operations - Recent Trends and 
Events - Sales of Hotels”.       
(*) These properties are subject to mortgages 
as more fully described under “Mortgage 
Indebtedness Outstanding after This Offering”. 
      
Source: SEC (2004b) Amendment No.1 to Form S-11 [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000112528204001524/b329974_s11a.htm [Accessed 16 
March 2015].  
 
After 2003, SHR acquired a number of hotels and the company’s portfolio grew to 20 
properties with a total of 10,000 rooms and a presence in six countries (Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Mexico, the UK and the US) (see Table 5.2). However, 
after the company’s decision to focus on its native market and dispose of its 
international brands, its hotel portfolio was gradually reduced and prior to its 
104 
 
acquisition by Blackstone, SHR’s portfolio consisted of 17 hotels with a presence only 
in the US market.  
 
Table 5.2 SHR Hotel Portfolio 2004-2015  
Strategic Hotel & Resorts 2004 - 2015 
Year  Number of Hotels Number of Rooms Countries Present 
2004 15 6,192 5 
2005 18 8,480 5 
2006 20 10,000 6 
2007 20 9,044 6 
2008 19 8,347 6 
2009 17 8,002 6 
2010 16 7,630 5 
2011 17 7,762 4 
2012 18 8,271 4 
2013 18 8,272 4 
2014 17 8,075 2 
3rd Quarter 
2015 17 Approximately 8,000 1 
Source: SEC (2015a) Form 10-K. Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000105743615000012/bee-20141231x10k.htm [Accessed 15 
March 2017]. SEC (2015b) Form 10-Q. Quarterly Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000105743615000051/bee-2015930x10q.htm [Accessed 15 
March 2017].  
 
SHR’s properties were found in desirable urban and resort markets in the US and 
Europe. The company’s total portfolio as of 30 September 2015 consisted of 
approximately 8,000 rooms, 875,000 square feet of multi-purpose meeting and 
banqueting space, featured restaurants, wine and cocktail bars, high-end spas and 
retail offerings. Asset management was the core competency and the company’s 
competitive advantage was driven by its team's depth of knowledge, hands-on 
expertise and inspired vision for every portfolio aspect. Prior to its acquisition, the 
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company presented itself as the REIT that ‘purely focuses on the upper-upscale and 
luxury lodging market’ (SHR, 2015).2  
 
Financial Performance 2006-2015  
Like any business in the hotel industry, the 2007-2008 financial crisis influenced SHR’s 
financial performance. Geller, in an interview during the Hotels and Casinos Summit 
in February 2007, revealed ambitious plans for the company. SHR was planning to 
spend $500 million to $750 million in capital expenditures over the 2007-2010 period 
to expand and upgrade its hotels (Reiter, 2007). However, the housing market crash 
and credit crisis in October 2007 put a halt to Geller’s plans for SHR’s growth. Despite 
a steady revenue growth from 2006 to 2008 reaching approximately $841 million, the 
company’s revenues declined in 2010 reducing to $647 million. In 2011, SHR’s 
performance began to recover along with improvements in the overall lodging market 
and by the 3rd quarter of 2015, revenues increased by 42% reaching approximately $1 












Table 5.3 SHR Revenue and Net Income 2006-3rd Quarter 2015 
Year Revenue ($) 
Revenue  
Change % Net Income ($) 
Net Income 
Change % 
2006 626,969,000   122,719,000   
2007 873,879,000 39% 68,771,000 -44% 
2008 841,291,000 -4% -317,486,000 -562% 
2009 615,398,000 -27% -246,433,000 -22% 
2010 647,365,000 5% -230,800,000 -6% 
2011 730,046,000 13% -4,852,000 -98% 
2012 775,217,000 6% -58,261,000 1101% 
2013 900,013,000 16% 9,887,000 -117% 




2015 1,036,607,000 -5% 58,759,000 -83% 
Source: SEC (2011) Form 10-K. Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000119312511045475/d10k.htm. [Accessed 15 March 2015]. 
SEC (2014a) Form 10-K. Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000105743614000006/bee-20131231x10k.htm [Accessed 15 
March 2015]. SEC (2015d) Form 10-K. Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000105743615000012/bee-20141231x10k.htm. [Accessed 8 
January 2016]. SEC (2015e) Form 10-Q. Quarterly Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000105743615000051/bee-2015930x10q.htm [Accessed 8 
January 2016].  
 
SHR’s biggest challenge during the period 2008-2012 was the fact that the company 
had to operate at a loss. For the first three years (2008-2010) the loss was high as it 
reached $317 million in 2008 representing almost one third of the company’s 
revenues. In its 2008 annual report, SHR noted that the negative impact of travel 
during the financial crisis led to a reduction in revenues at the company’s hotel 
properties. The company blamed the decline in occupied room nights in all segments 
of the business, both leisure and business demand, that was partly replaced by less 
expensive discount and heavily negotiated business. In addition, SHR had a 
substantial amount of outstanding debt, a portion of which bore interest at a variable 
rate. As of 31 December, 2008, SHR had a total debt of $1.7 billion, and, including the 
effect of interest rate swaps, 15.3% of the company’s total debt had variable interest 
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rates and 84.7% had fixed interest rates (SEC, 2009a).3 Even though the US economy 
had recorded the lowest rate ever in its history (0.25% on 16 December 2008) because 
of the financial crisis (Business Insider, 2015), companies like SHR had financial 
obligations that impacted on their cash flow.  
  
The following year, SHR recorded another loss year of $246 million because of a 
22.5% decrease in room revenues and a food and beverage revenue decrease of 
25.8% compared to 2008. During the last quarter of 2009, the company sold the Four 
Seasons Mexico City and Renaissance Paris (SEC, 2010a).4 Wes Golladay, an 
analyst with RBC Capital Markets stated that SHR was one of the worst positioned 
hotel REITs during the downturn (NASDAQ, 2015). Heinzl (2011) added that during 
the financial crisis, the share prices of some REIT’s including SHR had fallen more 
than 50% while, according to Green Street Advisors, a research firm that tracks real 
estate securities, REITs were trading at about a 30% discount to net asset value, on 
average (Marino, 2008). Over the next three-year period, SHR continued to run at a 
loss, for example, in 2012 the company made a loss of approximately $58.2 million. 
The situation became brighter from 2013 when the company started to come back into 
profit. From a profit of $9.8 million in 2013, SHR achieved $58.7 million in the third 






3 SEC (2009a) Form 10-K. Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000119312509042565/d10k.htm [Accessed 15 March 2015].  
4 SEC (2010a) Form 10-K. Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 




After a strong growth between 2005 to mid-2007 (in July 2007, SHR’s share reached 
$24.35 per share), SHR’s share price plummeted to its lowest level ($0.61) in March 
2009. By March 2009, the company was showing signs of recovery, its share price 
gradually started to increase and it peaked at $13.42 per share in January 2015 (Alva, 
2015) (see Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1 SHR Share Price 2005-2014  
 
Source: Morningstar (2015) Strategic Hotels & Resorts Inc BEE, [Online] Available at: 
http://quotes.morningstar.com/stock/BEE/s?t=BEE&region=USA [Accessed: 23 November 2015] 
 
On 8 September 2015, Blackstone, the world’s largest private-equity firm agreed to 
buy SHR for $6 billion including the company’s debt (Carmiel, 2015; Minaya, 2015). 
On the same day, SHR’s shares gained 3.5% reaching $14.07 per share (Ingram, 
2015). Subsequently, on 11 December 2015, SHR confirmed the completion of the 












































































































































































2015a). Prior to its acquisition by Blackstone, SHR’s market capitalisation as of 17 
August, 2015 was about $3.8 billion (Jaisinghani, 2015).   
 
Gellein who was SHR’s CEO in 2015 stated that the closest rivals of the company in 
the luxury hotel space were Pebblebrook Hotel Trust and LaSalle Hotel Properties 
(Alva, 2015). From 2009-2015 the share price performance of both Pebblebrook Hotel 
Trust and LaSalle Hotel Properties followed a similar pattern to SHR’s performance. 
The poor performance of the share price of both companies shows the challenges and 
difficulties that most REITs faced during the post financial crisis period. However, after 
the second half of 2009, the share prices of the above REITs showed rising trends 
with a few fluctuations for each of them.  
 
Leadership 
Prior to Raymond Gellein’s leadership – he was SHR’s CEO during the company’s 
acquisition – Laurence Geller was the founder and led the company from 1997. 
Geller’s unexpected resignation with ‘little explanation’ in November 2012 sent the 
share up 13%, the highest in 31 months at the time (Edmondson, 2013; Sutherland, 
2012). Commenting on Geller’s resignation, Enrique Torres, an analyst with Green 
Street Advisors, argued that the way it was communicated indicated mutual 
separation; however, the way it was handled suggested that there may have been 
more reasons (Bergen, 2012). Talking about the new phase that SHR entered, Geller 
stated that ‘it is an excellent time to transition leadership of the company into Rip's 
Gellein more-than-capable hands and focus on my myriad other activities and the next 
chapter in my life’ (Carr, 2012). 
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Raymond L. ‘Rip’ Gellein Jr. took over SHR’s CEO role after being at the company 
since August 2009 serving as a member of its Board and from August 2010 being the 
company’s chairman (Bergen, 2012). Torres noted that Gellein had a track record of 
selling a public hotel company earlier in his career, having sold Vistana (a resort 
developer) to Starwood, while on the other hand Geller was perceived as an unwilling 
seller (Gallun, 2012). For many people, the news about Geller’s departure was 
surprising and led to speculations about the sale of the company (Sutherland, 2012). 
At an SHR Investor Conference call that took place on 2 November 2012, the 
succeeding CEO, Gellein, in a question about the possibility about the company’s sale 
replied that ‘we think that we’re on the right track, we’ve got a strong team, we’ve got 
a great collection of hotels, and so we’re going to keep on going on’ (Gallun, 2012). 
Gellein’s statement did not directly answer the questions about SHR’s potential sale. 
However, responding to an analyst’s comment about his willingness to consider 
‘strategic alternatives’, Gellein said, ‘the CEO has to look at all strategic alternatives’ 
(Gallun, 2012).  
 
As of 21 May 2015, SHR’s Board of Directors consisted of nine members (see Figure 
5.2). Two members of the Board were also executive officers of the company. Gellein 
was the Board’s chairman, president as well as the CEO of the company after Geller 
resigned. Sheli Rosenberg was the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial 







Figure 5.2 SHR Corporate Governance Structure as of 21st May 2015 
 
 
Source: SEC (2015f) Form 8-K. Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1057436/000105743615000028/0001057436-15-000028-index.htm 
[Accessed 16 June 2016].  
 
The remaining Board members were independent and had no direct interest at SHR 
with the exception of David Johnston who was OC’s employee. An interesting 
membership was that of Richard D. Kincaid who was the President and Chief 
Executive Officer of Equity Office Properties Trust until its acquisition by the 
Blackstone Group in February.5 Finally, William A. Prezant served as SHR’s chairman 





5 Luxury Hospitality Daily (2017) Strategic Hotels & Resorts Appoints Richard Kincaid New Independent Director; Announces 
Resignation of Edward Coppola [Online]. Available at: http://www.luxury-hospitality-daily.com/news-20965-Strategic-Hotels-
Resorts-Appoints-Richard-Kincaid-New-Independent-Director-Announces-Resignation-of-Edward-Coppola-.html [Accessed 8 
October 2017].  
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5.2 The Activist 
 
Orange Capital, LLC 
Orange Capital, LLC was an employee-owned hedge fund based in New York that 
was formed in 2005 by Daniel Lewis and Russell Hoffman (CNW, 2014). OC primarily 
provided its services to pooled investment vehicles. It invested in public equity, fixed 
income markets, notes, index options, stock options, and other hedging markets. It 
also invested in value shares of companies by employing fundamental analysis to 
create its portfolios. The hedge fund obtained external research to complement its in-
house research activities and was interested in companies in consumer products, 
industrials, telecommunications, healthcare, retail, media, and entertainment sectors 
(Bloomberg Business, 2015). As of 31 December 2015, OC’s total portfolio was valued 
at almost $1 billion and the hedge fund held interest in companies from various 
industries such as hospitality, media and banking services (see Table 4.4). OC’s 






















Table 5.4 OC Portfolio as of 31st December 2015 
Company  Industry Shares held 
 
% of Share 

























CORPORATION REIT 3,083,137 
 
5,29 52,505,000 
DEERE & CO Manufacturing 537,500  4,13 40,995,000 
PATTERN ENERGY 








REALTY EUROPE  

















Source: Insider Monkey (2017a) 13F Holdings, [Online] Available at: http://www.insidermonkey.com/hedge-   
fund/orange+capital/510/holdings/#/ffp=2015-12-31&fot=7&fso=0&pfp=-1&fundType=0  [Accessed 10 March 
2018]. 
 
OC’s investments were diverse in terms of value and ranged from approximately $522 
million to approximately $1.6 million. Despite the interest OC had in a number of 
companies, in the beginning of February 2016, it announced that it would close its fund 
after 10 years. One of the key reasons behind OC’s decision was the lack of liquidity 
in the credit market as funds could not sell their assets quickly enough to get the 
money to return to their investors. Despite the fund’s positive performance – it 
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produced annualised returns of 9.7%, the fund’s main fund fell 7.4% in 2015 (La 
Roche, 2016). Subsequently, OC returned approximately $1 billion to investors.6  
 
5.3. Case Overview 
Prior to presenting the case, it is important to note the period within which OC bought 
and sold SHR shares. Table 5.5 presents OC’s number of shares held during the 
activism period. The case is presented in chronological order to illustrate OC’s 
intervention in the workings of SHR’s Board of Directors.  
 
Table 5.5 OC Shares in SHR  
Period of Report Number of Shares ($) Value  Shares in SHR sold 
31st March 2013 7,459,964 62,291,000   
30th June 2013 7,559,964 66,981,000   
30th September 2013 7,559,964 65,620,000   
31st December 2013 8,295,651 78,394,000   
31st March 2014 2,803,614 28,569,000 After 15 May 2014 
Sources: Business Wire (2013a) Orange Capital, LLC Urges Immediate Sale of Strategic Hotels & Resorts in 
Letter Sent to the Board of Directors [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130219006297/en/Orange-Capital-LLC-Urges-Sale-Strategic-
Hotels#.VPTwn_msWSo [Accessed 23 February 2015]; SEC (2013a) Form 13F [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1426756/000091957413003332/d1372516_13f-hr.txt [Accessed 23 
February 2015]; SEC (2014b) Form 13F [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1426756/000091957414001344/xslForm13F_X01/infotable.xml 
[Accessed 23 February 2015] 
 
In January 2013, OC, for the first time, bought SHR shares ($6.89 share price value); 
however, the filing for the first quarter occurred on 31 March 2013. By the end of 2013, 
the fund’s number of shares increased by 835,687 shares indicating their strong 
interest in SHR. During the first quarter of 2014, OC’s number of shares decreased by 
 
6 FINalternatives (2017) Orange Capital to Close, Return $1B to Investors [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/32477 [Accessed 15 June 2018].  
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approximately 30% representing a total value of $28.5 million. After the first quarter of 
2014, OC sold its entire shareholding to SHR ($7.96 share price value).  
 
5.4 Shareholder Activism Events 
The section below presents in detail how the events unfolded during the activism 
period. The events during the activism period span just two years, 2013 and 2014. 
Prior to presenting the case, a summary of key events is provided (see Table 5.6) in 















 Table 5.6 Overview of Key Events during the Shareholder Activism Period 
Dates Event  
2013   
 January OC bought for the first time SHR common stock. 
19th February OC went public urging for sale of SHR (issued a letter). 
19th February SHR rejected OC's urge for sale of the company. 
End of February OC increased its holdings to 6,625,800 million shares.  
End of February OC reiterated the sale of SHR after 2012 poor fourth quarter loss. 
End of February SHR's Board of Directors rejected OC's suggestions 
20th May  
 
 
SHR's Board of Directors approved an amendment to the company’s 
stockholder rights plan to accelerate the expiration date from the 30th 
November 2013, but no later than the close of business on June 14, 
2013. 
June  Reports surfaced that SHR had put itself up for sale. 
20th November 
OC issued a press release announcing its intention to nominate four 
independent directors to the Board of Directors of SHR for election at 
the 2014 Shareholders Annual General Meeting. 
12th December  
SHR agreed to sell the Four Seasons Punta Mita Resort for $200 
million. 
20th December  
OC sent a letter to SHR outlining that the sale process was non- 
marketed and exclusively negotiated basis with a major shareholder. 
2014   
7th March 
SHR in a press release announced that it had reached an agreement 
with Orange Capital, and agreed to appoint David W. Johnson to the 
company's Board of Directors. 
7th March 
OC withdrawn its notice of nomination of the remaining director 
candidates to the SHR Board and had agreed to vote its shares in 
favour of each of the company's nominees at the 2014 Annual 
Meeting. 
7th March OC agreed to a customary standstill provision. 
May  OC reduced its stake to an approximate value of $28 million. 
End of May  OC sold its stake  
2015   
8th September The Blackstone Group acquired SHR for approximately $6 billion. 
2016   
27th September 
Blackstone sold the company to Anbang Insurance Group for 




5.4.1 Period I: January 2013 - December 2013  
In a filing with the SEC regarding its stock holdings as of 31 December, 2012, OC did 
not list any SHR shares. In January 2013, OC bought, for the first time, SHR shares 
($6,89 share price value) after the company’s Board acknowledged the receipt of a 
letter (1 February) by the fund. In a press release, towards the end of February, OC 
claimed to own 6.25 million shares of SHR’s common stock (Heschmeyer, 2013; SEC, 
2013a).7 Prior to OC’s move to SHR, in January, the US President Barack Obama 
welcomed a deal that had been reached to avert a ‘fiscal cliff’ of huge tax rises and 
spending cuts that subsequently led to a rally of global stock markets (BBC, 2013). US 
investors reacted positively and the Dow Jones Industrial Average opened up 224 
points, while London’s FTSE closed up 129.5 points (Fletcher, 2013). This was related 
to the so-called ‘January effect’ where, according to Clancy (2013), the stock market 
usually rises in January, as investors that had sold out their holdings in December, to 
book profits and offset losses, buy back into the market.  
 
OC issued a letter on 1 February (see Appendix 1) to SHR’s Board urging an 
immediate sale of the company. The fund made this letter public on 19 February due 
to their failure to receive an adequate response from SHR’s Board. At the time of the 
release, OC was the beneficial owner of 6.25 million shares or 4% of SHR common 
stock (Bomkamp, 2013; Business Wire, 2013a; Reuters, 2013). OC highlighted the 
following points in its letter to SHR: 
 
 
7SEC (2013b) Orange Capital LLC - Form 13F-HR-Quarterly Report Filed by Institutional Managers, Holdings [Online]. Available 
at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1426756/000091957413001376/0000919574-13-001376-index.htm [Accessed 10 




1. Private market values for luxury hotel properties far exceeded public market 
valuations. 
2. There was a large pool of well-capitalised buyers for the company’s luxury 
hotels. 
3. SHR was burdened with material corporate overhead diluting shareholder 
returns. 
4. SHR’s large portfolio of luxury hotels was unique and had outstanding scarcity 
value. 
5. The company had a material cost of capital disadvantage compared to other 
owners of luxury hotels. 
6. SHR’s leveraged balance sheet offered few prospects for a return of capital to 
shareholders for the foreseeable future. 
7. SHR’s management lack of a credible plan for creating shareholder value. 
  
OC believed that the sale of SHR’s portfolio would likely result in earnings of $11-$14 
per share, a 40-79% premium over the most recent closing price at the time. OC based 
their valuation on a property level analysis using capitalisation rates, replacement 
costs and comparable M&A transactions. Qualitative variables such as the scarcity 
value of luxury hotel assets and favourable conditions in the capital markets were also 
taken into consideration (NY Business Journal, 2013a). OC reached this conclusion 
after carefully evaluating other possible alternatives, including SHR continuing its 
course as an independent company or a partial sale of the company’s portfolio with 
earnings used to retire debt (complete repayment of debt) (StreetInsider, 2013). OC 
also claimed that SHR lacked a solid plan for the future after its CEO resigned abruptly 




On the same date, SHR provided a response to OC’s press release stating that the 
company ‘strongly disagrees with certain assumptions and conclusions’ made by the 
shareholder activist in its letter (Hotel Analyst, 2013a). Although, SHR stated that they 
were disappointed that OC had released its letter publicly, supposedly to advance its 
short-term trading interest, they also stated that they remained open to strategic 
opportunities to enhance the company’s portfolio and would always act to enhance 
long-term shareholder value (Hotel Analyst, 2013a; SHR, 2013a). 
 
In spite of SHR’s accusations, OC had actually increased its holdings to 6,625,800 
million shares or 4.24% of common stock and remained one of SHR’s top 
shareholders (Hotel News Resource, 2013a). At the end of February, SHR posted a 
deeper fourth-quarter loss, intensifying the pressure exerted by OC. The loss 
amounted to $36.4 million, compared with a loss of $15.9 million a year earlier (Eisen, 
2013). SHR’s loss was impacted by the need to settle $18.8 million in impairment 
losses, a $7.8 million charge related to the termination of the management agreement 
at one of its hotels, Hotel Del Coronado in San Diego, and a $2.5 million severance 
charge.8 Funds from its operations were 6 cents per share which was down from 11 
cents per share a year before, while revenue rose to $224.1 million from $193.9 million 
(NY Business Journal, 2013b).  
 
Following SHR’s poor fourth-quarter loss, OC reiterated that a sale of SHR would net 
$11 to $14 per share. SHR’s shares were trading at $7.36 a share on February. The 
fund stated that one key consideration for urging the sale was SHR’s poor corporate 
 
8 Severance pay is the compensation an employer provides to an employee who has been laid off, whose job has been 




governance. The fund believed that the company made several arrangements that 
had established and enriched SHR’s management at the expense of shareholders 
(Eisen, 2013).  
 
OC suggested to the company to form a special committee of independent directors 
and hire a financial adviser to overhaul existing governance and explore all strategic 
alternatives, including a sale. In the event of failing to deliver the above, OC suggested 
that the independent directors should be replaced. OC also urged shareholders to 
withhold votes for four of the company’s 10 directors at the company’s 2012 Annual 
Meeting, including its CEO. SHR’s Board in turn rejected the suggestions and 
responded that it strongly disagreed with OC’s assessment (NY Business Journal, 
2013b).  
 
OC was trying to convince SHR to liquidate its luxury properties, and its efforts were 
merely ‘a function of math’ according to The Wall Street Journal. SHR’s shares were 
trading between $5.44 and $8.11 over the previous 52 weeks before March. OC 
strongly believed that selling the entire portfolio would produce proceeds of $11 to $14 
a share, a view that analysts shared too (Hudson, 2013a). Daniel Lewis, OC’s 
managing partner, in an interview, criticised SHR stating that the company did not 
have a concrete plan to close the gap between the current share price and the 
company’s private market value (Hudson, 2013a). 
 
In contrast, SHR’s management argued that it had a plan to increase the company’s 
value. SHR’s CEO, in an interview, mentioned that the company could increase its 
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share due to the reason that its conference business was improving; net operating 
income was rising, and it had reduced $1.4 billion of its debt. For Gellein and for SHR’s 
major shareholders, putting the company up for sale was not the best way to increase 
the value of the company (Hudson, 2013a).  
 
Eisen (2013) believed that OC did not have much leverage to force SHR to put itself 
up for sale. By that time, none of the other SHR major shareholders, including Cascade 
Investment LLC (Bill Gates’ private investment arm), had publicly joined OC’s cause. 
Although some large shareholders of the company agreed with OC’s arguments, 
SHR’s value would be even greater if sold, a year or two after Gellein had made further 
improvements. The potential sale looked attractive as SHR’s properties formed a 
potentially good fit for private buyers. In addition, the sudden departure of Geller and 
Gellein’s less personal attachment to the company were signs of a potential sale 
(Hudson, 2013a). Indeed, there were signs that Gellein was keeping options open for 
a disposal of part or all of SHR’s properties. The company had ensured, by refinancing 
mortgages on some of its properties, that any new owner could assume the debts.  
 
On 20 May, SHR’s Board of Directors had approved an amendment to the company’s 
shareholder rights plan (poison pill) to accelerate the expiration date from 30 
November 2013, but no later than 14 June 2013 (SHR, 2013b). The shareholder rights 
plan was one of the governance concerns that OC highlighted in its public statement 
on 19 February. OC further noted that SHR’s revised Corporate Guidance Guidelines 
contemplated that a shareholder rights plan could be re-instated without requiring a 
shareholder vote for up to twelve months. OC believed that the option to re-instate the 
poison pill could undermine any possible sale process. The fund also addressed the 
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fact that SHR still had numerous deficiencies (see Appendix 2) in its business strategy 
and corporate governance (Business Wire, 2013b). 
 
In June, reports surfaced that SHR had put itself up for sale to appease OC (NASDAQ, 
2015). According to speculations, the company had hired Eastdil Secured, an 
investment bank (subsidiary of Wells Fargo), to explore a potential sale of the 
company. However, Diane Morefield, SHR’s Chief Financial Officer later declined to 
comment (Hudson, 2013b; Jonas, 2013). Although SHR’s potential sale was never 
confirmed by any of its executives, there were signs that changes were about to occur 
in the short term. OC remained troubled that SHR had failed to confirm public reports 
stating that they had retained a financial advisor to pursue a potential sale of the 
company (Hotel News Resource, 2013b). On 16 July, OC sent a letter (see Appendix 
3) to SHR’s independent directors expressing their disappointment about the 
uncertainty that SHR created within the market for the company’s shares. The fund 
believed that the potential sale process was neither transparent nor appropriately 
disclosed. In addition, SHR’s poor corporate governance history was a further reason 
for OC to retain its own financial advisor (Gallun, 2013; Market Watch, 2013).  
 
On 20 November, OC issued a press release announcing its intention to nominate four 
independent directors to SHR’s Board for election at the 2014 Shareholders Annual 
General Meeting. The fund believed that the nominated directors would offer 
significant experience in hotel operations, industry dynamics and capital markets. 
Additionally, OC established a website that provided SHR’s shareholders with a 
presentation outlining the fund’s independent perspectives on SHR. The last point that 
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was featured on the press release was OC’s intention to retain Okapi Partners LLC as 
proxy solicitor for the SHR campaign (Business Wire, 2013c).  
 
One of SHR’s objectives was to reduce its debt of $1.4 billion. SHR’s agreement to 
sell the Four Seasons Punta Mita Resort, one of the greatest real estate assets of the 
company and 48 acres of land adjacent to Cascade Investment, LLC, intensified the 
pressure from the shareholder activist. OC expressed its shock and outrage at the 
sale of the resort calling it a ‘serious violation of investor trust’. Analysts believed that 
the sale meant that OC would not be able to count on Cascade’s support for its 
dissident director candidates at the annual meeting (Alva, 2015; Orol, 2013; Tekippe, 
2013). The sale of the Mexican resort, as well as its London hotel (the Grosvenor 
House) in 2014 generated cash flow that was critical for reducing SHR’s debt and 
expanding in the US market by focusing on new acquisitions. SHR’s response to OC’s 
release was immediate and emphasised the fact that the Board and the management 
of the company continually reviewed options to create value for their shareholders. 
SHR believed that the sale of the Punta Mita resort and the adjacent land for a gross 
value of $200 million was excellent value and provided an opportunity to de-leverage 
the company’s balance sheet (SHR, 2013c).  
 
On 20 December, following SHR’s response, OC sent a letter to Sheli Rosenberg, 
SHR’s lead independent director arguing that the sale process had been insufficiently 
marketed, having been exclusively negotiated with a major shareholder. OC charged 
SHR with ‘value destroying governance practices’ including problematic executive 
compensation; excessive corporate expenses – as a percentage of total revenue – 
and shareholder unfriendly defences owing to the fact that SHR did not hire an 
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independent financial advisor to evaluate the sale of the resort. Eventually, the deal 
closed in February 2014, with SHR insisting that it was a fair one (Alva, 2015).  
 
5.4.2 Period II: January 2014 - May 2014 
Following the sale of the resort, SHR, in a press release on 7 March announced that 
it had reached an agreement with OC and agreed to appoint David W. Johnson to the 
company's Board. With the addition of Johnson, SHR’s Board expanded to 10 
members, nine of whom were independent and all of whom were elected annually.  In 
turn, OC had withdrawn its notice of nomination of the remaining director candidates 
to the SHR’s Board and had agreed to vote its shares in favour of each of the 
company's nominees at the 2014 Annual Meeting. Furthermore, OC agreed to a 
customary standstill provision (Gallun, 2014; SHR, 2014). OC pointed to some positive 
measures taken by SHR, including an independent review of executive compensation 
and redemption of the company’s Series A Preferred Stock (Alva, 2015). OC held 
SHR’s shares (total value of $28 million) up until 15 May 2014 (latest filing report) 
(SEC, 2014) and shortly after that period, the fund sold its stake in SHR (Alva, 2015). 
On 19 May, SHR’s share price was $10.78 per share, while on the 25 August, it 
reached $11.86 per share. (Amigobulls, 2017; Gurufocus, n.d).  
 
5.4.3 Post-Activism Period 
In 2014, SHR’s revenues amounted to $1.09 billion while net profit was approximately 
$344.4 million and within the same year, its share price demonstrated a 40% increase. 
Lukas Hartwich, an analyst with Green Street Advisors, believed that even without 
paying dividend to its shareholders, SHR had outpaced the overall lodging and resort 
industry over the previous three years (NASDAQ, 2015). In the meanwhile, SHR’s 
margins were steadily moving up and in the third quarter of 2014, the company’s 
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EBITDA9 margin was 27%, up from 24.1% in the same quarter two years prior. In 
2014, SHR sold two of its hotels in London and in Mexico with the intention of focusing 
on the US market. Within the same year, the company acquired the Montage Laguna 
Beach (Mueller, 2015), the Four Seasons Resort Scottsdale, and acquired their 
partners’ interest in Hotel Del Colorado and the Fairmont Scottsdale Princess in 
Arizona (PR Newswire, 2015a).  
 
On 8 September 2015, SHR was acquired by the Blackstone Group for approximately 
$6 billion – including debt. On 11 December 2015, SHR announced the completion of 
the acquisition of the company by affiliates of Blackstone Real Estate VIII L.P. Holders 
of SHR’s shares were entitled to receive $14.25 in cash for each share they owned. 
Because of the transaction, SHR’s shares ceased trading on the NYSE (PR Newswire, 
2015b). Almost a year later (27 September 2016), Blackstone sold the company to 
Anbang Insurance Group for approximately $6.5 billion (Yu, 2016).  
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented the research findings emerging from the online 
documentary information and investigation of shareholder activism in SHR. The sole 
shareholder activist, OC, exerted significant pressure on SHR’s Board by urging the 
sale of the REIT over a 14-month period. To achieve this, OC focused on SHR’s poor 
corporate governance, undervalued portfolio and financial instability of SHR’s 
operating and financial results from 2006-2014 which was a result of the crash of the 
housing market in the US in 2007. SHR’s poor performance was in line with the 
 
9 Stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. It is one indicator of a company’s financial 
performance and is used as a proxy for the earning potential of a business.  
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challenges that most REIT’s and SHR’s competitors faced in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. 
 
OC engaged in a number of public disputes with SHR related to the future of the 
company. Shareholder activism increased the pressure on the company’s Board for 
sale of the company and battles between the two parties were frequent. OC was the 
winner in the feud with SHR as they managed to place a representative on the 
company’s Board and they made a profit on their investment to SHR after they sold 
their stake, showing one of the faces of shareholder activism which is to increase their 
return on investment. The next chapter presents the intervention of two shareholder 














CHAPTER SIX - CASE STUDY II INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The aim of this case study is to discuss and analyse Trian’s Fund Management, L.P. 
(TFM) and Marcato’s Capital Management (MCM) investment and activism targeting 
Intercontinental Hotels Group PLC (IHG). Both entities made several interventions in 
IHG over a three-year period (2012-2015). During their activism, both TFM and MCM 
believed that IHG could be a takeover target and would be more valuable if acquired 
by a competitor.   
 
After two turbulent activism periods, IHG did not become a takeover target and 
remained a standalone company. During the activism period, the company 
strengthened its portfolio by acquiring small companies such as Kimpton Hotels and 
Restaurants, by opening new properties globally and by launching new hotel brands 
such as Indigo, Avid Hotels, Hualuxe Hotels and Resorts and Voco.  
 
6.1 The Players 
The Target 
IHG is a global hotel company based at Denham, UK. It is one of the world’s leading 
hotel companies with more than 350,000 people working across almost 100 countries. 
IHG’s portfolio consists of 15 hotel brands and includes over 5,903 hotels and 883,563 
rooms, while the group has under development 1,918 hotels in its pipeline with 




IHG’s business model mainly focuses on franchising and managing while their 
business partners own the physical assets. The company has 4,870 hotels under 
franchise agreements, 1,007 hotels under management contracts and the group’s 
owned and leased hotels are twenty-six. Overall, 72% of the group’s operating profit 
is generated by franchised agreements and 28% by owned, leased and managed 
lease assets. IHG focuses on an asset-light business model supported by a long term-
approach to allocate capital and reduce the asset intensity of the business (IHG, 
2020b).    
 
IHG’s story dates to 1777 when William Bass opened a domestic brewery in Stoke on 
Trent, UK. After several acquisitions and ownership structures over the past two 
centuries, in 2003 IHG became a standalone company in a demerger from the brewing 
and pub company. Notable developments in the company include the launch of a 
boutique hotel brand, Indigo, the launch of a hotel brand, Even Hotels, that focuses on 
healthy travel, the launch of an upscale brand, Voco, and a hotel brand, Hualuxe 
Hotels & Resorts, designed for Chinese travellers. Furthermore, in 2015, IHG 
completed the acquisition of a US-based hotel company, Kimpton Hotels & 
Restaurants and in 2019 acquired a top tier luxury brand, Six Senses Hotels Resorts 
Spas (IHG, 2020c).  
 
Financial Performance 2006-2015 
As of 19 March 2020, IHG’s market capitalisation was £6.75 billion (Financial Times, 
2020). Similar to the SHR case, IHG did not escape the financial crisis, which hit the 
global hotel industry. In October 2008, the company’s shares fell more than 5% due 
to weakening conditions. The group’s revenue per available room fell 4.5% in October 
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2008; however, operating profits at the time were ahead of expectations, as there was 
a growth of 8% to $153 million in the three months to the end of September 2008 and 
the revenues rose 7.3% to $486 million. Despite the latter positive results, IHG’s pre-
tax profits fell 19.8% to $89 million (Scotsman, 2008; Sibun, 2008).  
 
Overall, IHG’s revenues (see Table 6.1) decreased considerably by 17% from 2008 to 
2009 because of the financial crisis. From 2009-2016, IHG’s revenue demonstrated 
changes, positive and negative, ranging from 6% to -5% change. Although the 
company’s net income was positive throughout the same period, it showed 
considerable fluctuations. For example, from 2006 to 2009 IHG’s net income 
decreased by almost $500 million, while after this period, the net income gradually 
recovered over several years and reached approximately $1.2 billion in 2015. In 2015, 
profit increased primarily due to gains from the sale of the InterContinental Paris-Le 














Table 6.1 IHG Revenue and Net Income Year 2006-2016 
Year  Revenue ($) 
Revenue Change 
% 
Net Income ($) 
Net Income 
Change % 
2006 1,446,000,000   754,000,000   
2007 1,771,000,000 22% 463,000,000 -39% 
2008 1,854,000,000 5% 262,000,000 -43% 
2009 1,538,000,000 -17% 214,000,000 -18% 
2010 1,628,000,000 6% 280,000,000 31% 
2011 1,768,000,000 9% 473,000,000 69% 
2012 1,835,000,000 4% 545,000,000 15% 
2013 1,903,000,000 4% 374,000,000 -31% 
2014 1,858,000,000 -2% 392,000,000 5% 
2015 1,803,000,000 -3% 1,224,000,000 212% 
2016 1,715,000,000 -5% 591,000,000 -52% 
Source: SEC (2008a) Form 20-F [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/858446/000115697309000202/u06009e20vf.htm  [Accessed 18 July 
2015]. SEC (2013) Form 20-F [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/858446/000119312513126680/d423471d20f.htm [Accessed 18 July 
2015]. SEC (2016a) Form 20-K [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/858446/000119312516490850/d76057d20f.htm#tx76057_17 
[Accessed 18 July 2017].  
 
 
Prior to the sale of its hotels in Paris and Hong Kong, IHG had completed the sale of 
the InterContinental London Park Lane in May 2013, the InterContinental New York 
Barclay in December 2013 and the InterContinental Mark Hopkins in February 2014 
(Lin, 2014), transactions that supported the group’s asset light strategy. An important 
aspect of IHG’s asset light strategy was the sale of 183 hotels for $5.5 billion from April 
2003 to November 2008. The asset light strategy had protected IHG during the 
financial crisis from plummeting property values. However, an analyst noted that 
despite IHG’s business model, the company would be unable to avoid the fallout from 




Following an overall good share performance in 2007 (reaching $38.58 per share in 
May), IHG’s shares had lost 70% of their value during 2008, although the company 
remained one of the better performing listed hotel companies at the time (Evans, 
2008). The decreasing pattern of the share price continued in February 2009, where 
it hit an all-time low of $8.30 per share amid the financial crisis. After 2009 and up to 
the beginning of August 2017, IHG’s share price started to rise, despite two periods in 
2012 and 2016 when the share price had dropped considerably leading to a negative 
percentage change of -12% and -17% respectively (see Table 6.2). 
  
Table 6.2 IHG Share Price Performance 2006-2017 
Date  $ % Change 
01 January 2006 25.88   
01 January 2007 36.47 41% 
01 January 2008 18.67 -49% 
01 January 2009 8.51 -54% 
01 January 2010 17.19 102% 
01 January 2011 25.66 49% 
01 January 2012 22.49 -12% 
01 January 2013 33.08 47% 
01 January 2014 37.00 12% 
01 January 2015 41.87 13% 
01 January 2016 34.67 -17% 
01 January 2017 48.12 39% 
01 August 2017 56.91 18% 
Source: Seeking Alpha (2017a) IHG [Online]. Available at: https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/IHG/chart [Accessed 
24 August 2017].  
 
After January 2016, IHG’s share price increased by approximately $22 and reached 
$56.91 per share up to the beginning of August 2017 which was the highest recorded 






Since 2006, IHG’s corporate governance demonstrated stability in its Board and 
Executive Committees. From 2006 to the current date, three CEO’s have led the 
company. More specifically: i) Andy Cosslett - February 2005 to June 2011, ii) Richard 
Solomons (IHG, 2011) - June 2011 to June 2017 and Keith Barr (IHG, 2017) - June 
2017 to the current date.  
 
Many of the executive and non-executive directors remained on the Board during 
shareholder activism. In 2015, IHG’s governance structure consisted of executive and 
non-executive directors and an executive committee (see Figure 6.1). None of the 
Non-Executive Directors on the Board had any direct interest in the group other than 







Figure 6.1 IHG Board of Directors as of 31 December 2015 
 
 
Source: IHG (2015b) Our Board of Directors [Online. Available at: 
https://www.ihgplc.com/files/reports/ar2015/files/pdf/corporate_governance.pdf [Accessed 3 July 2017].  
 
6.2 The Activists 
Trian Fund Management (TFM) L.P. / Nelson Peltz 
TFM is an investment management company that combines concentrated public 
equity ownership with operational expertise. According to its website, TFM is a ‘highly 
engaged shareowner’ that seeks to invest in high quality but undervalued and 
underperforming public companies. The company aims to work together with 
management teams and Boards to execute operational and strategic initiatives 
designed to drive long-term earnings growth for the benefit of all shareholders (Trian 
Partners, 2017a). It’s CEO and one of its founding partners is Nelson Peltz, a 
preeminent figure in the US investment community and a well-known activist investor. 
Peltz is famous for turning companies around and returning value to investors and 
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shareholders. Two of the most famous examples of his strategic investments are the 
H.J. Heinz Company in 2006 and the Wendy’s Company in 2008. Both companies 
benefited from his interventions and both retained him on their Boards during his 
investment (Shea, 2012). Peltz is also well known for being the driving force behind 
the demerger of Cadbury Schweppes in 2007, which left the chocolate brand 
vulnerable to assault by US food giant Kraft (McLachlan, 2008; Thomas, 2012).  
 
TFM’s portfolio as of December 2019 was valued at approximately $9.5 billion and its 
investments included companies in several industries. Its most recent investments 
consisted of large companies that are household names and generate billions in 
annual turnover – Procter & Gamble Co, Mondelez International Inc., General Electric 
Co –. As of December 2019, half of TFM’s portfolio were companies from the 
consumer goods industries (Insider Monkey, 2020).  
 
TFM invested in IHG in the second quarter of 2012. In its third quarter filings, 30 
September 2012, TFM’s investment portfolio consisted of several companies (see 
Table 6.3) that are presented in order according to their holding value. Apart from IHG, 
TFM’s former investments include companies such as Heinz, Tiffany & Co, Kraft 








Table 6.3 TFM Investment Portfolio as of 30th September 2012 





hold Value ($) 
INGERSOLL RAND PLC 
Industrial 
Manufacturing 13,470,668 17.18 603,756,000 
FAMILY DOLLAR STORES 
INC Retail 8,967,564 16.92 594,549,000 
STATE STREET CORP Financial Services 9,140,107 10.91 383,519,000 
WENDYS CO  Restaurants 83,000,245 10.69 375,576,000 
KRAFT FOODS INC Food Manufacturing 8,131,787 9.57 336,249,000 
LEGG MASON INC Asset Management 12,884,337 9.05 317,985,000 
LAZARD LTD Financial Services 5,598,980 4.65 163,658,000 
TIFFANY & CO  
Jewellery & Speciality 
Retailer 1,004,151 1.76 62,137,000 
HEINZ H J CO Food Manufacturing 106,500 0.16 5,959,000 
Source: Insider Monkey (2017b) Trian Partners – Holdings [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.insidermonkey.com/hedge-fund/trian+partners/163/holdings/#/ffp=2012-09-30&fot=7&fso=2&pfp=-
1&fundType=0  [Accessed 12 August 2017].  
 
 
In May 2012, TFM bought a 4.27% stake in IHG and traders in London at the time 
believed that the company’s future would be bright with Peltz involved (Shea, 2012). 
Investors believed that Peltz would shake up IHG’s strategy and support its market 
value, while other investors were betting that Peltz had found another of his favourite 
targets, a company that had valuable brands, but whose operational management of 
their assets required improvement. IHG’s shares had previously underperformed 
those in its peer group such as Marriott International and Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
Worldwide two years before TFM decided to enter the group (Foley and English, 2012; 
Werdigier, 2012).  
 
According to information listed on its website, TFM was attracted to the favourable 
supply and demand backdrop within the hotel industry in 2012 – the US economy was 
driving room demand while the number of new rooms under construction was at record 
low levels. TFM believed that IHG’s full value was not reflected in the stock valuation. 
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In addition, the fund believed that IHG was trading at a substantial discount to intrinsic 
value as a predominantly asset-light firm (Trian Partners, 2017b). After a series of 
interventions, TFM exited IHG in early 2013, only seven months after its entry into the 
hotel company. 
 
Marcato Capital Management (MCM)  
MCM is a hedge fund based in San Francisco, California, that was founded by Richard 
McGuire. The fund provides its services to pooled investment vehicles, it invests in 
value shares and employs a fundamental analysis to make its investments 
(Bloomberg, 2017a). MCM invests primarily in small- and medium-sized companies 
primarily in the services and consumer goods industries. Its total portfolio as of 30 
September 2019 was valued at approximately $127 million representing a sharp 
decline from December 2014 where it was valued at approximately $3.05 billion. More 
than half of MCM’s portfolio were companies from the services sector (Insider Monkey, 
2019).  
 
MCM invested in IHG in the second quarter of 2014. In its second quarter filings, 30 
June 2014, MCM’s investment portfolio consisted of several companies (see Table 
6.4) that are presented in order according to its holding value. MCM’s former 
investments include companies such as Sotheby’s, Avis Budget Group and Vall 




Table 6.4 MCM’s Investment Portfolio as of 30 June 2014 
Company  Industry 
Number of 
Shares  
% of share 
hold Value ($) 
NCR CORP Technology 10,850,488 20.09 380,744,000 
GOODYEAR TIRE AND 
RUBBER CO Manufacturing 10,966,078 16.08 304,638,000 
AMERICAN REALTY 




Aerospace, Oil & 
Gas, Bulk Liquid 
Storage 3,866,126 12.72 241,130,000 
SOTHEBYS Auctioneering 4,637,991 10.27 194,749,000 
LIFE TIME FITNESS 
INC Health Clubs 3,115,167 8.01 151,833,000 
AVIS BUDGET GROUP 
INC 
Mobility 
Solutions 2,050,020 6.45 122,376,000 
VALL RESORTS INC Hospitality 1,508,063 6.14 116,392,000 
LEAR CORP 
Automotive 
Systems 1,099,682 5.18 98,224,000 
BROOKFIELD 
RESIDENTIAL  Real Estate 552,535 0.6 11,464,000 
  
  Source: Insider Monkey (2017e) Marcato Capital Management – Holdings [Online]. Available at:     
https://www.insidermonkey.com/hedge-fund/marcato+capital+management/376/holdings/#/ffp=2014-06-  
30&fot=7&fso=0&pfp=-1&fundType=0 [Accessed 11 August 2017].  
 
 
In 2013, MCM was named the US equity hedge fund of the year and its founder and 
CEO, Richard McGuire, was named by the Institutional Investor as Emerging Fund 
Manager of the Year. These accolades were a result of the fund’s good performance, 
producing investment returns of more than 26% in both 2012 and 2013 (Robinson and 
Massoudi, 2014a). McGuire started MCM in 2010 with financial backing from 
Blackstone having previously worked at Pershing Square Capital Management (a 
leading US hedge fund) (La Roche, 2013). The fund came to prominence when it took 
a large stake in the auction house Sotheby’s and encouraged it to return more cash to 
shareholders (Robinson and Massoudi, 2014b). The firm disclosed its stake (3.8%) in 
IHG during May in 2014 and exited its investment in August/September 2015.  
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6.3 Case Overview 
Prior to presenting the case, it is important to note the period over which each 
shareholder activist bought and sold IHG’s shares (see Table 6.5). This case presents 
the events in chronological order to illustrate the intervention of the activists on IHG’s 
Board.  
 





% of common stock 
in MHG Date sold shares 
Trian Fund 
Management May 2012 Approximately 4.27% February 2013 
Marcato Capital 
Management   May 2014 Approximately 3.8% August/September 2015 
 
Both activists exerted considerable pressure on IHG to consider a takeover bid on two 
separate occasions; however, they did not stay in the company for a long period. 
Following MCM’s exit, IHG did not encounter further activism interventions.  
 
6.4 Shareholder Activism Events 
This section presents how the events unfolded during the activism period and involved 
all players in the case. Prior to presenting the events, this case study presents an 
overview of key events that occurred in IHG during the activism period (see Table 6.6) 







Table 6.6 Overview of Key Events during the Shareholder Activism Period 
Dates Event  
2012   
May 
TFM announced that they had bought a 4.27% stake in IHG and had 
become the fifth largest shareholder in the company at the time. 
May 
IHG’s share price rose by almost 6% on the same day as the stock bought 
by TFM. 
2013   
January  TFM had reduced its holding to IHG to less than 1%. 
2014   
May  IHG rejected a £6bn bid from an undisclosed U.S. suitor. 
29th May  
MCM revealed itself as one of IHG’s biggest shareholders that owned 
3.8% ($400m investment) and called on IHG to seriously consider a 
takeover bid. 
4th August 
MCM announced that it had hired advisers at Houlikan Lokey to find a US 
buyer for a strategic review of IHG in order to enhance shareholder value. 
11th November  
MCM released a letter to IHG shareholders along with a detailed 
presentation outlining the results of an independent evaluation of various 
potential strategic alternatives conducted by Houlikan Lokey. 
15th December IHG acquired Kimpton Hotels & Restaurants for $430 million. 
18th December  
Berenberg had issued a buy note with a £27.50 price target, stating that 
IHG could merge or take over Hyatt.  
2015   
July 
IHG agreed to sell another large trophy hotel - the InterContinental Hong 
Kong - for $938 million. 
July 
IHG had held early stage merger talks with Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
Worldwide Inc. to create the world’s largest hotel group. 
September  
MCM sold most of its 4 per cent shareholding in IHG and sources close to 
the situation had suggested that MCM was not an investor in the company.  
 
 
6.4.1 Period I: January 2012-December 2013 
As mentioned previously, the financial crisis negatively influenced the global hotel 




Figure 6.2 IHG Share Price Year 2006 - 2017 
 
Source: Seeking Alpha (2017a) IHG [Online]. Available at: https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/IHG/chart [Accessed 
24 August 2017].  
 
After a considerable drop in the share price during the financial crisis, IHG’s share 
price started to recover leading to a peak of $22.56 per share in January 2011. 
However, for almost a year (January 2011 to January 2012) the share price continued 
to decrease. During the second quarter of 2012, TFM announced that they had bought 
a 4.27% stake in IHG ($33.36 share price value as of 14 May 2012) and had become 
the fifth largest shareholder in the company. Traders in the London market believed 
that Peltz, who had been successful in the activism arena by forcing changes in public 
companies, would benefit IHG who was underperforming compared to its peers (Shea, 
2012). 
 
TFM’s move sent IHG’s share price up almost 6% within one day, stoked takeover 
speculations and increased shareholders’ hopes that TFM’s involvement would 
maximise shareholder value (Shea, 2012). Asked whether he was worried about 




















































































































































































































































































































had a track record of investing in companies that create value, and anybody could buy 
and sell IHG’s shares – TFM are just another shareholder – (Steiner, 2012).  
 
Analysts believed that Peltz would probably be looking to push IHG to sell more of its 
owned and operated hotels. Wyn Ellis of Numis Securities (a financial advisory firm) 
shared another view concerning TFM’s move and said that: ‘Consolidation is inevitable 
at some stage. IHG, trading at an apparently perpetual discount to its US peers, looks 
like a possible consolidate’ (Foley and English, 2012; Reuters, 2012; Thomas, 2012). 
The first big consolidation of the global hotel industry occurred in November 2015 with 
Marriott’s acquisition of Starwood Hotels and Resorts.  
 
On 19 February 2013, IHG confirmed that TFM had reduced its holding in the company 
to less than 1% and shortly after this period, the fund exited the group ($39.98 share 
price value at 4 March 2013) (Walsh, 2013). According to the Hotel Analyst (2013b), 
IHG’s shares had a strong run between January 2012 and January 2013 and TFM 
profited by reducing its holding. Over the course of TFM’s investment, IHG made 
progress in monetising its real estate assets, culminating in the sale of assets 
equivalent to approximately 10% of IHG’s market capitalisation. In 2013, IHG also 
delivered a 26% total return to investors and the company kept buying back stock: 
they had completed the latest $500 million repurchase on 29 May 2013 (Elliott, 2014). 
In addition, over a decade the company handed back to shareholders more than £10 
billion in dividends (Fletcher, 2014a; Robinson and Massoudi, 2014b). 
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6.4.2. Period II: January 2014-December 2015 
In May 2014, IHG rejected a £6 billion bid from an undisclosed US suitor. According 
to Kleinman (2014) Wyndham Worldwide Corporation (WYN) made a preliminary offer 
to acquire IHG. WYN was examining a merger with IHG in order to pursue a tax 
inversion, under which its tax domicile (US) would have switched to the UK that 
provided favourable corporate tax rates. Shortly after IHG’s rejection of the bid, MCM 
revealed on 29 May 2014 that it was one of IHG’s largest shareholders (the fifth 
largest) through its ownership of 3.8% (a $400 million investment on £50.60 share 
price value as of 19 May 2014) and called on the company’s management to seriously 
consider a takeover bid. In a statement, the fund said that the ‘prospect of a merger 
with a larger hotel operator would have compelling strategic and financial merit and 
would reshape the hospitality industry’ (Ide, 2014; Robinson and Massoudi, 2014b). 
 
The fund encouraged IHG’s Board to explore such an option and engage advisors to 
conduct a formal process to ensure it evaluated the full range of opportunities available 
to maximise value. The takeover speculation left IHG’s shares trading at an all-time 
high (Robinson and Massoudi, 2014b). IHG remained silent on the bid rumours during 
the summer. On 4 August 2014 and one day before IHG unveiled its half-year results 
to the City, MCM announced that it had Houlikan Lokey (an advisory bank) to find a 
US buyer for a strategic review of the business in order to enhance shareholder value 
(Onge and Brandt, 2014). MCM’s review would focus on various alternatives including, 
but not limited to, improving capital structure and/or capital allocation and strategic 
transactions. The fund believed that the market conditions at the time could 
significantly enhance IHG shareholder value, something that would not be available in 
the future (Bray, 2014; Maidment, 2014). MCM said at the time that it intended to 
143 
 
engage in direct dialogue with IHG’s Board, IHG shareholders and industry 
participants (Zagger, 2014).  
 
IHG did not comment on the reported takeover offer or on MCM’s statements and the 
next day, announced its half-year results. MCM’s pressure intensified after mixed 
results and despite the 6% increase in underlying profits, IHG’s operating profits and 
revenues were down by 8% ($310 million) and 3% ($908 million) respectively. The 
company’s shares fell by almost 3% to 2,290p on the day results were disclosed, 
having fallen steadily since the record high of 2,475p on 24 July (Savage, 2014). IHG 
increased its half-year dividend by 9%, to 25 cents per share; however, the payment 
of the $750 million special dividend in May 2014 pushed the company’s net debt to 
about $1.8 billion – up from $1.03 billion at the end of June (Armstrong, 2014a; CNBC, 
2014; Robinson and Massoudi, 2014a).  
 
On 11 November 2014, MCM released a letter to IHG shareholders that included a 
77-page presentation outlining the results of an independent evaluation of various 
potential strategic alternatives conducted by Houlikan Lokey (Armstrong, 2014b). 
MCM publicly released its analysis because IHG’s Board had dismissed the fund’s 
suggestion to merge with a larger operator. MCM stated that in order to ensure the 
Board and IHG’s shareholders were acting responsibly and in the interests of all IHG 
shareholders, they made the analysis available on a website that they had created – 
www.IHGvaluecreation.com – (the website has since been taken down) (PR 
Newswire, 2014). After the analysis was made publicly available, IHG’s share price 
jumped 3% to $40.36 (Brandt, 2014; Herbst-Bayliss, 2014). The fact that IHG had 
dismissed previous suggestions by MCM to explore strategic alternatives, led the fund 
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to decide to build its stake further. It suggested that the Board ‘was not giving due 
consideration to the strategic alternatives available in the industry and M&A 
environment’. According to MCM, IHG had neither solicited offers nor performed the 
rigorous analysis necessary to evaluate potential share-enhancing options (Brandt, 
2014; Herbst-Bayliss, 2014; PR Newswire, 2014). 
 
After receiving Houlikan Lokey’s evaluation, MCM concluded that on a standalone 
basis, IHG would not be able to provide shareholder value compared to what could 
have been achieved if it combined with another major hotel operator (PRNewswire, 
2014). MCM argued that an equity combination with a major hotel operator could 
deliver a premium upwards of 100% over IHG’s share price at the time, creating a 
powerful and diversified hotel management company (Herbst-Bayliss, 2014). Most 
importantly, in the event of a transaction, IHG’s shareholders would maintain 
ownership of any combined entity, therefore enabling MCM to participate in the long-
term upside of the larger company (Armstrong, 2014b; PR Newswire, 2014). MCM 
further added that there would be synergies and growth opportunities through the 
expanded scope and scale of the business (Brandt, 2014). In its public presentation, 
MCM presented a timeline of IHG’s share price from January 2014 up to September 
of the same year that shows a considerable increase in IHG’s share price since MCM’s 
intervention in the company (see Figure 6.5). On March 2014, when MCM begun 
purchasing IHG shares, the price per share was valued approximately at £18.30. 
Following several MCM interventions over the next months, the price per share was 




Figure 6.3 IHG Share Price January 2014-September 2014 
Source: SlideShare (2016) Marcato Capital - IHG September Board Presentation [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.slideshare.net/RyanMartin57/marcato-capital-ihg-september-board-presentation [Accessed 14 
August 2017].  
 
The above timeline of IHG’s share price intended to influence IHG’s Board and 
shareholders, therefore intensifying the pressure on the company. In its presentation, 
MCM indicated that Houlihan Lokey’s research highlighted key points. 
 
The first point the fund highlighted on their presentation was the potential contribution 
of the global M&A market growth to the Board’s urgency (abundance of low-cost 
financing and increased cross-border activity). Justifying its statement, MCM referred 
to record-low interest rates and improved business confidence in the global M&A 
market. The fund referred to the increasing desire for geographic diversification as well 
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as the intensifying search for revenue growth and expense efficiencies (Hotel Analyst, 
2014).  
 
The second point was related to the existence of latent interest from several potential 
industry partners. Numerous diverse business combinations could deliver permanent 
value creation for IHG shareholders as owners in a new hospitality company. MCM’s 
presentation noted that a combination with any of the main three – Starwood, Marriott 
or Hilton – would create the largest and most valuable hospitality company in the world. 
A combination with any of these strategic partners had the potential to: i) create a 
powerful and diversified hotel management company with significant global scale, ii) 
enable revenue synergies expanding their loyalty programme, iii) allow for potential 
cost and tax efficiencies, iv) serve as a catalyst to reach optimal capital structure 
targets. Concluding the key points MCM advised IHG to hire an independent financial 
advisor and conduct a full and formal evaluation of strategic alternatives and their 
impact on shareholder value stressing the timing of that period (Hotel Analyst, 2014). 
  
In response to MCM’s public presentation, IHG issued a statement and said that they 
had met MCM twice (22 September 2014 and 20 October 2014) and reviewed the 
fund’s analysis. Following the review, the Board concluded that it remained in the best 
interests of its shareholders to pursue the company’s strategy for quality growth and 
by delivering operational and financial performance (IHG, 2014).  
 
On 18 December, after IHG’s response to MCM, Berenberg (a private banking 
company) issued a buy note with a £27.50 price target and said that IHG could merge 
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or take over another hotel company, but was more likely to be the ‘prey rather than the 
predator’, with Starwood or Hilton the most obvious acquirers. In their statement, 
Berenberg concluded that on a standalone basis, IHG was fully valued and 
consolidation should be inevitable. During the same week, IHG acquired Kimpton 
Hotels & Restaurants for $430 million, but Berenberg believed that it would take a 
much bigger deal for IHG to retain its independence. Berenberg conducted a detailed 
analysis and concluded that IHG should consider merging or acquiring Hyatt (or other 
small players). However, according to Berenberg, IHG was likely to be the prey in 
industry consolidation and an offer of £29 to £30 should secure management approval 
(Fletcher, 2014b). It is worth noting that amid MCM’s pressure to change course, IHG 
continued to sell its large trophy hotels, including the sale of Paris Le-Grand to 
Constellation Hotels for $405 million (Holton, 2014).   
 
In July 2015, IHG had agreed to sell another large trophy hotel – InterContinental Hong 
Kong – for $938 million to fend off the attention of circling activist investors. The sale 
of the hotel raised hopes at the time of further returns to shareholders after IHG 
pledged an 11% boost to its dividend in February 2015. IHG had returned more than 
$1bn to shareholders in 2014, including a $736m special dividend in May 2014 after 
an informal takeover approach and the sale of two hotels (Fox, 2015; Martin, 2015; 
Paton and Thomas, 2015). On July 2015, it was revealed that IHG had held early stage 
merger talks with Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc. The informal talks were 
tentative, and Starwood could choose another suitor to pursue another strategy at the 
time. IHG said in a statement that the company was not ‘in talks with Starwood with a 
view to a combination of the businesses’ (Shanahan, Fahmy and Johnson, 2015). 
IHG’s CEO, Richard Solomons declined to comment on the merger talks as the 
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company reported a 21.5% rise in first-half pre-tax profits to $458 million and he added 
that IHG’s strategy was to grow organically. He further added that ‘there is a lot of 
noise around consolidation. If you look back a few years back it was real; now it is 
effectively organic’ (Massoudi, Moore and Fontanella - Khan, 2015).  
 
IHG, according to Solomons, had achieved extensive organic consolidation as the 
company had signed more deals in the first half of 2015 than at any time since 2008. 
The company was building new brands and buying brands such as Kimpton Hotels & 
Restaurants (Massoudi et al., 2015). Shortly after the reporting of the talks by The 
Financial Times, IHG shares surged 4.6% (Massoudi et al., 2015; Shanahan et al., 
2015). 
 
In the beginning of September 2015, MCM had sold most of its 4% shareholding 
($44.41 share price value as of 7 September 2015) in IHG and sources close to the 
situation had suggested that MCM was no longer an investor in the company. It was 
believed that the fund sold its stake following a denial by IHG of a report in late July 
2015 that said that the company had held preliminary talks with Starwood Hotels & 
Resorts (Kleinman, 2015). Some sources believed that the surge of IHG’s shares over 
the summer of 2015 led MCM to make its exit, by making a ‘significant gain’. However, 
it was suggested that underperformance of other MCM’s top holdings over the summer 
led MCM to this move. More specifically, MCM had the majority of its portfolio invested 
in Bank of New York whose shares were down 8.3% in August 2015. Other notable 
holdings, Sotheby’s and NCR were down 16% and 9% respectively for August 




This chapter has presented the research findings emerging from the online 
documentary information and archival investigation of shareholder activism in IHG. 
Both shareholder activists, TFM and MCM, exerted significant pressure on IHG’s 
Board over two different periods, in 2012 and 2014 respectively. Both activists 
believed that the company could be a takeover target and that it would be more 
valuable if a competitor acquired it. Interestingly, the activists did not follow the same 
tactics when entering IHG as shareholders. MCM was more ‘vocal’ and took a more 
aggressive approach by engaging publicly with IHG compared to TFM who remained 
silent during their time in the company.   
 
Despite shareholder activism on two separate periods, IHG remained a standalone 
company. However, both shareholder activists profited from their investments as their 
exit from the company allowed them to gain returns on their investment when IHG 
returned dividends to its shareholders, a tactic that shareholder activists apply in their 
targets. The next case study presents the struggle of the targeted company with four 












CHAPTER SEVEN - CASE STUDY III MORGANS HOTEL GROUP 
 
7.0 Introduction 
The aim of this case study is to discuss and analyse OTK Associates, LLC (OTK), 
Yucaipa Companies, LLC (YC), Kerrisdale Capital Management (KCM) and 
Rambleside Holdings LLC (RH) investment and activism targeting Morgans Hotel 
Group (MOR). All entities made numerous interventions to MOR’s Board of Directors 
over an eight-year period (2008-2016). During their activism, all entities expressed the 
following intentions regarding MOR’s future:  
 
1. OTK’s main intention was to assume full control of the Board. OTK’s panel 
would seek to both grow the business and return MOR into profitability and 
evaluate and pursue strategic alternatives in a disinterested fashion.  
 
2. YC urged both a sale process and increased transparency by the Board. 
 
3. KCM wanted to take full control of the Board and believed that MOR should 
explore all strategic alternatives including the sale of the company at the time. 
 
4. RH suggested steps for MOR to reform its corporate governance and urged the 
company to sell its hotels and management company separately.   
 
Eventually, in late 2016 and after a long process, SBE Entertainment Group (SBE) 
acquired MOR. As part of the transaction, SBE received a significant investment from 
Cain Hoy Enterprises, a global real estate investment company. In addition, YC 
converted its stake at the time in MOR into an ownership interest in SBE. The other 
shareholder activists sold their shares to MOR at the end of September of 2016, after 
all MOR’s shareholders approved the sale of the group to SBE, a transaction that paid 




7.1 The Players 
 
The Target  
In 1984, Ian Schrager10 and Steve Rubell founded MOR when they opened the 
company’s first hotel in New York. MOR grew by acquiring, redeveloping and 
operating assets initially in New York, in Miami and in Los Angeles. In 1997 and 1998, 
NCIC11 acquired a majority interest in MOR in a series of transactions that resulted in 
the integration of the management, development and ownership parts of its business. 
In the following two years, from 1999 to 2001, MOR opened hotels in major cities – 
London, New York and San Francisco –, while in 2002, the company for the first time 
entered into a transaction when it acquired a minority interest in the Shore Club in 
Miami (SEC, 2006).12 
 
SBE’s portfolio of MOR brands currently consists of 11 properties and 2 properties 
under development and all of its hotels are in desirable urban and resort markets in 
the US, Europe and the Middle East. SBE’s portfolio comprises four MOR brands 
(Delano, Mondrian, Hudson and Originals) (see Table 7.1) and 4,212 rooms (including 
those under development), that comprise banqueting space, restaurants, cocktail bars 
and spas (SBE - Morgans Hotel Group, 2020). SBE in their website lists another 11 
hotels under development from MOR brands but with no additional information 
(number of rooms) rather than the location of the assets (SBE, 2020).  
 
10 Ian Schrager is considered as the Steve Jobs of the hospitality industry. He and his partner invented the boutique hotel 
concept with the Morgans hotel in 1984, a market that currently represents a $6.6bn market in the US (Mashayekhi, 2016A; 
Williams, 2017). 
11 NCIC was organised for the purpose of investing in real estate and real estate related companies. Its founders, Scheetz and 
Hamamoto served at MOR as president and CEO and chairman respectively. 
12 SEC (2006a) Form 10-K 2015 Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000110465906021211/a06-6912_210k.htm [Accessed 15 June 2015].  
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Each hotel brand presents several distinctive characteristics that enable the group to 
gain an advantage over its competitors. MOR described itself as the global leader of 
the lifestyle hospitality sector, dedicated to building a differentiated brand portfolio and 
establishing their hotels in urban and resort markets.13  
 








DELANO      
Delano is the ultimate oasis of sensuality and soul, where sophistication 
and ease seamlessly blend with timeless design. Effortlessly chic and 
flirtatious, yet restrained in its simplicity, Delano is proof that the new rules 
of elegance are crisp, clean, and modern, without fuss or complexity.  2 1,311 
MONDRIAN      
Mondrian is a place to see-and-be-seen. Here we believe in the perfect 
moment, where confidence reigns and perpetual possibility awaits. Intense, 
current, and playful, Mondrian is bold and brave, offering instant excitement 
the minute the door swings open - seductive and striking, and it’s where 
glamour and fantasy prevail.  4 852 
HUDSON      
Hudson is filled with exuberance and energy, social interaction and passion 
for life. It all begins in the lobby, the heart and soul of the hotel, where 
intriguing lives intersect, genuine conversations spark, and adventure and 
experimentation begin. Spirited and casual, Hudson is the perfect urban 
playground, where youthful curiosity hangs with eclectic enchantment, and 
around every corner lies another opportunity to explore.  1 866 
ORIGINALS      
Originals are a family of individual hotels that shun the status quo, each 
distinctive and daring, creating a surreal fantasy where anything is possible. 
Stimulating, charismatic and iconic, Originals bring vision and style together 
with a spirit filled with magic and illusion.  4 725 
Under Development 
2 458 
Total  13 4,212 
Source: SBE - Morgans Hotel Group (2020) About Us [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.morganshotelgroup.com/page/about-us [Accessed 15 February 2020].  
 
 
13 SBE - Morgans Hotel Group (2020) About Us [Online]. Available at: https://www.morganshotelgroup.com/page/about-us 




After almost twenty years, Schrager stepped down from MOR in 2005, before the 
company’s IPO in 2006 (Mashayekhi, 2016a). On 19 October 2005, MOR was 
incorporated as a Delaware14 corporation to complete an IPO and its shares traded on 
the NASDAQ. On 17 February 2006, the company completed its IPO by offering 
15,000,000 shares at $20 per share resulting in estimated net proceeds to the 
company of $272.3 million after ‘underwriters’ discounts’15 and estimated offering 
expenses16 (see Appendix 4). According to speculations, the company had been for 
sale since September 2007 and as a result, the following year it drew takeover interest 
from real estate investors and investment funds (MacIntosh, 2008). These events 
indicate a long-term interest from potential buyers because it was not until September 
2016 that MOR’s shareholders finally approved the group’s acquisition by SBE 
Entertainment Group in a deal that valued the company at around $805 million and 
was completed in December 2016 (Gourarie, 2016; Karmin, 2016a).  
 
Financial Performance 2006-2015  
Similar to SHR and IHG, MOR did not escape the financial crisis; it performed poorly 
and this is the period when shareholder activists began acquiring stakes in the 
company. The group’s revenues were in decline for almost a six-year period, down 
from approximately $306 million in 2007 to a low of approximately $189 million in 2012 
(see Table 7.2).  
 
 
14 The state where the majority of the largest US companies are incorporated, and its corporate law often serves as the authority 
that other US states look to when developing their own statutory and case law (Rose and Sharfman, 2015).  
15 Is the differential between the price paid to the issuer for the new issue and the prices at which securities are initially offered 
to the investing public (USLEGAL, n.d.) 
16SEC (2006b) Form 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2006 [Online]. Available at: 




Table 7.2 MOR Revenue and Net Income Years 2006-2015 
Year  Revenue ($) Revenue Change % Net Income ($) 
Net Income 
Change % 
2006 273,091,000   -10,228   
2007 306,249,000 12% -11,975 17% 
2008 300,679,000 -2% -54,569 356% 
2009 225,051,000 -25% -101,605 86% 
2010 236,370,000 5% -83,648 -18% 
2011 207,332,000 -12% -88,442 6% 
2012 189,919,000 -8% -56,491 -36% 
2013 236,486,000 25% -44,150 -22% 
2014 234,961,000 -1% -50,043 13% 
2015 219,982,000 -6% 22,050 -144% 
Source: SEC (2010b) Form 10-K, Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000095012311025968/c06644e10vk.htm#C06644106 
[Accessed 16 May 2015]. SEC (2015g) Form 10-K, Annual Report [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000156459016014693/mhgc-
10k_20151231.htm#ITEM3_LEGAL_PROCEEDINGS  [Accessed 12 January 2016]. 
 
In September 2008, according to Smith Travel Research, hotel occupancy in the US 
was down 5% compared to the previous year. During the last week of September 
2008, cancellations of reservations were running about 50% above normal at full-
service hotels in the US (Sharkey, 2008). Weston (2009) argued that MOR did not 
perform well during the same period because of (1) its heavy exposure to the worst 
performing segment of the weak lodging industry and because (2) several properties 
in its portfolio were heavily mortgaged.  
 
Because of the declining revenues over the six-year period (2007-2012), MOR’s net 
income was negative with the biggest loss recorded in 2009 of $101,605. In the second 
quarter of 2009, Weston (2009) noted that MOR’s revenue per available room had 
plummeted to -39.5% in contrast to the overall hotel industry that was around -20%. 
Even some of MOR competitors demonstrated negative results within the same 
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period. For example, in the third quarter of 2008 profit fell 28% at Marriott International 
(Sharkey, 2008).  
 
In 2013, MOR’s revenues increased by 25% compared to 2012. Despite the revenue 
growth, over the next two years, MOR’s revenues further declined by 6% reaching 
$219 million in 2015. During the same period, MOR presented positive income results 
in 2015 – this is the only time since 2006 that MOR net income results were positive 
– a year before its acquisition. MOR’s financial performance also resulted in significant 
variations in its valuation which sunk to $52 million in 2016 after peaking at $800 million 
in 2007. In addition, in 2016 the company ended up in debt of $500 million 
(Mashayekhi, 2016a).  
 
During the 2008-2013 period, MOR’s stock performance was in the bottom 20% of 
companies in the NASDAQ composite index and its share price plummeted by 63%. 
After 2013 and up to the first quarter of 2015, the group’s share price showed 





Figure 7.1 MOR Share Price Years 2008-2016 
 
Source: Seeking Alpha (2017b) MHGC [Online]. Available at: https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/MHGC [Accessed: 
5 January 2018].   
 
From March 2015 up to March 2016 MOR’s share price showed a considerable drop 
and it reached $2.50 per share which is equal to a price drop of 79% (Seeking Alpha, 
2017b). In addition, had the company performed in line with its peers, its equity market 
capitalisation would be nearly four times what it was in 2013 (almost $272.9 million) 
(Business Wire, 2013d). 
 
After several efforts and intensifying pressure from all shareholder activists, in 
December 2016, SBE acquired the group. Shortly before the acquisition was 
approved, MOR’s market capitalisation was $47.97 million as of 31 March 2016 
(Equities Staff, 2016), a considerably reduced figure compared to 2008 and before the 
peak of the financial crisis, when its market capitalisation had been estimated to be 
$415 million (MacIntosh, 2008). The interesting part of MOR’s takeover is the fact that 
SBE’s owner, Sam Nazarian has a 50% interest in SBE including the day-to-day 
management responsibilities, with the remainder of the group split between YC (former 
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Some of the problems that the company faced, according to analysts started when the 
company went public in 2006. Ryan Meliker, a hotel analyst, told the Wall Street 
Journal in 2013 that: ‘Morgans should not be a public company. It is way too small a 
company to be public and have public operating and reporting costs’ (Mashayekhi, 
2016a). After Schrager’s departure in 2005, four chief executive officers led MOR and 
since 2013, the company had been without a permanent CEO and its interim CEO left 
the company in 2015 (Ting, 2016). The continuous leadership changes exposed 
problems in the company’s corporate governance structure, a point emphasised by all 
activists during their tenure. Prior to its acquisition, MOR’s executive officers were 
Richard T. Szymanski, Meredith L. Deutch and Chadi Farhat (see Table 7.3).  
 
Table 7.3 MOR Executive Officers Before its Acquisition as of December 2016 
Name Role  Other MHG roles 
Richard T. Szymanski  
Principal Executive Officer for SEC 
Reporting Purposes since May 2016 Chief Financial Officer 
Meredith L. Deutsch  
Executive Vice President, General 
Counsel (since May 2014)  Secretary (since March 2015) 
Chadi Farhat 
Senior Vice President and Chief 
Revenue Officer of the Company 
(since March 2015), 
Interim Chief Operating Officer  
since February 2016 
Source: SEC (2016b) Schedule 14A - Proxy Statement [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000156459016016282/mhgc-def14a_20160512.htm 
[Accessed 16 December 2016].  
 
MOR’s officers who were part of its operating structure were not members of its Board 
(see Figure 7.2). Therefore, their non-presence on the Board would restrict their views 
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on several matters concerning the company, especially MOR’s potential sale. MOR’s 
longest serving officer, Richard Szymanski (CFO since 2005) was appointed as its 
principal executive officer for SEC reporting purposes in 2016, a role that could be 
linked to speculations over a sale of the company.   
 
Figure 7.2 MOR Board of Directors as of 18 May 2016 
 
 
Source: SEC (2016c) Form 8-K - Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312516594440/d194270d8k.htm [Accessed: 16 
December 2017].  
 
MOR’s Board consisted of nine members. The Board’s chairman was Howard Lorber 
whose company (Vector Group) had shareholder interests in MOR and held the role 
because the company did not have a CEO at the time. MOR did not have a policy 
regarding whether the offices of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 
could or could not be held by the same individual. MOR’s governance documents 
permitted the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer to be the same or different 
159 
 
individuals. This provided the Board with the flexibility to determine whether these 
roles should be combined or separated based on the company’s circumstances and 
needs at any given time (SEC, 2016c). As can be seen below (see Table 7.4), six 
Board members had a shareholder interest in the company. Four Board members with 
shareholder interest pursued an activist approach during their tenure at the company, 
while two of MOR’s shareholder activists did not have Board representation at the 


















Table 7.4 Overview of the Members of the Board of Directors 
Name 




Role at the 
Board 
Other Duties at the 
Board 












May 2015 - 
Operating 
Committee of the 
Board 







2014) Board Member - 
Vice President and Partner at 
Hotel Assets Group, LLC (Has 
been the principal broker for 
over 150 hotel transactions 




2015) Board Member 
Audit Committee 
since May 2015 -
Operating 
Committee of the 
Board  





2013) Board Member 
Chairman of the 
Audit Committee,  
member of the 
Compensation 





Up to June 2013 - Vice 
President of Olshan Hotel 
Management Inc 
The Olshan family 
is one of the 









(was the interim 
CEO at MOR 
and was 
Chairman of the 
Board of 
Directors) 




Committee from July 
2011 through March 
2013 and from June 
2013 through August 
2013 CEO Talisman Group, LLC 
Founding member 






2015)  Board Member - 























Committee of the 
Board of Directors 
Chairman and Managing 
Partner of O-CAP 
Management, L.P. Co - 
Manager of OTK Associates 
LLC 







2014) Board Member 
Chairman of the 
Compensation 
Committee 
Chief Executive Officer of 





2015) Board Member 
Member of our 
Compensation 
Committee and Audit 
Committee 
Portfolio Manager at Pine 
River Capital Management 
Pine River Capital 
Management 
(Shareholder) 
Source: SEC (2016c) Form 8-K - Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312516594440/d194270d8k.htm [Accessed 16 





In contrast, the shareholder activists who had Board membership had been on the 
company’s Board for a few years. Jason T. Kalisman had been a Board member since 
April 2011 and he had served as an interim CEO and as the Chairman of the Board. 
Three members of MOR’s Board were part of OTK, while one member represented 
YC. During shareholder activism both funds had different visions about MOR’s future. 
 
7.2 The Activists 
 
OTK Associates (OTK) LLC 
OTK was a Delaware limited liability company based in Michigan and it was an 
investment entity (SEC, 2008B).17 The entity was controlled by the Olshan hedge-fund 
family (50%) and the Taubman luxury-mall family (50%) (Hudson, 2013c). The Olshan 
family privately owns a real estate firm. Olshan properties specialises in the 
development, acquisition and management of commercial real estate. The company 
manages properties in 11 US states with a staff of over 1,000 employees (Olshan 
Properties, 2017). The Taubman family controls Taubman Centers, a real investment 
trust (REIT) that owns, manages and/or leases 26 regional, super-regional and outlet 
shopping centres in the US and Asia (Taubman, 2020).  
 
On 22 January 2008, OTK bought 4,500,000 shares representing almost 14% of 
MOR’s outstanding common shares of approximate value of $68.4 million. OTK filed 
a Schedule-13D report on 27 February 2008 to report the purchase of shares in the 
open market for investment purposes (SEC, 2008B). According to PR Newswire 
 
17 SEC (2008b) Form SC 13D [Online]. Available at: 




(2015c), OTK was not an investment advisor, investment fund or other professional 
enterprise, it did not have any online presence and after extensive research on the 
Internet, the study did not identify other investment holdings of the firm. Although OTK 
claimed that they were not ‘a shareholder activist’, throughout their investment in MOR 
they pursued an activist approach with numerous interventions into the workings of 
MOR’s Board.  
 
Yucaipa Companies (YC) LLC  
YC is an investment company founded in 1986 by Roland Burkle, one of the US’s 
preeminent investors in several industries. The company has completed mergers and 
acquisitions valued at more than $40 billion. According to its website, the firm ‘works 
with management to strategically reposition businesses and implement operational 
improvements, resulting in value creation for investors’ (The Yucaipa Companies, 
2020). 
 
YC specialises in start-ups, middle market, growth capital, industry consolidation, 
buyouts and turnaround investments and usually invests in food-related businesses, 
distribution, consumer, retail, logistics, hospitality and entertainment industries. It 
considers investments between $25 million and $300 million and will invest in 
companies with revenues of between $300 million and $500 million (Bloomberg, 
2017b). Table 7.5 set outs some of YC’s and Burkle’s most notable investments over 
the 10-year period, 2006-2016.  
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Table 7.5 YC and Burkle’s Investment Portfolio 2006-2015 





hold Value ($) Filing Date 
WILLAMETTE 
INDUSTRIES, INC.  
Forest 




MARKET INC.  
Consumer 




GROUP Hospitality 12,522,367 26.4 26,923,095 9th May 2016 
AMERICAN 
APPAREL INC 




WORLDWIDE INC.  
Marketing / 





   Source: WhaleWisdom (2017a) Burkle Roland [Online]. Available at: https://whalewisdom.com/filer/burkle-  
ronald-  w#tabsummary_tab_link [Accessed 10 November 2017]. 
 
YC’s investment portfolio confirms its strategy to invest in small to medium companies. 
YC’s total shareholding interests in companies ranged from 6% to 91.25% from 2006-
2016 (WhaleWisdom,2017a). This may be related to the nature of the fund’s 
investments; for example, it may be linked to their intentions in terms of whether they 
would pursue a sale or merger of the target or push for changes in the governance 
structure of each target. YC has since exited all the above investments.   
 
Consumers’ decisions to shift down market from luxury hotel brands after the financial 
crisis caused problems for hotel operators. Worried about liquidity and searching for 
expansion, MOR made a deal with YC. Through two affiliated investment funds at 
multiple levels of MOR’s capital structure, YC exercised significant influence over the 
company (Delaware Courts, 2013). On 15 October 2009, YC made a $75 million 
infusion18 to MOR and in exchange the fund received preferred securities that had an 
 
18 A private investment in private equity, or PIPE. In other words, Yucaipa had taken a large ownership (lending money), 
rescuing the company (MHG). 
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8% dividend rate for the first five years, a 10% rate for years 6-7; and for any remaining 
balances a 20% rate thereafter. In addition, YC received warrants to acquire as many 
as 12.5 million shares (at an exercice price of $6 per share) of MOR’s common stock 
at the time, the right to nominate one director and extensive control rights (veto sale) 
over MOR (SEC, 2009b; Solomon, 2013b).19  
 
As of May 2013, YC owned almost 28% of MOR, had bought $88m of its debt and one 
of its directors was in charge of MOR (Gray, 2013a). Solomon (2013b) believed that it 
was unclear whether MOR’s management appreciated the consequences of handling 
this degree of control over the company to YC. However, in an investment conference 
call in 2009, MOR’s president referred to YC and Burkle’s investment as being 
‘shareholder friendly’ and able to provide the company with the flexibility to manage 
the post financial crisis period (Solomon, 2013b). 
 
Kerrisdale Capital Management (KCM) 
KCM is a private investment management company based in New York, focusing on 
value investments (Kerrisdale Capital, 2020a). The hedge fund was founded in 2009 
by Sahm Adrangi and currently manages approximately $500 million on investments 
(Kerrisdale Capital, 2020b). The fund had recorded strong gains since 2009 by betting 
both for and against company stocks and in the year period 2009-2014, it averaged 
an annual return of approximately 28%. However, at the beginning of 2016, like other 
hedge funds, the firm suffered double-digit drops resulting in a 7% loss in the first 
 
19 SEC (2009b) Form SC 13D [Online]. Available at: 




quarter of the year (Herbst-Bayliss, 2016). The firm’s total investment portfolio was 
worth approximately $500 million in April 2016 (Delevingne, 2016); however, the firm’s 
SEC filing in June 2017 disclosed a portfolio worth approximately $108 million (see 


















Table 7.6 KCM Portfolio as of 14th August 2017 
Company  Industry 
Number of 
Shares   
% of 
share 
hold Value ($) Filing Date 
LUXOFT HLDG INC Technology 306,481 17.16 18,649,000 30th June 2017 
GIGAMON INC Technology 462,989 16.77 18,219,000 30th June 2017 
COGNIZANT 
TECHNOLOGY 
SOLUTIO Technology 129,396 7.91 8,592,000 30th June 2017 
EBAY INC E-Commerce 227,555 7.31 7,946,000 30th June 2017 
CARS COM INC 
Consumer 
Discretionary 265,000 6.49 7,057,000 30th June 2017 
FOOT LOCKER INC 
Consumer 
Discretionary 130,800 5.93 6,446,000 30th June 2017 
STAMPS.COM INC 
Consumer 
Discretionary 39,781 5.67 6,161,000 30th June 2017 
YELP INC Industrials 200,000 5.52 6,004,000 30th June 2017 
NUTANIX INC Technology 272,550 5.05 5,492,000 30th June 2017 
TOTAL SYS SVCS 
INC Technology/Financial 93,919 5.03 5,471,000 30th June 2017 
JONES LANG 
LASALLE INC Real Estate 40,433 4.65 5,054,000 30th June 2017 
PURE STORAGE  Technology 363,464 4.28 4,656,000 30th June 2017 
PALO ALTO 
NETWORKS INC Technology 23,000 2.83 3,078,000.00 30th June 2017 
CHECK POINT 
SOFTWARE TECH 
LT Technology 13,993 1.34 1,461,000 30th June 2017 
ZENDESK INC Technology 38,900 0.99 1,081,000 30th June 2017 
ETSY INC 
Consumer 
Discretionary 70,000 0.97 1,050,000 30th June 2017 
AZUL  Aviation 37,968 0.74 800,000 30th June 2017 
CARA 
THERAPEUTICS 





Discretionary 33,168 0.63 685,000 30th June 2017 
Source: WhaleWisdom (2017b) Individual Manager Holdings [Online]. Available at: 
http://legacy.whalewisdom.com/filer/kerrisdale-advisers-llc#/tabholdings_tab_link   [Accessed 15 August 2017].  
 
KCM’s investments ranged from approximately $18.65 million to approximately $685K 
and they represented shareholder interests that ranged from 0.63% to 17.16%. On 14 
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February 2013, KCM acquired for the first time, 243,491 of MOR’s shares with a value 
of approximately $1,35 million (SEC, 2013c).20 The hedge fund continued to gradually 
acquire MOR shares and after a year (on 14 February 2014), its investment resulted 
in the possession of 1,272,965 shares (an almost 4% stake in the company at the 
time) with a total value of approximately $10.35 million (SEC, 2014C).21 KCM was a 
strong supporter of MOR’s sale and intensified the pressure during their activism 
through several interventions.  
 
Rambleside Holdings LLC (RH) 
RH is a family-controlled investment company that is active across the real estate 
spectrum and includes direct investing, development and lending (PR Newswire, 
2017). The company is a subsidiary of Rambleside Real Estate Capital LLC and its 
founder, Gregory Cohen, is a well-known activist investor. Commenting on his activist 
approach he has argued that ‘we’re just not afraid or intimidated to go after companies 
that are acting in an inappropriate way’ (Morrissey, 2016). RH’s intervention in MOR 
was short as it took place approximately between August 2015 and February 2016. 
During the seven-month period the company held almost 4% of MOR’s shares 
(Hospitality Net, 2015). Other notable RH investments included the New York REIT 
and the Ashford Hospitality Trust (Morrissey, 2016).  
 
 
20 SEC (2013c) Form 13F-HR [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1569688/000156968813000002/0001569688-13-000002-index.htm [Accessed 10 
June 2015].  
21 SEC (2014c) Form SC 13F-HR [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1569688/000108514614000658/0001085146-14-000658-index.htm [Accessed 10 
June 2015].  
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During their activism at MOR, RH offered to buy two of the company’s hotels, a move 
that would have complicated the merger talks between MOR and SBE Entertainment 
Group. In a letter sent to MOR’s Board, RH stated that it would pay $507 million in 
cash to acquire the Hudson Hotel in New York and the Delano Hotel in Miami (Karmin 
and Hoffman, 2015). The same year, RH took part in another intervention with one of 
its holdings. The company criticised the New York REIT over its share price and 
management decisions. Throughout its activism, RH managed to convince the REIT’s 
management to sell four properties (Morrissey, 2016).  
 
7.3 Case Overview 
Prior to presenting the case, it is important to note the period at which each 
shareholder activist acquired and sold the company’s shares (see Table 7.7). The 
case is presented in chronological order to illustrate the intervention of each activist in 
the workings of MOR’s Board.  
 
Table 7.7 Shareholder Activists’ Investment Overview 
Shareholder 
Activist 
Shares in MHG 
bought in the 
month and year 
% of common 
stock in MHG 
(approx.) Shares in MHG sold 
Activism in 
years/months 
OTK Associates January 2008 14 
End of September 
2016 8.8 
Yucaipa 
Companies  November 2009 28 
MHG has been 
acquired by SBE 
where YC are 
shareholders 6.8 
Kerrisdale Capital 
Management  February 2013 4 












Although the activities of all activists ended in December 2016, their initial investments 
began at different periods and their tenure in the company varied. OTK and YC 
acquired MOR’s shares in 2008 and 2009 respectively and remained shareholders for 
eight and seven years respectively. On the other hand, KCM and RH acquired MOR’s 
shares in 2013 and 2015 respectively and their investments lasted for three and one 
years. Although the acquisition of MOR’s shares by shareholder activists began in 
2008, the interventions and the pressure exerted by the activists did not start until 
2012.  
 
7.4 Shareholder Activism Events 
This section presents how the events unfold during the period 2009-2016. Prior to 
presenting the events, this case study presents an overview of key events that 
occurred to MOR during the activism period (see Table 7.8) in order to enable a 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.4.1 Period I: January 2009-December 2012 
Following the financial crisis, MOR’s share price dropped significantly compared to the 
close of its first year of trading, when it stood at $20 per share (see Figure 7.4). From 
a peak of approximately $22.50 per share in the second half of 2007, MOR’s share 
price started to decline and by 2009, it had sunk to almost $2.50 per share. Its share 
price started to recover in 2010, rising to $5 per share, albeit with continuous 
fluctuations. It reached a peak of approximately $10 per share, however, it ended 
again at almost $2.50 per share in the second half of 2016.  
 
Figure 7.3 MOR Share Price 2008-2016 
 
Source: Seeking Alpha (2017b) MHGC [Online]. Available at: https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/MHGC [Accessed 
5 November 2017].   
 
MOR’s share price performance demonstrates both similarities and differences 
compared to two competitors, Wyndham Worldwide Corporation (currently Wyndham 
Destinations) and Marriott International. WYN’s share price followed a similar path to 
MOR’s share performance when in February 2009, it sunk to $1.66 per share. 
However, its share price started to recover and gradually increased from the second 
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half of 2009 to the current date, with several fluctuations after the second half of 2015 
(Seeking Alpha, 2020a). Marriott’s share price followed a similar path (albeit in higher 
$ share value). In February 2009, its share reached $14.15 per share, but its share 
price started to recover and gradually increased from the second half of 2009 to date 
with minor fluctuations after the second half of 2015 (Seeking Alpha, 2020b). 
  
On 16 November 2009, YC filed a Schedule 13D where, in exchange for a $75 million 
infusion, it would receive preferred securities and warrants to acquire as many as 12.5 
million shares or 9.9% of MOR’s shares ($3.61 share price value), the right to nominate 
one director and extensive control rights (veto sale) over MOR (SEC, 2009b).22 OTK 
as a shareholder in the company since January 2008, also voted favourably for this 
transaction.  
 
A few years later, in 2011, MOR operated under challenging conditions as it struggled 
with a long-term mortgage debt of $534.9 million, equal to about 2.5 times its market 
capitalisation. The high amount of debt and the decline in the share price made the 
company a potential acquisition target (Chernikoff, 2011; Reuters, 2011). On 
December 2011, following the challenges that MOR was facing, its Board established 
a Special Committee to evaluate potential strategic alternatives for the company, 
including a possible transaction with YC (Hotel-Online, 2013). One of the committee 
members was Kalisman, OTK’s Director. In its 2011 annual report, MOR referred to 
its corporate strategy of growing by (1) leveraging its management experience, (2) 
expanding its hotel portfolio into new and existing markets, and (3) targeting internal 
 
22 SEC (2009b) Form SC 13D [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015899/000110465909067170/a09-32210_1sc13d.htm [Accessed 10 June 2015].  
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growth opportunities. To execute this strategy, MOR aimed to shift towards a ‘light 
asset model’, which would be achieved by selling five hotels while retaining the 
management pursuant to long-term management agreements (SEC, 2012).23 Within 
the same year, the group sold two of its London properties – the Sanderson Hotel and 
St Martins Lane – for approximately $300 million while retaining the management of 
both properties (Stamford, 2011).  
 
During 2012, MOR was under continuous pressure from YC who made proposals to 
acquire some of its assets in exchange for YC’s various holdings in the company. YC’s 
proposals were stopped by Kalisman who influenced the Special Committee to stop 
YC’s plans for further control of MOR (Delaware Courts, 2013). Towards the end of 
the year, in October, Hyatt Hotels Corporation (HYC) sent a letter to MOR expressing 
their interest in acquiring all MOR’s outstanding shares ‘at a meaningful premium to 
recent trading levels’, a proposal that was declined (Delaware Courts, 2013).  
 
The following month (November), HYC offered to purchase all outstanding shares of 
MOR for $7.50 per share price, subject to due diligence. The Special Committee 
decided that MOR should not engage in discussions with HYC. YC objected to any 
public disclosure of the HYC bid and threatened to not proceed with the rights offering 
if the offer was disclosed. MOR’s counsel advised that HYC’s offer was important 
information and should be disclosed. However, the Special Committee went against 
the counsel’s advice by giving in to YC and subsequently, failing to provide any 
disclosure about the HYC bid. Although the Special Committee developed a range of 
 
23 SEC (2012) Form 10-K [Online]. Annual Report 2011. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312512106816/d288074d10k.htm [Accessed 10 June 2015].  
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options for MOR, the process of exploring strategic alternatives stalled a month later, 
in November (Delaware Courts, 2013). 
  
7.4.2 Period II: January 2013-December 2013 
On 15 March, OTK sent a letter to MOR indicating their intention to nominate seven 
nominees to the Board at the Annual Meeting of the Shareholders, on 15 May (SEC, 
2013E).24 OTK suggested nominating six candidates and Kalisman, whom OTK 
supported for re-election (AllAboutAlpha, 2013a). OTK’s intention was to replace 
seven of MOR’s eight-member Board (Hoffman, 2013a). Three days later, on 18 
March, OTK sent a letter to MOR shareholders indicating the reasons for its proposal 
to alter its Board. OTK's arguments focused on issues such as the waste of resources 
and failure to capitalise on MOR’s brand value by the Board and the company’s poor 
management. They argued that this had resulted in poor financial performance for 
MOR in the period 2008-2012 when the company made almost $450 million in annual 
losses, and questionable leadership decisions during the Board’s tenure (SEC, 
2013F).25  
 
The latter included the appointment of a CEO, Michael Gross, who had never 
previously served in a publicly listed company and was a paid employee (from 2008-
2011) for MOR’s largest holder (YC) of convertible securities and preferred shares. 
OTK believed that their proposal for its panel had been developed to refocus MOR on 
 
24 SEC (2013d) Form SC 13D [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513111249/d503682dsc13da.htm [Accessed 10 June 2015].  
25 SEC (2013e) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513111256/d503784ddfan14a.htm [Accessed: 10 June 2015].  
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its core business, increase its portfolio and reduce operating cost structure (SEC, 
2013F). 
 
OTK also criticised MOR for cancelled management contracts, property foreclosures, 
debt restructurings, and ‘generous’ compensation for executives. OTK said at the time 
that if it could not return the company to profitability, it would ‘appropriately evaluate 
and pursue strategic alternatives in a disinterested fashion’ (Hoffman, 2013a). 
However, MOR’s CEO, Michael Gross, argued that ‘OTK entered the company stock 
at an average cost of about $15.20 per share, raising questions about whether it would 
support a sale of the company below this price’ (Koyitty, 2013). 
 
Gross’s statement shows that OTK would not explore and pursue strategic alternatives 
unless MOR’s share price showed signs of improvement. In March, MOR’s share price 
was trading below $7 per share and it would potentially represent a loss for OTK if the 
company explored strategic alternatives. On the same day that OTK sent the letter to 
shareholders, MOR stated that it would review the letter and respond appropriately. 
The Board considered the fact that OTK already held Board membership proportionate 
to its ownership and proposed to take full control of the company’s Board without 
paying a premium to MOR’s remaining shareholders (SEC, 2013G).26  
 
On 29 March, OTK was notified by MOR’s counsel that a meeting would take place 
the following day to review and approve a recapitalisation. This recapitalisation 
 
26 SEC (2013f) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513113378/d505197ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 12 June 2015].  
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involved wanting to shift their business plan to focus on managing hotels, rather than 
owning them, a strategy suggested by YC. Under the terms of the transaction, MOR 
would transfer one of its signature assets, the Delano Hotel in Miami Beach, and one 
of its subsidiaries, The Light Group, to entities affiliated with YC (Delaware Courts, 
2013). In exchange, the latter would transfer to the company 75,000 shares of its 
Series A preferred stock, warrants to purchase 12.5 million shares of its common 
stock, and $88 million of its notes. In addition, YC would backstop a $100 million rights 
offering. If any shares were not purchased in the rights offering, YC would have the 
right to purchase those shares. Eventually, on 1 April 2013, MOR duly announced the 
recapitalisation (Voien, 2013).  
 
On 2 April, OTK issued a press release expressing their concern about MOR’s 
recapitalisation announcement and its seemingly close engagement with YC. OTK 
questioned whether the Board’s Special Committee had considered the fact that the 
two MOR directors involved had a significant financial interest in the transaction. In 
addition, OTK believed that the recapitalisation would place a large block of stock in 
‘friendly’ hands prior to the company’s annual meeting. On 5 April, OTK subsequently 
filed a motion to join a derivative lawsuit filed in Delaware Court to stop the transaction 
between MOR and YC (SEC, 2013H).27 
 
On 9 April, MOR issued a press release announcing that it had ‘voluntarily rescheduled 
the $100 million pro-rata rights offering’ and that it would close after the recorded date 
 
27 SEC (2013g) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513137605/d515052ddfan14a.htm [Accessed 12 June 2015].  
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of the company’s 2013 Annual Meeting (SEC, 2013I).28 On 15 April, OTK intensified 
its pressure by releasing another press release in which they continued to ask the 
Delaware Chancery Court to invalidate and rectify the YC transactions. OTK required 
from the Board that: i) YC waive its termination fee, ii) the YC transactions be 
terminated and iii) it should proceed with the original meeting date and record date.  
 
OTK stated that if elected, they would refocus the company on its core business, 
extend its brand portfolio and improve its operating cost structure. On 1 May, MOR 
held a conference call discussing its first quarter 2013 results and its CEO, Michael 
Gross, stated that the negotiations with YC had been ongoing for one and a half years 
and that OTK had been part of the process (SEC, 2013J).29   
 
On 28 May, OTK delivered a presentation to investors and ISS30 addressing areas of 
concern, namely, MOR’s share price performance and the Board’s composition that 
had been raised over the years (SEC, 2013K).31 Some of these areas included:  
 
1. Share price performance. Since its IPO, MOR had underperformed compared with 
competitors such as Choice Hotels International, Marriott International and Wyndham 
 
28SEC (2013h) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513147302/d519162ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 12 June 2015]. 
29SEC (2013i) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513154991/d521764ddfan14a.htm [Accessed 12 June 2015].  
30 The world’s leading provider of corporate governance and responsible investment solutions for asset owners, asset 
managers, hedge funds and asset service providers.  
31SEC (2013j) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 




Hotels and Resorts and peer groups such as Wynn Resorts, Ryman Hospitality 
Properties from 2009-2013.  
2. Poor returns. Since its IPO its returns were significantly below peers over the period 
2009-2013.  
3. Qualifications of MOR Board of Directors (see Table 7.9). 
 
Table 7.9 Lack of Qualifications of MOR Board of Directors 
Existing Directors are not Qualified to Serve on the Morgan's Board 
Name  Key Attributes 
Michael Gross 
No previous lodging experience 
No previous operating experience 
Partnered with Yucaipa since 2004 and handpicked by 
Yucaipa to be CEO; lack of independence 
Jeffery Gault 
No previous lodging experience 
President and CEO of Americold, a Yucaipa portfolio 
company; lack of independence 
Thomas Harrison 
No previous lodging experience 
No real estate experience 
Marketing services background 
Robert Friedman 
No previous lodging experience 
No real estate experience 
Entertainment background 
Ron Burkle 
No previous lodging experience 
No real estate experience 
Founding and Managing Director of Yucaipa; inherent 
conflict of interest with shareholders 
Source: SEC (2013j) Form SC 14A Available at:                
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513236552/d539255ddfan14a.htm [Accessed: 16 
June 2017].  
 
MOR’s Board poorly executed its asset-light strategy, resulting in declining revenues, 
declining EBITDA margins and negative net income. The company’s largest general 
and administrative item was executive compensation that was not related to MOR’s 
performance. Re-electing the Board at the time would be destructive for MOR as their 
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interests were not aligned with those of the shareholders. In response to OTK’s 
presentation, on 30 May, MOR made a presentation to ISS and to investors (SEC, 
2013L)32 committing that it intended to increase value by establishing and executing a 
clear strategy by creating shareholder value (see Table 7.10).  
 
Table 7.10 MOR’s Economic Model 
Creating Shareholder Value - Our Detailed Economic Model 
MORGANS HOTEL 
GROUP 
    
Target Signing of 2-4 New Contracts Per Year 
Shareholder Value 
4 new contracts signed in 2012 
Current infrastructure capable of supporting additional business 
  
Long-Term Contracts: 15-20 Years Plus Renewals 
Base fees and chains service reimbursements on managed hotels 
Incentive fees 
License fees on selected hotels 
  
Limited Capital Investment 
Historical fees per hotel management agreement average between 
$750,000 to $1 million per 100 rooms 
Target a 3-4 year payback on upfront invested capital 
  
High Incremental Margins 
Incremental cash flow margins projected at 90% on new hotels in the 
pipeline due to scalable infrastructure 
Source: SEC (2013j) Form SC 14A Available at:                
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513236552/d539255ddfan14a.htm [Accessed: 16 
June 2017].  
 
MOR also stated that OTK’s director nominees were not aligned with shareholder 
interests. It criticised the activist for: 1) lacking a credible alternative to create 
shareholder value, 2) not having a credible record of controlling Boards and 3) 
 
32SEC (2013k) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513240302/d546743ddefa14a.htm [Accessed: 10 June 20 
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suggested nominees lacking relevant experience. Both families that controlled OTK 
had family members who were director nominees on behalf of the company.  
 
Following MOR’s presentation, OTK issued a letter to shareholders asking them for 
their support to elect its seven nominees at the company’s upcoming annual meeting 
of shareholders (SEC, 2013M).33 In response to OTK’s letter to shareholders, MOR 
issued a press release on 4 June 2013 stating its Board was committed to initiating a 
process to explore strategic alternatives, including the company’s sale, upon their re-
election at the following annual meeting. At the same time, a representative of YC 
announced that it would support MOR’s panel in pursuing such a process, as YC did 
not believe that OTK was qualified to run such a process and believed that their 
election to the Board would ‘lead to continued uncertainty and animosity and deter any 
effort to maximise shareholder value’ (SEC, 2013N).34 In addition, YC’s representative 
commented that YU would not be a bidder for the company (SEC, 2013N).  
 
On 4 June, MOR announced that it had received five expressions of interest in a 
takeover and was considering a sale. The news sent MOR’s share to its highest price 
($7.53) in almost two years (Gray, 2013b). On 5 June, according to a press release 
by MOR, it was announced that ISS had rejected OTK’s attempt to take control of 
MOR’s Board, having identified ‘significant deficiencies’ with the seven candidates 
offered by OTK that made them ‘incapable of representing the interests of all 
shareholders’. MOR had previously announced that it would nominate six candidates 
 
33SEC (2013l) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513243508/d539255ddfan14a.htm [Accessed 10 June 2015].  
34SEC (2013m) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513251017/d551158ddefa14a.htm  [Accessed: 10 June 2015]. 
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for its seven-person board, thereby ensuring that OTK would be represented on the 
Board by at least one director, representation proportional to OTK’s share ownership 
(Gray, 2013b; SEC, 2013O35). 
 
On 14 June, at the company’s annual meeting, MOR shareholders duly elected OTK’s 
entire panel (seven nominees) who opposed the YC transaction. The results came as 
a surprise, disappointing some investors and pushing the group’s shares down by 8%. 
Several observers commented that shareholder support for MOR’s incumbent Board 
was increasing following its promise to sell the company if re-elected (Koyitty, 2013). 
On 20 June, YC sent a letter to the new Board, demanding to know whether it intended 
to go through with the Delano disposal. Up to the date that YC sent the letter, they did 
not receive a response, which equated to a breach of the agreement. YC demanded 
a termination fee of $9 million, and another $1 million of related costs. However, 
analysts at the time had a contrasting view regarding the YC filing, believing that The 
Delano was no longer in financial straits and the disputed deal was a proxy for a larger 
fight over control of the company (AllAboutAlpha, 2013b).  
 
On 19 June, KCM also sent a letter to the Board urging the company to move forward 
with a thorough sale process, to be led by a reputable investment banking firm 
(Kerrisdale Capital, 2013). KCM believed that MOR would be an attractive asset for a 
large international hotel company and they would put forward a panel of bankers, hotel 
 
35SEC (2013n) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 




experts and M&A experts at the company’s next annual meeting (Hoffman, 2013b). 
This served to intensify the pressure on the Board.  
 
On 1 July, Burkle filed a complaint against OTK for using false and misleading proxy 
materials to take control of the Board and accusing it of misrepresenting the 
recommendations of two outside firms, ISS and Glass Lewis Company36 (SEC, 
2013P).37 After a quiet month, turbulence continued at the troubled company until the 
30 August when MOR announced the departure of its CEO, Michael Gross, by 
entering a separation agreement with him and subsequently appointing Kalisman as 
CEO on an interim basis (King, 2013; SEC, 2013Q38). Shortly after the appointment of 
the interim CEO, on 5 September 2013, KCM sent a letter to shareholders indicating 
its intention to nominate a separate set of directors to the Board at the 2014 Annual 
Meeting, arguing that: ‘the current directors of Morgans Hotel do not adequately 
represent the interests of the majority of Morgans’ shareholders’ (SEC, 2013R)39. 
 
They believed that OTK’s views were over-represented on MOR’s Board, while the 
views of the other 85% of shareholders were under-represented. KCM further 
expressed its belief that MOR should initiate an immediate public sale process to sell 
the company to one or multiple strategic acquirers (SEC, 2013R). Before KCM’s letter 
to the Board, the fund had increased its number of shares from 243,391 
 
36 Leading independent provider of global governance services.  
37SEC (2013o) Form SC 13D/A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015899/000110465913053201/a13-15181_1sc13da.htm [Accessed 10 June 2015].  
38SEC (2013p) Form 8-K [Online].  Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312513354885/d591187d8k.htm [Accessed 10 June 2015].  
39SEC (2013q) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 




(approximately $1.35 million) to 1,286,457 (approximately $10.4 million), an increase 
of approximately 7.5% in terms of the share value.   
 
In the beginning of September, Burkle and YC, demanded that MOR should find a 
buyer following the departure of the CEO. Writing a letter to the interim CEO, Burkle 
stated ‘get Morgans on the market and sell it to an appropriate buyer’. After losing his 
seat at the MOR Board in June 2013, Burkle saw the dividend rate on his $100 million 
in preferred stock jump 4% without a ‘spot’ on the Board, and he said that the penalty 
was costing MOR shareholders $10,000 per day (Strickland, 2013). Burkle also 
mentioned in the letter that his observation rights, guaranteed by his debt position, 
were ignored.  
 
Following Burkle’s letter to MOR’s interim CEO, YC filed a legal suit in a New York 
state court alleging that MOR reneged on the term of a $75 million investment 
agreement following a proxy battle and accused the company of violating the terms of 
an October 2009 share purchase agreement. In return, MOR was required to nominate 
someone selected by YC to its Board, or to allow the YC nominee to observe Board 
meetings and receive copies of key documents. YC suggested that MOR had refused 
to allow an observer to sit on their Board meetings, in retaliation for a pair of lawsuits 
filed by the private equity firm in the wake of the proxy battle (Stendahl, 2013). Burkle’s 
assumed intention was the fact that he wanted to stop MOR’s secret plans to refinance 
one hotel and sell another (Kosman, 2013).  
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YC sent another letter to MOR again urging a sale process to begin and increased 
transparency by the Board (SEC, 2013S).40 Shortly after the letter, on 31 October, YC 
sent further correspondence to the Board expressing a desire to make a proposal to 
the Board to purchase the company for $8.00 per share (roughly $870 million), subject 
to due diligence and no material change in the company’s financial position. YC also 
encouraged the company to seek other bids in order to ascertain if they could obtain 
a higher price (SEC, 2013T).41 However, sources told the New York Post that 
Kalisman and MOR had rejected YC’s offer (Cameron, 2013). According to Kosman 
and Whitehouse (2013) investors believed that the Board was not serious about selling 
the company, despite interest from strategic buyers. Burkle’s view that MOR should 
be sold was supported by many traders who had bought shares in the company. The 
continuous pressure for the company’s sale company could have brought higher 
returns to shareholders as property prices in this period continued to rise.  
 
7.4.3 Period III: January 2014-December 2014 
At the beginning of the year, MOR borrowed $450 million against two of its properties 
(the Hudson and Delano South Beach hotels) in a deal that it would help pay off most 
of the $220 million debt held by Burkle. According to Agnew, an analyst for MKM 
Partners, the refinancing put ‘MOR in a position to sell one or two hotels or the whole 
company’ (Maurer, 2014a). The successful refinancing sparked a 5.2% rise in the 
company’s shares on the same day, to $7.90. In addition, through the debt offering, 
Citigroup valued the properties at between $600 million and $640 million, well above 
 
40SEC (2013r) Form SC 13D/A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015899/000110465913075864/a13-22337_1sc13da.htm [Accessed 12 June 2015]. 
41SEC (2013s) Form SC 13D/A [Online]. Available at: 




the consensus $550 million valuation (Kosman, 2014a). On 28 February, MOR, OTK 
as well as several other associates entered into a binding Memorandum of 
Understanding with YC providing for the settlement of all litigations involving affiliates 
of the YC (SEC, 2014D).42  
 
Following MOR’s refinancing, a few weeks later, on 12 March, KCM delivered a letter 
to MOR and to the company’s shareholders announcing their intention to nominate 
seven individuals for election to the Board at the 2014 Annual Meeting of Shareholders 
in May 2014. The letter cited the immediate sale of the company at the highest price 
possible as well as corporate governance issues that had resulted in reduced 
transparency and communication (SEC, 2014E).43 Sources close to the situation said, 
‘he is making the rounds’, letting shareholders know (Kosman, 2014b). Adrangi said 
that his nominees, if elected, would hire a bank, run a sale process, and would take 
the best price for the company. MOR’s shares were trading at $8 a share during that 
week, up about 0.4% and Adrangi felt that the run-up in the shares since the beginning 
of 2014 had been due to sale speculation (Kosman, 2014c). KCM’s letter was 
acknowledged by MOR who stated that ‘KCM would propose the liquidation of MOR 
prematurely and categorically and would rob MOR shareholders of the value that 
rightfully belongs to them’ (SEC, 2014F).44 
 
 
42SEC (2014d) Form 8-K [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514079034/d687375d8k.htm [Accessed 12 June 2015].  
43SEC (2014e) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000092189514000530/dfan14a00322mor_03122014.htm [Accessed 12 June 
2015].  
44SEC (2014f) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514105466/d695924ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 13 June 2015].  
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Even though KCM had been previously involved in activism in other companies, 
Agnew, a senior analyst at MKM stated that his understanding was that some investors 
did not believe that the KCM panel was strong enough (Maurer, 2014a).  
 
On 2 April, KCM sent a letter to the Board highlighting the qualifications of its director 
nominees and stating that they were committed to exploring strategic alternatives, 
including a serious consideration of selling the company to the highest bidder (SEC, 
2014G).45 On 16 April, MOR and KCM respectively filed their definitive proxy 
statements in connection with the 2014 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. MOR’s letter 
highlighted the Board’s significant improvement on areas such as strategy and 
performance and their continued commitment to maximising value for all shareholders. 
The letter also highlighted the fact that KCM’s panel could permanently impair the 
company’s value. MOR believed that KCM’s slate was neither incentivised to act in 
their best interest nor capable of achieving the greatest value for their investment and 
KCM was looking for attention and publicity, rather than economic incentives (SEC, 
2014H).46 
 
On 22 April, in a presentation made to ISS, MOR presented the actions and 
improvements of the Board over their tenure prior to the Annual Meeting of 
Shareholders (SEC, 2014I).47 MOR stated that they had delivered on all promises 
 
45SEC (2014g) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000092189514000712/dfan14a09892002_04022014.htm [Accessed 13 June 
2015].  
46SEC (2014h) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514145143/d713089ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 13 June 2015].  
47SEC (2014i) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514153230/d714586ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015].  
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made: i) In ten months, the Board had overseen improved earnings, ii) the successful 
refinancing of two hotel properties on attractive terms provided the company with 
improved liquidity and reduced risk at the corporate level, iii) MOR was on track to be 
cash flow positive at the time and iv) there was a detail - oriented focus on the 
operational performance of the business (SEC, 2014J). 
 
On the same date, KCM announced that they had retained Andrew Zobler, CEO and 
founder of the Sydell Group, as an advisor in connection with its efforts to evaluate 
strategic options at MOR, including the sale of the company (SEC, 2014J).48 Burkle 
and KCM were in talks and it appeared at the time that Burkle supported KCM’s 
proposed nominees as both entities supported selling the company with immediate 
effect. In addition, Zobler who was an advisor with KCM, had previously been a partner 
with Burkle and YC on several joint ventures (Maurer, 2014b). KCM also made a 
presentation to ISS in connection with the forthcoming annual meeting. In their 
presentation, they criticised the Board for failed performance (SEC, 2014K).49 Key 
areas highlighted in the presentation were:  
 
1. MOR continued to underperform peers since OTK had assumed control, and 
as a standalone business, MOR had continually underperformed. 
 
2. OTK had failed to hire an experienced management team. 
 
3. MOR had failed to unlock value by selling owned assets at market value. 
 
4. Balance sheet issues remained a concern. 
 
48SEC (2014j) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000092189514000876/dfan14a09892002_04222014.htm [Accessed 14 June 
2015].  
49SEC (2014k) Presentation to ISS [Online]. Available at: 






5. The share price at the time was supported by expectations of a sale transaction. 
 
6. The standalone value was substantially less than a potential sale price.  
 
7. MOR unilaterally increased the Board’s size just 40 days prior to the Annual 
Meeting and after the record date (SEC, 2014K). 
 
Prior to the company’s annual meeting, on 24 April, MOR entered into an amendment 
to the Shareholder Rights Agreement to accelerate the expiration date of the 
Shareholder Rights Agreement from 9 October 2015 to 24 April 2014. The amendment 
had the effect of terminating the Shareholder Rights Agreement and all the rights 
distributed to shareholders pursuant to the Shareholder Rights Agreement would 
expire (SEC, 2014L).50 On 1 May, MOR issued a press release in which it announced 
that ISS had issued a report advising MOR’s shareholders to vote for seven of MOR’s 
nine director nominees and withhold on director nominees Michael Olshan and Andrea 
Olshan (OTK’s directors). ISS also recommended that shareholders should not vote 
for any of the seven nominees set forth by KCM (SEC, 2014M).51 In the meanwhile, 
days after ISS’s report, another advisory firm, Glenn Lewis & Co. LLC, issued a report 
in which they recommended that MOR shareholders should vote in favour of the two 
director nominees that were suggested by KCM. MOR, in a press release, disagreed 
with Glenn Lewis’ analysis and recommendations and urged all shareholders to vote 
for its qualified nominees (Rodriguez, 2014; SEC, 2014N52). 
 
50 SEC (2014l) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514157351/d718005ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015].   
51SEC (2014m) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514177409/d717168ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015].  
52SEC (2014n) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514183848/d722854ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015].  
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On 7 May, KCM issued a press release claiming that ISS and Glen Lewis had 
acknowledged MOR’s years of underperformance and corporate governance issues. 
KCM presented statements from both companies that outlined the Board’s 
weaknesses at the time. For example, ISS noted that MOR should hire a new CEO 
who would oversee the company’s effort to improve its performance. In addition, Glass 
Lewis stated that ‘...since the current Board came into office on June 14, 2013, the 
company’s share price has been down as much as 15% and up as much as 12%, but 
through April 30, 2014, was up only 0.4%’ (SEC, 2014O).53 On the same day, YC sent 
a letter to MOR’s Interim CEO outlining repeated failures by the company to honour 
certain investor observation rights (SEC, 2014P).54  
 
On 13 May, MOR issued a press release in which it disclosed that at the beginning of 
the year, the Board had again formed a special transaction committee to evaluate a 
full range of strategic alternatives, including the potential sale or merger of the 
company. In addition, the Board had retained Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC to serve as 
its financial advisor to assist the company in exploring strategic alternatives (SEC, 
2014Q).55 MOR’s shareholders elected seven of the company’s director nominees and 
two of the Kerrisdale director nominees as directors at the 2014 Annual Meeting (SEC, 
2014R).56  
 
53SEC (2014o) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000092189514001013/dfan14a09892002_05072014.htm [Accessed 14 June 
2015].  
54SEC (2014p) Form SC 13D/A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archive/edgar/data/1015899/000110465914036026/a14-12273_1sc13da.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015]. 
55SEC (2014q) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514197274/d727134ddefa14a.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015].  
56SEC (2014r) Form 8-K [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514206556/d729314d8k.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015].  
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On 14 June, Mahmood J. Khimji who was nominated to the Board by OTK’s panel, 
provided notice to MOR of his intention to resign from the Board. Prior to Khimji’s 
resignation, there were speculations that Kalisman, MOR’s interim CEO was 
considering a merger with Highgate Holdings where Khimji was CEO. In the case of a 
successful merger, sources stated that Khimji would become MOR’s new CEO 
(DiChristopher, 2014). Following this event, Derex Walker also provided notice to 
MOR of his resignation from the Board of Directors (SEC, 2014S).57 Walker had been 
a transaction partner at YU since January 2006 where he had played a key role in 
several of YU’s investments.  
 
On 9 October, according to the New York Post, MOR was looking to sell one of its 
properties, the Hudson Hotel, for an estimated $500 million. The company was also 
looking to sell another property, the Delano South Beach. The company retained 
Morgan Stanley as an advisor to proceed with the sales that were estimated to be a 
combined $700 million (Moses, 2014). In addition, on 16 December, MOR disclosed 
that they had entered into an equity purchase agreement with Hakkasan Holdings 
LLC, pursuant to which MOR agreed to sell its 90% interest in the Light Group to 
Hakkasan (SEC, 2014T).58  
 
 
57SEC (2014s) Form 8-K [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514340469/d788712d8k.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015].  
58SEC (2014t) Form 8-K [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312514443916/d837802d8k.htm [Accessed 14 June 2015].  
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7.4.4 Period IV: January 2015-December 2015 
During a quiet first quarter, on 2 February, YC sent a letter to the company designating 
Mr Bradford Nugent as the investor’s nominee to the company’s Board pursuant to the 
purchase agreement (SEC, 2015H).59 On 20 March, Opiatowski, an analyst at APB 
Financial Group suggested that the time had come for MOR’s sale. The analyst 
increased the buyout target to $14 per share from $12 per share. She believed that 
MOR was a different company compared to a year ago, stating that: ‘the company 
went from bleeding cash, ensnared in lawsuits, and expense-heavy to running like a 
skilled boutique hotel operator’. On 13 March, the company reported full-year earnings 
in EBITDA of $55.1 million from $52.2 million the previous year. The company had 
$1.4 million in operating income in 2014, compared to negative $1.9 million in 2013 
(Brown, 2015).  
 
On 3 April, MOR’ increased the size of the Board from nine to 10 directors and 
appointed Bradford B. Nugent to fill the vacancy. On 15 April, MOR sent a letter to its 
shareholders informing them to elect 10 directors to serve one-year terms expiring in 
2015 (SEC, 2015I).60 However, on 18 May, Kalisman provided notice to MOR of his 
resignation as the company’s interim CEO, so that he could focus on personal matters. 
Kalisman would remain a member of the company’s Board and the Board’s Special 
Transaction Committee. In connection with his resignation, the company announced 
that Richard Szymanski (who had served as MOR’s Chief Financial Officer since 2015) 
 
59SEC (2015h) Form SC 13D/A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015899/000110465915005977/a14-25239_1sc13da.htm [Accessed 3 February 
2016].  
60SEC (2015i) Form SC 14A [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312515131270/d852951ddef14a.htm [Accessed 3 February 2016].  
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would temporarily serve as CEO (SEC, 2015J).61 The company also announced the 
appointment of Howard Lorber (as Chairman) who mentioned that: ‘Going forward, we 
will continue to build on our operational momentum and complete the strategic 
alternatives process in a timely manner’ (Cameron, 2015) 
 
Lorber was president and CEO of Vector Group Ltd that was a major shareholder in 
MOR with a 7.4 per cent stake. On top of Lorber’s appointment, MOR had appointed 
Jonathan Langer, a former Goldman Sachs real estate executive, who was also a 
former Board member, to work as a consultant to the Board’s Special Transaction 
Committee. Following the above appointments, Opiatowski argued that because 
Langer and Lorber were known for being ‘transactional’ and ‘getting things done’, a 
deal to sell the company or part of it was close (Solomont, 2015). 
 
On 6 August, sources revealed that SBE was close to an agreement to merge with 
MOR, but none of the involved parties commented on the matter (Brandt, 2015). 
However, the potential merger between them was challenged after RH offered to buy 
two hotels for $507 million in cash. RH criticised the possible merger, suggesting that 
a better way to maximise the shareholder value would be for MOR to sell the hotels 
and the management company separately. RH noted that almost all major 
shareholders of the company communicated to the Board (both verbally and in writing) 
the lack of enthusiasm and disapproval of the potential transaction with SBE 
(Mashayekhi, 2015).  
 
61SEC (2015j) Form 8-K [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312515193599/d928582d8k.htm [Accessed 3 February 2016]. 
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The possibility of the merger broke down on 31 October after a disagreement between 
Burkle and Kalisman. This resulted in MOR’s share hitting a low of $0.79 per share in 
the following February. Burkle, a strong proponent of the deal, would have become 
chairman of the combined company, he would have acquired two MOR hotels and he 
agreed to give up his preferred equity stake ($130 million) in the company, which 
included extensive veto rights over sales and acquisitions. On the other hand, 
Kalisman opposed the deal, saying that the Board would cede too much control of the 
company to Burkle. The merger would have created a company, to be called SBE-
Morgans, with a market capitalisation of $260 million. At the time, MOR was valued at 
around $120 million with $500 million in debt (Stulberg, 2015). 
  
On 4 November, MOR issued a press release announcing its financial results for the 
quarter ended 15 September 2015. MOR announced further changes to its Board as 
Olshan (OTK’s co-founder) was appointed a Board member to fill a vacancy that was 
created because of a member’s resignation a few days before. In addition, the 
company announced the appointment of Adam Stein (portfolio manager of Pine River 
Capital Management that owned 9 per cent of MOR) because of the resignation of 
Brecker (KCM elected nominee) (SEC, 2015K).62  
 
7.4.5 Period V: January 2016-December 2016 
In the beginning of 2016, MOR was still looking to sell two of the properties not sold 
previously. While its share had collapsed during 2015, Walker (2016) believed that 
selling these assets could result in a ‘serious upside for investors at today’s prices’. 
 
62SEC (2015k) Form 8-K [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000119312515366224/d53266d8k.htm [Accessed 3 February 2016].  
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He further added that the strong demand for real estate properties in prime markets, 
could lead to robust auction for the assets. At the end of January, RH sent a letter to 
MOR and expressed ‘serious concerns about the strategic direction of the company’63 
and suggested steps to reform MOR’s troubled governance (Mashayekhi, 2016b). 
RH’s letter addressed to MOR’s Board, indicated that the company ‘is now facing a 
crisis’ that had seen its share price drop to $1.69 a week before. In the letter sent to 
the Board, RH made the following recommendations for: i) the Board to host an 
investor conference call to update shareholders on its strategic plan and why MOR 
had been unable to reach agreement with any industry partners over a potential sale 
of the company and ii) the Board to hire new independent financial and legal advisors 
to help with finding potential strategic partners (Mashayekhi, 2016c).  
 
After a long-standing conflict, on 9 May, MOR had entered into an agreement and plan 
of merger with SBEEG Holdings, LLC. Under the deal, SBE acquired MOR for $2.25 
per share, even though a week before the shares were trading as low as $1.33 before 
jumping on speculation of a takeover. The deal valued MOR at $82 million in equity 
value and would create a hotel management company with a total value of around 
$800 million. SBE’s founder, Nazarian, would serve as CEO and retain majority control 
of the combined company, while Burkle and YC, who held a $75 million preferred 
equity stake in MOR, would obtain a 25% equity interest in SBE. SBE would acquire 
 
63 In its 2016 Annual Report, MOR expected to focus its business on an asset-light, brand-centred model with lower leverage. 
MOR intended to achieve growth primarily through the pursuit of new management agreements and, in select situations where 
they believed third-party managers had the experience and resources to satisfy its high branding standards, through franchise 
or licensing agreements.   
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all MOR’s hotel management brands (Karmin, 2016b; Mashayekhi, 2016d; SEC, 
2016D64).  
 
Shortly after the agreement, things took an unexpected turn as a securities law 
company (Rigrodsky & Long) was exploring potential legal claims against MOR’s 
Board that challenged the takeover. Rigrodsky & Long said in a statement that they 
were looking into ‘possible breaches of fiduciary duties and other violations of law’ 
related to the deal. The company was examining whether MOR’s Board failed to 
properly market the company and obtain the best possible shareholder value before 
making a deal, as they believed that the proposed buyout price was too low 
(Mashayekhi, 2016e). However, their investigation was triggered by MOR’s minority 
shareholders who argued in a class action filing that the deal undervalued MOR and 
unfairly benefited the controlling shareholder, YC. In the filing, attorneys for one of the 
minority shareholders argued that MOR failed to consummate a more attractive deal 
valued at around $6 per share. The lawsuit also alleged that Burkle had a longstanding 
personal and professional relationship with SBE founder, Nazarian and that ‘self-
motivated dysfunction’ among other Board members had given YU disproportionate 
control (Montgomery, 2016).  
 
On 12 May 2016, MOR held its 2016 Annual Meeting of Shareholders at which they 
elected the following nine directors: Andrew Board (KCM’s representative), Kenneth 
Cruse, John Dougherty (OTK’s representative), Jason Kalisman (OTK’s 
 
64SEC (2016d) Form 8-K [Online]. Available at: 




representative), Howard Lorber (Vector Group’s representative), Bradford Nugent 
(YU’s representative), Michael Olshan (OTK’s representative) and Michelle Russo and 
Adam Stein (portfolio manager of Pine River Capital Management) (SEC, 2016D).  
 
Following the Board’s election, in the beginning of September, a mystery bidder 
wanted to acquire MOR. MOR announced the revised offer from the bidder and 
delayed a shareholder vote on Burkle’s bid until 26 September. Burkle bid $2.25 per 
share for MOR, approximately $800 million, whereas the rival bidder offered $2.75 per 
share (Putzier, 2016). However, on 28 September, MOR shareholders voted to 
approve SBE’s acquisition of MOR, in a deal that was valued at around $800 million. 
Shareholders representing 71% of MOR stock voted in favour of the acquisition. Of 
the votes cast by shareholders, 98% were in favour of the buyout (Gourarie, 2016; 
King, 2016). The New York Post reported that MOR was ‘thin on cash and needs to 
lock down a buyer or financing by the end of the year’ (Bockmann, 2016). Finally, the 
deal closed on 30 November and Burkle and SBE acquired MOR for $2.25 per share, 
or $805 million. YC and Cain Hoy Enterprises split a 50% stake with SBE retaining the 
other half. The extended company would have a portfolio of 22 hotels and YC and 
Cain Hoy would own $150 million of preferred shares in the new combined company. 
(Kosman, 2016).    
 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented the research findings that emerged from the online 
documentary information and archival investigation of shareholder activism in MOR. 
OTK, YC, KCM and RH exerted substantial pressure on MOR’s Board over an eight-
year period, 2008-2016. During this period, all shareholder activists made numerous 
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interventions to MOR’s Board of Directors, focusing on corporate governance matters 
and urging the Board to explore strategic alternatives such as the sale of the company. 
MOR attracted competitors who were interested in acquiring the company and 
shareholder activists because of the challenges that it faced in relation to corporate 
governance and poor financial performance.   
 
The fact that all shareholder activists acted on a personal interest created tensions in 
the relationship between themselves and with the Board and some of the tensions 
were solved at federal courts. Compared to the other two cases, MOR was sold to one 
of its shareholder activist owners and their partners at a lower price per share than 
expected by all shareholder activists. Consequently, the remaining shareholder 
activists did not profit from their investment in the company. The next chapter presents 
the research findings from the three case studies in relation to the impact of 
shareholder activism through a complexity lens and in the context of outcomes 










PART 3 - CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The final part of the study brings together the research findings of the case studies 
and develops a deeper understanding of the impact of shareholder activism in 
corporate boards. It synthesises and discusses the findings derived from the cases in 
light of the study’s research questions, corporate governance and complexity theory 
literature and the template framework in Chapter 4. Chapter 9 synthesises the key 



















CHAPTER EIGHT - ANALYSIS and DISCUSSION 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the Boards and shareholder activists as CCESs and addresses 
their interaction and interconnection with the agents that form their corporate 
governance ecosystem. It then investigates the impact of shareholder activism through 
a complexity lens, using the template created in Chapter 4. The chapter further 
discusses the journey of shareholder activists that begins from their entry and 
concludes when they leave their targets. The journey of shareholder activism led to 
the identification and discussion of four themes that relate to the intervention of 
shareholder activism – Board vulnerabilities, shareholder activist attacks, Board 
defence mechanisms and company changes (outcomes).  
 
8.1 The Boards and Shareholder Activists as CCES 
During shareholder activists’ interventions, both Boards and all shareholder activists 
adapted and evolved, influenced by the changes caused by these interventions, and 
influenced all agents in their corporate governance ecosystems, eventually creating a 
new order (Mitleton-Kelly, 2006). As CCES, the Boards and shareholder activists 
exhibited the generic characteristics of complex systems suggested by Cilliers (1998) 
in Chapter 3. They consisted of multiple agents who were interrelated and interacted 
between themselves and their environments with limited local knowledge and 
influenced by their own personal agendas (e.g., Cascade’s purchase of Four Seasons 
Punta Mita Resort from SHR). They adapted to the turbulence caused by activists’ 
interventions and Boards’ reactions. For example, they re-organised their internal 
structures (e.g., MOR’s Board changes) and counteracted the opponents’ actions 
(e.g., SHR’s amendment to the company’s shareholder rights plan). 
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The actions of shareholder activists and a multitude of positive and negative feedback 
processes (through public demands and statements, press releases and proxy fights) 
brought them into far from equilibrium states and forced them to use their dissipative 
structures (defence mechanisms explored in Section 8.6) in order to maintain their 
integrity as systems. Boards’ behaviours were determined by their history as systems 
and their agents’ history. For example, IHG’s Board had long ago established an 
asset-light strategy that was used as a defence mechanism with the sale of Paris Le-
Grand and InterContinental Hong Kong. In addition, prior to leading SHR, Raymond 
Gellein had a record of selling a public hotel company, which is what he did in the case 
of SHR.  
 
Cilliers suggests that ‘each element in the system is ignorant of the behaviour of the 
whole system; it can only act locally and only knows what goes on there’ (1998, p. 6). 
In disciplines such as biology, physics and chemistry, agents may be ignorant of the 
behaviour of the whole system; however, in a business context, agents behave 
differently. Both systems, the Boards and shareholder activists acted locally (e.g., 
Board meetings), but they also tried to influence the broader corporate governance 
ecosystem (financial analysts, media, proxy advisors and investors) to serve their 
interests. In that way, not only did they evolve by ‘hill climbing’ (Allen, 1994) adapting 
to the changes in their environment but as they moved along their fitness landscape, 
they altered the fitness landscapes of other systems in the broader corporate 
governance ecosystem (Kauffman, 1995). Although they were adapting to the 
changes caused by this continuous ‘hill climbing’, they were not just complex adaptive 
systems. Mitleton-Kelly (2006, p.230) argues that ‘short-term adaptation may result in 
long-term co-evolution if the entities in due course influence and change each course’. 
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The changes taking place in both systems did not happen in a vacuum, but they 
influenced one another as well as the rest of the corporate governance ecosystems, 
a process that fits Mitleton-Kelly’s (2006) description of CCES.  
 
8.2 Impact of Shareholder Activism through a Complexity Lens 
Under the template framework, there are four stages that characterise the shareholder 
activists’ journey that started with their advent in the target companies and concluded 
with their exit from their targets and the emergence of new order. Stage 1 addresses 
the initial conditions identified in the micro and macro environments of each company 
that led shareholder activists to demonstrate their interest in their targets. Stage 2 
examines the Board’s journey from near to far-from-equilibrium states looking at 
strange attractors, feedback processes, fitness landscapes and dissipative structures. 
Stage 3 explores the impact of shareholder activism and examines emergent 
behaviours such as self-organisation and exploration of the space of possibilities that 
leads to Stage 4, the emergence of new order.  
 
8.2.1 Stage 1 Initial Conditions   
The evolution of a complex system is sensitive to the environmental conditions that 
triggered its evolutionary trajectory (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). The cases presented in the 
previous chapters showed that the conditions in the business environment at specific 
periods triggered the interest and facilitated the entry of shareholder activists in the 
corporate governance ecosystem of each case company. One environmental factor 
that facilitated the actions of shareholder activists were a series of regulatory changes 
(e.g., 1985, 1992 and 1996) that benefited hedge funds (Section 2.2.2). These 
regulatory changes allowed hedge funds and other institutional investors to scrutinise 
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and publicly criticise, where appropriate, Boards and pool resources from investors 
without disclosing the source of their investments. By adopting the characteristics of 
each regulatory change, shareholder activists were able to enter each company with 
minimal effort and continue with their tactics to influence each Board’s practices. Their 
entry may be a small change (e.g. another shareholder) for each company, but in a 
complex system like the Board it grew quickly and in large amounts due to the interest 
from media, a view confirmed by the literature (Mason, 2007).  
 
Another environmental factor was the financial crisis that started in the US real estate 
market. What started locally had spread globally with unpredictable severity (Choi and 
Douady, 2009). The combination of the financial crisis and the regulatory changes 
enabled subsequently shareholder activists to lead the Boards to changes, a view that 
the literature characterises as the right kind of ‘nudge’ at the right time (Hendrick, 2009; 
Nilson, 1995). Before the shareholder activism events, all case companies were at a 
stage of recovery from the financial crisis and eventually they became a target for 
shareholder activists. This confirms Boyson and Mooradian (2012), Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) and Muhtaseb and Grover (2012) who suggest that poor financial and 
share performance are conditions that attract shareholder activists. Shareholder 
activists’ primary emphasis is to focus on poorly performing companies and pressure 
the management of such entities to improve performance in order to increase their 
shareholder value (Gillian and Starks, 2000; Jiang and Anandarajan, 2009). All target 
firms were poorly performing in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Both SHR and 
MOR operated at a loss for several years and their share price showed a considerable 
decrease. On the other hand, IHG did not operate at a loss but the company’s net 
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income substantially decreased with a similar share price performance, thus becoming 
an appealing target for activists too.  
 
As in other studies, activists were attracted to the case companies by vulnerabilities 
they identified in their corporate governance and asset valuation, aspects addressed 
in the literature review (Brav et al., 2008; Birstingl, 2016 and Lachapelle and Jinks, 
2014). Section 8.4 discusses the vulnerabilities that are unique to each case company. 
Whilst, the other two sets of conditions that initiated shareholder activism were 
common to all case companies, it is these vulnerabilities that differentiated the most 
the co-evolutionary trajectories taken in each case. A slight change in the conditions 
at which a system’s evolutionary process begins can lead through positive feedback 
to major changes in each evolutionary trajectory (Hendrick, 2009). Kernick (2004) 
argues our inability to measure initial systems conditions accurately and the extreme 
sensitivity of complex systems behaviour to these initial conditions make them 
unpredictable. Nevertheless, many complexity theorists (cited in Kuhn, 2009, p.57) 
maintain that even an approximate knowledge of a system’s initial conditions can help 
in predicting the approximate behaviour of this system. Therefore, identifying these 
initial conditions was important in order to comprehend the different pathways the 
Boards followed in order to respond to activists.  
 
8.2.2 Stage 2 - Far from Equilibrium 
Before shareholder activists intervened in the ways Boards were running the case 
companies, all Boards had plans to improve the performance of their companies.  
Despite engaging with certain plans, their performance was not successful in most 
cases and financial analysts were not optimistic about their future. As a result, activists 
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took the opportunity to intervene by acquiring sufficient stock to cause disruption 
between shareholders and the Boards. The further the system moves away from near 
equilibrium, the more it displays chaotic patterns of bounded instability (Stacey, 2003). 
As the disruption grew, Boards started moving from their near equilibrium state to far 
from equilibrium. 
 
Another characteristic that pushed the Boards far from equilibrium were the strange 
attractors that were the result of the Boards interaction with shareholder activists. This 
supports Pascale et al.’s (2000) view that strange attractors do not occur in isolation, 
but they are the result of an interaction between an agent and its environment. 
Activists’ demands for change in the case companies acted as strange attractors, 
which guided the Boards behaviours towards actions that would not take place in a 
near equilibrium state. In all companies, the activists’ demands were related to 
strategic areas that if they were to be successful, would benefit both agents. For 
example, in case I, the strange attractor was OC’s demand for SHR’s sale by 
generating $11-$14 per share. A private equity company acquired SHR and its share 
price before its sale reached $10-$11 and eventually benefited OC’s investment 
confirming Dai’s (2013) and Levine’s (2015) views that hedge fund activism tends to 
increase share prices. In case II, the strange attractor was the activists’ assertion that 
the company could become a takeover target and would be more valuable if merged 
with or sold to a competitor. Despite several attempts by MCM, IHG remained a 
standalone company. In case III, the strange attractor was the potential sale of the 
group, a demand that was encouraged by all activists and led to MOR’s sale. Under 
the guidance of the strange attractor, the system will allow change while trying to 
maintain some order (Mason, 2007).  
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When a strange attractor is introduced, the system applies dampening mechanisms 
(negative feedback) that minimise their effects and allow the system to explore its 
fitness landscape searching for an optimum position of stability (Gilstrap, 2005; 
Pascale et al., 2000). All Boards initially attempted to dampen the effects of 
shareholder activists’ demands in order to maintain stability within their ecosystems. 
SHR rejected the proposal for the sale of the company and denied the allegations 
made by OC. This is why SHR responded to OC’s demand stating that the fund was 
interested only in short-term gains. In IHG’s case, the company’s CEO appeared to 
keep an open mind about TFM’s intervention by downplaying the fund as just ‘another 
shareholder’ and suggesting that anyone in the public could buy and sell the 
company’s shares. When MCM made their own intervention to IHG, the Board 
responded by saying that the company would focus on pursuing their strategy at that 
time, ignoring MCM altogether. MOR’s initial reaction with OTK’s demand for a change 
in strategy was that the priority for the Board was to return the company to profitability. 
Therefore, in all cases, the Boards ignored the interventions trying to shift 
stakeholders’ focus to their existing agendas. Even if the complex system resists the 
turbulence caused by increased energy and information within its broader environment 
and attempts to ignore the newly introduced strange attractor, the agents within it start 
exploring their fitness landscape for new ‘local optima’ with small incremental 
adjustments. Levinthal (1997) calls these adjustments ‘adaptive walks’ in the fitness 
landscape, especially if the peaks in this landscape are correlated i.e., high peaks are 
near other high peaks and no major changes are required. MOR’s decision to establish 
a Special Committee to evaluate the sale of the company to YC is an example of such 




When the system starts to move far from equilibrium and explore its fitness 
landscapes, it still displays predictable patterns of behaviour (Pascale et al., 2000). 
Such patterns were observed in all three cases when companies disposed of some of 
their assets. However, while this behaviour was predictable, the outcomes of this 
behaviour were not always predictable. Although, SHR’s sale of assets led to the 
decrease of the company’s debt, it caused challenges in its corporate governance 
function where it was accused of transparency issues. IHG’s asset disposal enabled 
the company to lower the activists’ influence on other shareholders. On the other hand, 
MOR’s asset disposal did not improve the company’s share price and financial 
performance, which, in turn, increased the pressure from the activists.  
 
As the pressure to the system increases, ‘adaptive walks’ are not effective anymore. 
Maturana and Varela (1987) contend that increased information and energy flows from 
the environment lead to behavioural iterations according to the system’s own structure 
and meaning. These flows act as positive feedback mechanisms amplifying the 
disruption and thus contributing to further change and gradual disorganisation (leading 
to the edge of chaos). In such a position, the system starts behaving in often 
unpredictable and even chaotic patterns (Hendrick, 2009; Mason, 2007). With 
increased pressure from shareholder activists and other stakeholders, the Boards 
started using different defence mechanisms in order to restore stability. For example, 
SHR refinanced mortgages on some of its properties where the new owner would 
assume its debts. It also approved an amendment to the company’s shareholder rights 
plan in response to OC’s governance concerns. IHG employed the tactical defence of 
asset disposal and on two occasions, delivered dividends to the company’s 
shareholders. MOR used presentations to investors to address concerns raised in 
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OTK’s presentations to the same audience. The company also refinanced the 
mortgages on two properties in order to make the company attractive to potential 
buyers.   
 
In the journey from a near to a far from equilibrium state, a complex system displays 
a property, which explains its transitions from one state to the other. Prigogine and 
Stengers (1984) talk about dissipative structures that import energy and information 
flows from the external environment and export entropy (a measure of disorder), thus, 
tending to stabilise the system and return it closer to equilibrium. This property 
maintains the integrity of the system, i.e., its deep structure (Hodge and Coronado, 
2007). IHG’s dissipative structure was able to maintain the deep structure of the 
system as it was reinforced by the disposal of assets, which in turn provided dividends 
to shareholders, the acquisition of Kimpton Hotels and Restaurants and the 
development of new brands. In that way, all investors benefited including shareholder 
activists who took advantage of the increasing share price and exited the company 
with a substantial profit.  
 
When the dissipative structure of a complex system is not able to handle the energy 
and information flows anymore, the deep structure of the system collapses. The 
complex system, however, retains this property, which later forms the basis for its self-
referencing processes needed for self-organisation (Hodge and Coronado, 2007; 
Smith, 1986). Consequently, in the other two case companies, the dissipative 
structures were seized to be able to manage energy and information flows, thus 
leading to the collapse of their existing Board structures. Despite the implementation 
of tactics by both SHR and MOR, their disadvantaged position due to loss of profit and 
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governance issues did not convince activists and other stakeholders about their 
intentions.  
 
8.2.3 Stage 3 - Edge of Chaos and Beyond 
As complex systems move farthest from their equilibrium or from their near equilibrium 
states, they eventually enter a zone, which Stacey (2003) calls the ‘zone of complexity’ 
and Pascale et al. (2000) call ‘the edge of chaos’. Continuous pressure from 
shareholder activists pushed all Boards in the case companies into this zone forcing 
them to find ways to respond to or reject their demands. In all cases, the Boards 
adapted, evolved and demonstrated flexibility in response to the activists.  
 
SHR’s continuous poor financial performance and the pressure from OC gradually 
pushed the company to the edge of chaos. OC sent a letter to SHR’s lead independent 
director arguing that the sale process of one of the assets of the company to Cascade 
had been insufficiently marketed, having been exclusively negotiated with a major 
shareholder. The activist charged SHR with ‘value destroying governance practices’ 
including problematic executive compensation, excessive corporate expenses – as a 
percentage of total revenue – and shareholder unfriendly defences owing to the fact 
that SHR did not hire an independent financial advisor to evaluate the sale of the 
resort. Following OC’s allegations, SHR appointed one of the fund’s representatives 
to the company’s Board, which according to Boyson and Mooradian (2011), is one of 
the successes of hedge fund activists.   
 
On the other hand, two events pushed IHG to the edge of chaos. Initially, MCM advised 
IHG to hire an independent financial advisor and conduct a full and formal evaluation 
210 
 
of strategic alternatives and their impact on shareholder value stressing the timing of 
that period. Then, following IHG’s response to MCM, Berenberg issued a buy note 
with a £27.50 price target and said that IHG could merge or take over another hotel 
operator but was more likely to be prey rather than the predator, with Starwood or 
Hilton as the most obvious acquirers. The second event led IHG to acquire Kimpton 
Hotels and Restaurants. Complex systems constantly adapt and evolve by self-
organising and become flexible in their approach (Kauffman, 1993; Mason, 2007; 
Stacey, 1995). 
 
As far as the third case in this study is concerned, at the beginning of 2016, MOR was 
looking to sell two properties to improve its financial performance. The company’s 
share collapsed during 2015 and financial analysts believed that selling these assets 
could result in a ‘serious upside for investors at today’s prices’. After a series of 
shareholder activists’ interventions attacks, RH sent a letter to the company’s Board 
by expressing concerns about its strategic direction and suggested steps to reform its 
troubled governance. RH offered to buy two hotels and proposed that the Board should 
host an investor conference call to discuss the reasons for not finding strategic 
partners to sell the company. In addition, it proposed that MOR should hire 
independent financial and legal advisors to assist in the process of finding strategic 
partners.  
 
When a complex system reaches a point in which previous beliefs, interrelationships 
and practices cannot any longer function, its dissipative properties cannot maintain the 
integrity of its existing structure. This is a system breakdown point at which the system 
disintegrates and a return to its previous status becomes increasingly difficult (Seeger, 
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Sellnow and Ulmer, 2003). At this point, which is also known as a bifurcation point 
(Haynes, 2014; Hendrick, 2009), there are several, perhaps many, possible paths for 
the system to follow and no way to predict which path will be taken.    
 
Pushed to the edge of chaos, SHR responded to shareholder activists with a series of 
actions. However, it was the sale of the Four Seasons Punta Mita resort to Cascade, 
and the lack of transparency for this transaction that caused major distrust among the 
Board, thus weakening the Board’s dissipative structures. OC’s further pressure 
eventually led to SHR’s Board bifurcation point where a re-structure was deemed 
necessary with the inclusion of OC’s representatives on the Board. MOR’s continuous 
poor financial performance caused disbelief among its shareholder base who voted in 
favour for OTK’s panel of seven nominees to take control of the Board despite the 
proxy advisor opposing position. Not all systems disintegrate when reaching the edge 
of chaos. Those that manage to adapt and evolve in line with the changes in their 
environment can survive and even thrive in this zone (Stacey, 2003) just like IHG, 
which was transformed with the sale of assets and the development and acquisition 
of new brands keeping its Board structure intact.  
 
Self-organisation is the property that complex systems display when driven far from 
equilibrium, and when they have gone through a radical shift i.e., the bifurcation point 
(Espinosa and Porter, 2011; Goergen et al., 2010). Crossing that point, new patterns 
of relationships emerge and the features of the system continually change until the 
new situation settles down with a new underlying form. Several complexity theorists 
view self-organisation as the ‘transformative cause of emergent new directions in the 
development of the organisation’ (Stacey et al., 2000, p.123) which allows the 
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organisation to be in constant renewal and to attain new forms of order and structure 
(Kiel, 1994, pp.173-199). Although the Boards in the three case studies tried to keep 
an ‘open mind’ to all activist interventions when crossing the several bifurcation points 
that emerged from these interventions, their agents ‘spontaneously came together’ to 
explore new solutions in an effort to establish a dynamic balance within the corporate 
governance ecosystem through a process that Pascale et al. (2000) call ‘episodic self-
organisation’. Changes in the relationships between agents led to changes in the 
power dynamics within the corporate governance structure. MOR’s Board experienced 
the departure of some of their members as happened with the departure of Michael 
Gross and the appointment of Kalisman as CEO on an interim basis. Following this, 
further changes occurred in MOR where the company appointed Michael Olshan to its 
Board to fill a vacancy that was created by another resignation. 
 
Pascale et al. (2000) also suggest that a form of self-organisation is the creation of 
alliances, partnerships and temporary project teams during the period of turbulence. 
When transitioning from bifurcation to bifurcation at the edge of chaos, agents within 
complex systems explore various alternatives and configurations, which ultimately, will 
enable them to choose and develop different structures (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003; Mitleton-
Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 2002). The sale of the Four Seasons Punta Mita Resort to 
Cascade Investment, LLC, demonstrated SHR’s Board intention to receive support 
from the shareholder during shareholder activism. MOR’s agreement to merge with 
another operator resulted in the investigation of the transaction after the company’s 
minority shareholders argued about MOR’s value. These self-organising actions of the 
Boards were not imposed by anyone within the Board or outside and were neither 
designed nor an outcome of a strategic plan. They were the result of local interactions 
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(Boulton et al., 2015) between the Board members and/or with shareholder activists 
who were attempting to influence their respective companies.  
 
Goldstein (1994, pp. 33-52) parallels self-organisation to participatory and democratic 
management practices. This view implies that self-organisation is a natural law, which 
almost inevitably, leads a complex system to an ‘optimal’ balance. However, the cases 
of shareholder activism investigated in this study show that optimal states emerged in 
limited instances. In all Boards, self-organisation did not lead to democracy and 
participation but to different hierarchical structures, some of which were not able to 
withstand the test of time.  
 
In the self-organisation process, the Boards explored different alternatives in an 
attempt to maintain their status quo by keeping their shareholders satisfied and 
returning to near-equilibrium conditions. SHR’s Board reviewed an independent 
review of executive compensation and redemption of the company’s Series A 
Preferred Stock. Similarly, IHG during TFM’s activism monetised some of its real 
estate assets and returned dividends to its shareholders. During MCM’s shareholder 
activism, IHG continued to apply its asset-light strategy by selling key assets (e.g., 
Paris Le-Grand and InterContinental Hong Kong), acquired hospitality brands e.g., 
Kimpton Hotels and Restaurants, and returned dividends to its shareholders.  
 
The result of complex systems’ self-organised processes is the emergence of new 
order (Goldstein, 1999; Medd and Haynes, 1998). In SHR, the new order came about 
with the company’s acquisition by the Blackstone Group and the fact that holders of 
shares of SHR’s common stock were entitled to receive $14.25 in cash for each share 
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they owned. The outcome was OC’s demand when entering SHR’s ownership 
structure. In IHG, the new order was related to changes in the company’s operating 
structure and the fact that the company remained standalone. The fact that the 
company had been involved in mergers and acquisitions in the past (up to 2003) did 
not influence its corporate structure. The conditions that enabled IHG to remain 
standalone were the company’s asset-light strategy that strengthened its financial 
performance, the return of dividends to its shareholders and the fact that its leadership 
had been stable since 2005. In MOR, the emergence of new order was the sale of the 
company to another group (SBE). Prior to the company’s sale, all shareholder activists 
were urging its sale.   
 
The new order illustrates that the presence of a shareholder activist on the Board 
influences its future behaviour in favour of the activist’s intentions. Despite any 
differences (that they may have), when shareholder activists have a simultaneous 
presence in a company, they will work together in order to accomplish their goals, 
especially if they have similar intentions (e.g., return on their investment). The 
emergence of new order in all case companies confirms the literature (Hendrick, 2009; 
Mason, 2007; Mitleton-Kelly, 2006) as some of the examples of emergence are new 
strategic developments, new structures and new cultures.  
 
8.2.4 Shareholder Activism from a Complexity Theory Perspective 
In all cases, the new order was not the result of a direct and linear causal relation 
between the Board’s decisions and the activists’ interventions. The analysis of the 
cases under the proposed template framework and through the complexity lens 
enabled an understanding of why the outcomes of shareholder activism often differ 
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from initial expectations and can be unpredictable. The complexity lens applied in this 
study showed that uncertainty is inevitable and no party (Board, shareholder activists, 
financial analysts and other stakeholders) can appreciate how the governance 
ecosystem functions in its entirety.  
 
The literature on corporate governance and shareholder activism has used theoretical 
models that looked at linear cause-and-effect relationships between constructs and 
agents. The discussion in this chapter showed that a complexity theory perspective 
offers researchers and practitioners a clearer understanding of the changes that are 
taking place in the corporate governance ecosystem because of shareholder activism. 
The differences in applying the complexity perspective to shareholder activism as 












Table 8.1 Shareholder Activism from a Linear Versus a Complexity Perspective 
Shareholder Activism  Linear Perspective Complexity Perspective 
      
Assumptions on Board’s 
response 
A well-structured system 
that consists of components 
such as executive members 
and non-executive 
members. 
A dynamic complex system that 
consists of interacting and 
interdependent agents (Board 
members, primary and secondary 
stakeholders) that co-evolve with 
its environment.  
  
A system is managed and 
controlled by a top-down 
approach.  
A complex system that evolves 
by both bottom-up and top-down 
approaches.  
Board's Culture  
The Board's culture is 
broken down into 
components (standards, 
values and the code of 
conduct, written and 
unwritten rules). The 
Board's chairman and the 
CEO influence the Board's 
behaviour.  
Internal and external agents 
influence the Board’s culture. 
Stakeholders continuously 
interact with and challenge the 
Board's status quo. The 
interaction leads to emergent 
properties of the Board.  
Business Environment  
Near equilibrium conditions 
are the desirable state for 
the system. Any changes in 
the environment may move 
temporarily the system to far 
from equilibrium conditions 
but the ultimate goal is the 
return to the old status quo. 
Stability is temporary, the system 
constantly co-evolves with its 
dynamic environment and 
explores the space of 
possibilities to re-configure itself 
and reach states of ‘new order’.  
 
 
Shareholder activism causes Boards to operate in far-from-equilibrium conditions and, 
often, to behave unpredictably. By default, the Boards need to engage in non-linear 
responses and interactions to meet the challenges of their operating environment and 
this includes shareholder activism. However, their responses are directly related to the 
Board’s culture and how the Board will behave when attacked e.g., engage, reject or 
ignore shareholder activists’ demands. The Board will not be able to and may not 
return to its previous status quo and ultimately, shareholder activists will influence its 




8.3 The Journey of a Shareholder Activist  
In all case companies, shareholder activists followed a systematic approach that 
demonstrates the steps that they took during their interventions (see Figure 8.1). The 
shareholder journey confirms Muhtaseb’s and Grover’s (2012) study on shareholder 
activists’ engagement when they intervene in companies. Although two shareholder 
activists (OTK and YU) had not engaged with activism before, they adopted similar 
tactics to the ones that established shareholder activists apply in the business 
environment.  
 





The first step of the shareholder activists’ journey is related to the selection of the 
target company. Activists undertake research and identify their targets based on 









with the acquisition of stock. The literature review suggests that shareholder activists 
usually enter their targets with a representative 5% ownership (Muhtaseb and Grover, 
2012). However, with the exception of OTK and YC, who acquired a stake of more 
than 5% in their targets, all other shareholder activists did not exceed the 5% threshold 
and did not file their investments (see Table 8.2). Unlike all other shareholder activists, 
OTK and YC were not active activists and their interventions in MOR began 
approximately four years after their entry into the company.  
  
Table 8.2 Initial Stake of Shareholder Activists in Targets 
Company/Target Activist 
Date bought 
shares for the first 
time 
% of shares 
bought  
Strategic Hotels & 
Resorts Orange Capital (OC)  March 2013 4% 
Morgans Hotel Group OTK Associates (OTK) January 2008 14% 
Morgans Hotel Group 
Yucaipa Companies 
(YC) November 2009 28% 
Morgans Hotel Group 
Kerrisdale Capital 
Management (KCM) February 2013 4% 
Morgans Hotel Group 
Rambleside Holdings 










Management (MCM) May 2014 Approximately 3.8% 
 
Following the filling of their ownership or share acquisition, proactive activists start 
exerting their pressure on the Board, which is usually done with an email, statement, 
telephone call, press release or an open letter to the Board and the shareholders 
(Armour and Cheffins, 2009). All shareholder activists communicated their investment 
goals and intended to influence the Boards and their companies. Activists use their 
ownership status to influence policies and practises in companies (Judge et al., 2010). 
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Eventually, OC issued a press release to inform the public about their ownership status 
in the company, while MCM issued a statement disclosing their proposal about IHG’s 
strategic direction. In MOR’s case, both KCM and RH sent an open letter to MOR’s 
Board expressing their concerns about the company and urging the company to 
consider strategic alternatives about its future.  
 
When the initial pressure does not yield the desired results, shareholder activists 
mount their pressure in the form of criticism, letters, public arguments, presentations, 
proxy fights and litigations (Cheffins and Armour, 2011; Hilldrup, 2013). All shareholder 
activists employed these tactics to intensify their pressure on the Boards. OC publicly 
criticised SHR for their decision to sell one of their assets to another shareholder of 
the company, whereas, MCM released a letter to IHG’s shareholders presenting their 
evaluation potential of strategic alternatives about the company. In MOR, shareholder 
activists such as OTK made a presentation to investors and proxy advisory firms 
addressing their concerns and YU filed a litigation towards the Board, as it did not 
invest as claimed in the company. In addition, all shareholder activists issued letters 
as a form of pressure to the Board and shareholders for reasons related to the 
governance and financial performance of the companies.  
 
In two cases, the mounting pressure resulted in negotiations between shareholder 
activists and the Boards. SHR and OC negotiated the appointment of David W. 
Johnson to the company's Board of Directors. Johnson’s appointment led OC to 
withdraw its notice of nomination of their director candidates to SHR’s Board and to 
agree to a customary standstill provision. Similarly, in MOR, OTK and KCM negotiated 
with the company the possibility of taking full control of the Board while YC proposed 
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the nomination of one its representatives to the company’s Board. This contradicts the 
literature review, as activist hedge funds do not usually seek control of target 
companies. Instead, they rely on cooperation from management or in its absence, 
support from shareholders to implement their value-improving agendas (Dai, 2013). 
Having made negotiations with both companies, shareholder activists managed to 
secure seats on the Boards of Directors. Hedge fund activists achieve Board 
representation in 69% of their targets in a study conducted by Boyson and Mooradian 
(2011).  
 
In the final step of their journey, shareholder activists exited their targets but not all of 
them met their goals in terms of their investment return. OC exited SHR after the 
company’s share price had increased substantially ($11.22) since their entry ($6.70). 
Their short-term interest that led to SHR’s increased share price benefited the 
company’s shareholders, a consequence discussed by Tricker (2012b). In IHG, only 
TFM benefited from their investment in the company as the share price of the company 
had increased during their presence, while MCM did not increase the returns on their 
investment. In MOR, all shareholder activists had losses on their investment in the 
struggling hotel group. In addition, not all target companies accepted their shareholder 
activists’ proposals. OC’s intention for SHR’s sale was finalised a year after OC’s exit 
from the company. TFM’s and MCM’s intentions for IHG’s takeover by a competitor 
did not occur and IHG remained a standalone company. However, in both activist 
interventions, IHG continued its asset-light strategy by monetising their assets and by 
paying dividends to their shareholders, something that hedge funds tend to favour. On 
the other hand, MOR’s Board incorporated shareholder activists’ proposals for the sale 
of the company.  
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8.4 Board Vulnerabilities  
Prior to attacking each Board, shareholder activists identified vulnerabilities in their 
targets. Three vulnerabilities emerged from the cases and they were as follow: 
 
1. Poor corporate governance practices such as violations of investor trust, 
problematic executive compensation and excessive corporate expenses and 
reduced transparency and communication. 
2. Poor financial performance of the target company.  
3. Undervalued portfolios of assets including large cash positions.  
 
The findings confirm the literature on shareholder activism as activists usually acquire 
stakes in companies with weak corporate governance or which they believe are 
undervalued (Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Lachapelle and Jinks, 2014; Muhtaseb 
and Grover, 2012). In addition, hedge fund activists tend to target companies with low 
market value relative to book value, although they are profitable with sound operating 
cash flows and higher leverage (Brav et al, 2008). Targets of shareholder activists also 
have also operating performance, larger cash positions and lower sales (Boyson and 
Mooradian, 2012; Gillian and Starks, 2000; Jiang and Anandarajan, 2009).  
 
Improving financial performance and effectively managing a well-known brand 
portfolio proved to be challenging for both SHR and MOR. Prior to OC’s intervention 
in 2013, SHR was running at a loss while MOR was consistently underperforming over 
the course of shareholder activism. On the other hand, IHG’s large size (both in terms 
of assets and annual revenue generation) and the lack of significant financial 
challenges, were an opportunity for shareholder activists to increase the company’s 
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shareholder value. Unlike SHR and MOR, IHG’s undervalued portfolio was a concern 
for both activists. Another vulnerability that both shareholder activists addressed in 
IHG’s case was the company’s large cash position. During TFM’s tenure, the company 
paid dividends to its shareholders. In situations where companies have excess cash 
available, the hedge funds will lobby the company to engage in one-off dividend 
distribution to shareholders (Kahan and Rock, 2009). Although TFM did not publicly 
demand from IHG to pay dividends to its shareholders, its history of successful 
interventions must have prompted the company to pursue this path. The identified 
vulnerabilities reflected the Board’s practices and gave leverage to activists to exert 
pressure on each Board and ultimately, drive them into far-from-equilibrium states.  
 
A vulnerability addressed in the literature is associated with leadership stability in the 
case companies and the impact it had on activists’ interventions. MOR was constantly 
searching for a permanent CEO to lead the company and on several occasions, 
shareholder activists suggested the replacement of its CEO. The continuous pursuit 
to find the ‘right’ leader led to the governance challenges the company faced and which 
was raised by activists. Activist hedge funds may propose a company to replace their 
CEO (Bebchuk et al., 2015) and the literature (Cheffins and Armour, 2011; Gantchev 
et al., 2017) suggests that activists interventions increase CEO turnover by 10%. In 
contrast, IHG demonstrated stable leadership for a long period, had a clear strategic 
plan and the Board and shareholders seemed to trust the company’s CEO. In addition, 
IHG’s leadership publicly engaged with both activists’ demands and media 
speculations on the success of past activists’ interventions. Previous successes of 
activists have even made the most confident CEOs engage with them leading to 
settlements either before or after a proxy contest (Goldberg and Nathan, 2017).  
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8.5 Shareholder Activist’s Attacks   
Following their initial entry and filing of their investments, shareholder activists 
employed tactics in order to support their agendas. Most activists in these cases 
initially urged all Boards to either sell their companies or part of them (see Table 8.3). 
The sale of a company is one of the main aims of shareholder activists when they 
enter a company (Bebchuk et al., 2015; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Pearson and 
Altman, 2006). In addition, the sale of a target was one of the main demands of 
activists in a study conducted by Birstingl (2016) during the period 2014-2016. Other 
demands were related to the full control of MOR’s Board and the prospect of IHG’s 
merger with another company. The demands in all case companies were part of the 
tactics employed by activists in this study.  
 
Table 8.3 Initial Demands  
Company Activist 
Initial demands 




Strategic Hotels & 
Resorts Orange Capital (OC)  
Demanded a sale of 
the company 
Letter to the 
board/Publicly 
Morgans Hotel Group OTK Associates (OTK) 
Takeover of the 




Proposals to acquire 
a number of MHG’s 
assets in exchange 
for YC’s various 




Demanded a sale of 




Pushed for hotel 
assets to be sold and 
the separation of the 
management 
company 






TFM would probably 
be looking to push 
IHG to sell more of its 
owned and operated 
hotels Analysts' speculations 
  
Marcato Capital 
Management (MCM) Prospect of a merger 





Following their initial demands, shareholder activists employed tactics in order to 
influence each Board’s agendas and practices. In all cases, these tactics displayed 
similarities and activists employed them during their interventions (see Table 8.4). 
 
Table 8.4 Shareholder Activism Tactics 
Strategic Hotels & Resorts 
InterContinental Hotels 
Groups Morgans Hotel Group 
Orange Capital  Marcato Capital Management 




Publicly communicate their 
intentions 
Publicly communicate their 
intentions 
Publicly communicate their 
intentions 
















Increase ownership  
 
Litigations 












    
Support from proxy advisory 
firms 
    Exit 
 
 
With the exception of TFM which remained silent and whose intentions were based on 
analysts’ speculations, all activists approached the Boards in communicating their 
initial intentions after the stock acquisition and before moving on to implement several 
different tactics. Proactive hedge funds activists usually probe management with a 
phone call, e-mail or letter, urging management to agree to implement the hedge 
fund’s proposal designed to increase shareholder value (Armour and Cheffins, 2009).  
Following their initial contact, activists increased their pressure on the Boards, as they 
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did not receive a response. This supports the literature review, as activists will become 
more hostile in the event that managers resist their appearance (Kruse and Suzuki, 
2012) and this contradicts Brav et al.’s (2015) study where only 30% of the 
engagements in their sample were hostile requiring an actual or threatened proxy 
contest, a takeover threat, litigation, or confrontational public statements. 
 
OC made a letter public due to SHR’s Board’s failure to provide an adequate response 
to its initial letter. After IHG denied certain tactics employed by MCM, the fund hired 
an advisory bank (Houlikan Lokey) to find a US buyer for a strategic review of the 
business. All shareholder activists attempted to negotiate their position by sending 
several letters to the Boards at different periods criticising the companies. Not having 
influenced the Boards, shareholder activists escalated their pressure by employing 
additional tactics.  
 
It is evident from all cases that shareholder activists studied carefully their targets. 
Some of their media campaign tactics (presentations and creation of websites) were 
thorough and gained interest from the financial media and analysts. Activists will use 
public relations, social media and traditional media campaigns to establish their 
arguments (WLRK, 2019). OC and MCM established websites where they presented 
their proposals for the future of their targets. The presentations were made available 
to all shareholders, investors, and other stakeholders such as analysts and media. 
Subsequently, both activists increased their ownership as a form of pressure on the 
Boards and remained their top shareholders. Other shareholder activists (OTK) 
delivered a presentation to investors and proxy advisory firms (ISS) addressing 
several concerns – MOR’s share price performance and the composition of its Board 
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of Directors. The activists’ tactics in this study demonstrate that hedge fund activism 
is firstly about creating value and secondly about governance (Bratton, 2010).    
 
Proxy fight was another tactic employed by shareholder activists in one case company 
(MOR). The activists were looking to solicit support from the company’s shareholders 
regarding their intentions. Brav et al. (2015) characterise some engagements as 
‘openly hostile’, involving an actual or threatened proxy contest. The threat of a proxy 
contest is, perhaps, the most important weapon the activist hedge fund has in its 
possession to drive change (Sharfman, 2015). Proxy fights were only evident in MOR’s 
case from several activists. In one instance, YC filed a complaint against OTK for the 
use of false and misleading proxy material with the intention of controlling the Board 
and accused OTK of misrepresenting recommendations made by ISS and Glass Lewis 
Company.  
 
Shareholder activists exited their investments in various ways. OC exited its 
investment after placing one of its representatives on the company’s Board and after 
the fund agreed to a customary standstill provision. The proxy battle between KCM 
and MOR’s Board was followed by a series of events between the agents that led to 
the company’s sale. Unlike the above, in IHG, MCM exited the company after their 
tactics did not have much effect on the company’s strategic direction and resulted in 
loss for their investment.  
 
8.6 Board’s Defence Mechanisms  
The advent of a shareholder activist in a company usually triggers a wide range of 
Board defence mechanisms (see Table 8.5). There are Boards that will initially engage 
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with a shareholder activist and then move into denial and other Boards that will initially 
be defensive and negative and then engage with shareholder activists. Boyson and 
Pichler (2017) argue that target companies do not typically embrace the advent of an 
activist, since dealing with them can be costly and time consuming. According to them, 
a target company may engage, not in public dialogue but in private negotiations with 
activist hedge funds, something that this study did not corroborate, perhaps, because 
such negotiations are usually not publicised.  
 
IHG’s Board initially engaged with the media and shareholder activists and then denied 
the proposals made by the activists for the company’s merger with another operator. 
Although the Board denied the proposals made, it followed other defence mechanisms 
e.g., tactical, that benefited both shareholder activists and shareholders. The other two 
Boards were negative (did not respond and disagreed) to shareholder activists’ initial 
and subsequent communication; however, due to their vulnerabilities, they eventually 
had to engage with activists’ intentions and tactics.   
 
Table 8.5 Board’s Defence Mechanisms 
Strategic Hotels & Resorts 
InterContinental Hotels 
Groups Morgans Hotel Group 
Disagreement with 
shareholder activists’ proposal  Media engagement 
Disagreement with shareholder 
activists’ proposal 
 
Engagement on shareholder 
activists’ proposals 
 
Tactical defences (assets sale, 
dividends pay to shareholders, 
acquisition and creation of 
brands) 
 
Engagement on shareholder 
activists’ proposals 
Tactical defence (assets sale)  Media campaign (presentation 
to investors, press release, 
letter to shareholders) 
Legal defence (poison pill 
amendment) 
 Tactical defence (refinancing) 





Disagreement on the initial shareholder activists’ demands was publicly 
communicated by SHR’s Board in response to OC, stating that the Board disagreed 
with certain assumptions and conclusions made by the fund. However, the Board 
remained open for discussion leaving a window for engagement with the activist. The 
response escalated OC’s pressure and led to a further response from the Board 
rejecting suggestions about the sale of the company that the fund made and 
disagreeing with their views. IHG remained silent in the initial demand made by MCM, 
but then the Board engaged in a dialogue with the activist investor and claimed they 
were open to their suggestions. However, they then disagreed with MCM’s takeover 
intentions and claimed they were confident in pursuing their own strategy for high 
quality growth and delivering financial performance.  
 
MOR’s Board was operating in a more complex situation and had to deal with four 
activists who already held positions on the Board at different times. The Board mostly 
defended their views towards YC, OTK and KCM who aggressively demanded 
changes in the company. During shareholder activism, the Board engaged and 
disagreed with all shareholder activists’ views and proposals. This was due to the 
instability of the company’s governance and financial problems that challenged the 
Board’s operation. On two occasions, shareholder activists (OTK and KCM) attempted 
to take over control of the company’s Board, thus quickening their intentions to sell the 
company. However, the Board argued that both the activist’s suggested nominees 
lacked relevant experience and in KCM’s attempt it believed that the fund’s proposed 
panel could impair the company’s value. The management of many publicly listed 
companies believe that activists lack the expertise to understand their targets and view 
activism as a threat to their jobs or independence (Sorkin, 2015).  
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All Boards employed tactical defences as defence mechanisms to minimise the 
pressure from shareholder activists and satisfy their shareholders. SHR’s Board sold 
one of their assets to Cascade Investment that triggered further pressure from the 
activist. Similarly, IHG employed tactical defences such as selling key assets, 
acquisition of other brands and creation of new brands, whereas, MOR refinanced two 
of its properties to pay off a debt that the company had.  
 
In addition, the Boards’ employed legal defences as a defence mechanism. 
Shareholder activists’ media campaigns and statements forced SHR’s and MOR’s 
Boards to engage with them and approve an amendment to their companies’ 
shareholder rights agreements (poison pill). The amendments pleased all shareholder 
activists and their agendas as a poison pill could undermine any possible sale 
processes and showed engagement towards the future of the companies. Pressure 
by shareholder activists may lead the Board to adopt poison pills in response to 
control-seeking shareholders (Lu, 2016).  
 
Bratton and McCahery (2015) argue that good shareholder relations and constant 
monitoring are another defence mechanism for Boards but equally important for 
activist hedge funds. There is evidence in the cases here that both shareholder 
activists and Boards reached out through presentations to investors and shareholders 
increasing their chances of engaging and influencing stakeholders. MOR’s Board 
made presentations to ISS, and to investors about the action and improvements taken 
by its Board during their tenure before the Annual Meeting of Shareholders in response 




8.7 Company Changes   
Dealing with shareholder activists results in various changes as the target company 
will have to take decisions regarding its future in order to respond to activist 
interventions. In all cases, the Boards took decisions when the pressure begun to 
escalate. Based on the analysis of the cases, shareholder activists identified 
vulnerabilities and aimed to improve three areas in a target company: financial and 
operational performance and governance structure. Their impact resulted in several 
changes – minor and major – that were related to the areas that shareholder activists 






















Table 8.6 Company Changes 
Company Minor Changes Major Changes 
Strategic Hotels & 
Resorts 
   
Financial and Operational 
Performance 
Sale of the Four Seasons Punta Mita 
Resort and Grosvenor House. 
1. Improved financial 
performance (Revenue, 
Profit and EBITDA margin). 
2. 40% share price increase. 
Generated a premium 
price per share as 
proposed by OC. 
3. Sale of the company. 
 Governance Performance 
1. Agreed to appoint David W. 
Johnson to the company's Board 
of Directors.  
2. Approved an amendment to the 
company’s stockholder rights 
plan to accelerate the expiration.  
3. Independent review of executive 
compensation and redemption of 









1. Acquired Kimpton Hotels & 
Restaurants for $430 million. 
2. Sale of assets equivalent to 
approximately 10% of the 
company's market capitalisation 
prior to Trian’s involvement. 
1. IHG delivered a 26% total 
return to investors. Over a 
10 year period it handed 
back to shareholders more 
than £10 billion in 
dividends. The company 
kept buying back stock: 
had completed the latest 
$500 million repurchase on 
29 May 2013. 
2. Continued its asset-light 
strategy. 
3. In 2014, IHG returned 
more than $1bn to 
shareholders. 
Morgans Hotel Group 
  
Financial and Operational 
Performance 
 The company borrowed $450 million 




1. Filed their definitive proxy 
statements in connection with 
the 2014 Annual Meeting of 
Shareholders. 
2. Entered into an amendment to 
the Shareholder Rights 
Agreement. 
3. In 2015, Richard Szymanski 
temporarily served as CEO. 
4. In 2015, announced the 
appointment of Howard Lorber 
(as Chairman). 
1. Shareholders elected 
OTK’s entire panel (7 
nominees). 
2. In 2016, election of the 
new Board of Directors. 
3. Sale of the company. 
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The Boards agreed to take several decisions associated with their financial and 
operational performance and corporate governance structure. The decisions taken by 
the Boards confirm the problems and/or challenges they were facing, and shareholder 
activists addressed during their interventions. Despite the above, the changes which 
emerged were the result of different actions taken by all Boards. For example, the 
companies sold part of their portfolio for different reasons (Bebchuk et al., 2015). SHR 
and MOR took this decision to reduce their debt, whereas, IHG supported its asset-
light strategy and funded its expansion. Hedge fund activism is about value while 
governance and the processes of capital market discipline take second place on the 
agenda (Bratton, 2010). 
 
Shareholder activism and the actions taken by the Boards also influenced the share 
price of all companies both in the form of minor and major changes. Minor changes 
were the result of the entry of shareholder activists, allegations that they made to the 
Boards about each company’s financial performance. On the other hand, major 
changes were the result of the impact of shareholder activists from their entry to their 
exit from their targets. Table 8.7 presents the long-term outcomes of the share price 
based on the impact of shareholder activism. Most shareholder activists held their 
stake in their targets for a short period, ranging from 10 months (TFM) to 3.5 years on 
one occasion. A sample of activist events by Boyson and Mooradian demonstrated 
that the average activism period is slightly over two years in length (Boyson and 
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Shareholder activism is likely to increase a company’s share price after the exit of a 
shareholder activist (Cheffins and Armour, 2011; Levine, 2015) but this is not evident 
in all cases. In SHR’s case, OC’s exit resulted in a 67.4% increase in the company’s 
share price since the fund’s entry. A similar pattern was evident in IHG’s case, as when 
TFM exited the company, IHG’s share price increased by 19.8%. In contrast, MCM’s 
exit resulted in a -12.2% share price decrease for the fund. Similarly, in MOR’s case, 
the company’s share price decreased substantially after each shareholder activist’s 
initial investment into the company. Despite the variances in the share price paid by 
each shareholder activist, their exit from MOR coincided with the sale of the company 
to SBE and as a result, all had been paid $2.25 per share, substantially less than their 
initial investment in the company. 
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The impact of shareholder activism leads to the emergence of various changes in 
financial, operational and governance areas. The changes are the result of continuous 
pressure exerted by shareholder activists and the intentions they have about their 
targets. In the case companies, most of the shareholder activists achieved their initial 
demands (e.g., sale of the company, share price improvement) on their targets and 
exited the companies with a return on their investment. It was the interaction with the 
Boards that proved to be important for the emergent outcomes and a guide for the 
journey of shareholder activism in increasing shareholder value. 
 
8.8 Enabling Environment 
In order to understand what worked and what did not in all cases during shareholder 
activism, this study has identified enablers that enabled the Boards to manage change 
and inhibitors that have restrained their ability to manage change in relation to activists’ 
attacks (see Table 8.8). These enabling conditions together contributed to the creation 
of a co-evolving enabling environment or infrastructure (Goergen et al., 2010; Mitleton-
Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 2002).  
 
Table 8.8 Enablers and Inhibitors 
Enablers Inhibitors 
Openness and engagement Non-transparent governance  
Exploration of opportunities Financial instability 
Structure Underperformance 
Autonomy and support Unstable leadership  
Stability    
Widely accepted strategy   
 
 
There are several enablers identified in this study from the analysis and discussion of 
the cases. Regardless of their intentions, all Boards engaged in dialogue with 
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shareholder activists and considered their strategic proposals (openness and 
engagement). They explored opportunities (sale and acquisition of assets) in the 
business environment to withstand the pressure from shareholder activists and to 
minimise their financial, operational and corporate governance challenges (exploration 
of opportunities). The Boards demonstrated a structured approach when responding 
to shareholder activists’ demands and tactics and media and analysts’ speculations 
(structure). The CEO and other senior leaders of each target company represented 
each Board, the companies and their shareholders in their responses demonstrating 
autonomy and support. Another enabler that was demonstrated from IHG during 
shareholder activism was the Board’s stability and the fact that its asset-light strategy 
was widely accepted by the company’s shareholders. Some of the enablers identified 
in this study correspond Mitleton-Kelly’s (2003) case study findings of an international 
bank which had to upgrade the information systems of its operations.  
 
On the other hand, several inhibitors also challenged the Boards’ ability to effectively 
face shareholder activists. SHR’s Board’s non-transparent governance practices such 
as the sale of a hotel asset to an existing shareholder exerted further pressure by the 
shareholder activist. Financial instability such as long-term debt and 
underperformance compared to their peers were signs of weakness for the companies 
and their Boards when interacting with shareholder activists and other stakeholders. 
Finally, a Board’s (MOR) unstable leadership demonstrated a sign of weakness and a 




8.9 Integrated Model of Shareholder Activism  
Leading on from the dynamic analysis and discussion, a model has been developed 
which places shareholder activism at the core of corporate governance, and through 
the complexity lens, it looks at the simultaneous interaction of the Board with 
shareholder activists, other shareholders and stakeholders that are part of a 
company’s social ecosystem. The discussion below explains the construction of the 





















































































The major elements of the integrated model are the Board of Directors and other 
shareholders and stakeholders and it captures their interactions through the process 
of a shareholder activist attack. These interactions are sensitive to macro-
environmental conditions as suggested by Mitleton-Kelly (2003). The non-linear 
relationships and interactions of the major elements are exhibited by dynamic loops – 
selective pressures, shareholder activism attacks and defence mechanisms – that 
may take place simultaneously or at different periods and characterise each element’s 
choices during the Board’s evolutionary trajectory. The model also illustrates the entry 
of a shareholder activist in a public listed company which begins with macro-
environmental conditions, it presents the Board’s vulnerabilities, activist attacks and 
the Board’s defences. The shareholder activism journey concludes with the 
emergence of new order and the exit a shareholder activist from the target company. 
Activist attacks and the Board’s defences usually take place more than once during 
the Board’s evolutionary trajectory. The model also demonstrates the four conditions 
identified in the template framework (see Table 4.3) and their relation to the stages 
that have been identified during the analysis and discussion of the case studies.  
 
Prior to a shareholder activist attack, the Board operates near equilibrium conditions 
and its operation and management is not under threat. Similar to any other complex 
system, the Board is sensitive to initial conditions. Macro-environmental conditions 
and a Board’s vulnerabilities trigger the interest and facilitate the entry of shareholder 
activists into a company. Shareholder activists’ initial interest also amplify the interest 
from various stakeholders and forces the Board to depart from near equilibrium 
conditions that are generally stable and move to an unstable state – far from 
equilibrium conditions.  
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A Board’s move to far from equilibrium conditions is, in many cases, the result of both 
shareholder activist attacks and the selective pressure of stakeholders who force the 
Board to change its behaviour. In response to an attack, the Board will usually take a 
defensive stance and apply negative feedback to demands and/or speculations in 
order to maintain stability in its governance structure, therefore attempting to return 
the system to a near equilibrium state. Often a Board’s defence mechanisms are not 
effective and attract further interest from activists and from other shareholders and 
stakeholders. The increased interest acts as a positive feedback mechanism and 
results in behavioural iterations in the Board’s structure that amplify the disruption 
leading to further changes and disorganisation of the system. In order to maintain 
order and stability in their structure, Boards adopt additional defence mechanisms 
associated with their financial or governance performance.  
 
From a near to a far from equilibrium state, the Board’s dissipative structures import 
energy in the form of pressure/attacks exerted by shareholder activists and export 
entropy in the form of defence mechanisms in order to maintain order and stability and 
possibly return to a near equilibrium state. Some Boards will be able to maintain the 
dissipative structure of their system. However, other Boards may have dissipative 
structures which result in them not being able to handle the pressure exerted by 
shareholder activists. The latter may eventually collapse, although they will retain their 
property which will later form the foundation for self-organisation.  
 
Continuous activist attacks drive the Board to turbulence by forcing it to operate at the 
edge of chaos to find ways to respond to shareholder activism. At the edge of chaos, 
as shareholder activists look to implement their agendas in the target company, they 
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will usually take a more aggressive approach in order to influence Board members 
and other shareholders and stakeholders. The exact approach that activists adopt and 
pursue, depends on the vulnerabilities and opportunities they have identified in the 
target company prior to their entry and to the effectiveness of defence mechanisms 
during their presence in the company.  
 
At the edge of chaos, some Boards will acknowledge the significance of activists’ 
interventions in order to minimise and prevent further attacks that are likely to further 
disrupt their structure. In this state, there are some Boards whose dissipative 
structures are weak. They will not be able to maintain the integrity of their existing 
structure because their defence mechanisms are not effective. At the edge of chaos, 
a return to stability becomes difficult and Boards reach a tipping point and their 
dissipative structures usually collapse. Consequently, a Board will disintegrate, and 
re-structure will be considered necessary. However, there will always be Boards that 
will not disintegrate when they reach the edge of chaos, being able to adapt and evolve 
in line with macro-environmental changes. They will be able to survive and keep their 
structure intact.   
 
When a Board crosses a tipping point, its agents ‘spontaneously come together’ to 
explore new solutions in order to establish a dynamic balance within the company’s 
corporate governance ecosystem. The exploration of alternatives in the self-
organisation process is an attempt by Boards to maintain their status quo by keeping 
shareholder activists and their shareholders satisfied and to return their systems to a 
near equilibrium state. During the self-organisation process, some of the alternatives 
explored may be similar to the ones taken previously by the Board. Self-organised 
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processes lead to the emergence of new order which can take many forms depending 
on the impact of shareholder activism and the condition of the Board and the target 
company.  
 
The result of the Board’s interactions and relationships with shareholder activists and 
other stakeholders throughout shareholder activism gives rise to enabling conditions, 
for example, enablers, which enable Boards to manage change, and inhibitors which 
restrain their ability to manage change. Both enablers and inhibitors must be identified 
and enablers kept in place and inhibitors removed. Together with other conditions, 
such as political and economic, enablers and inhibitors collectively create an enabling 
environment that encourages and supports Boards to face shareholder activism with 
appropriate practices and enable the daily running of an organisation. 
 
8.10 Summary 
This chapter discussed and evaluated the research findings of this study. It 
demonstrated that the impact of shareholder activism is of great importance and taken 
seriously by corporate boards and other stakeholders in a company’s corporate 
governance ecosystem. The analysis and discussion of the cases through a 
complexity lens provided a comprehensive view of the interaction between Boards, 
shareholder activists and other stakeholders, both primary and secondary. During 
shareholder activism, shareholder activists and other stakeholders influenced Boards, 
but at the same time, Boards also influenced the above agents.  
 
The investigation of the three cases demonstrated the journey of a shareholder activist 
when attacking a company and confirms the discussion in the literature review in 
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Chapter 2. Two shareholder activists (YU and OTK) with different ownership structures 
and motives employed an effective shareholder activism approach indicating that the 
phenomenon is not always employed by hedge funds. Other agents such as private 
equity funds or real estate companies with a shareholding position employ shareholder 
activism not necessarily only to grow their investment returns but to lead a company 
out of troubling conditions.  
 
This chapter also discussed key factors and events related to shareholder activism 
that were critical in the evolution of the phenomenon in each case. These include:  
 
• All activist interventions began in 2012. 
• The Boards vulnerabilities that attract shareholder activists. Financial and 
operational performance and corporate governance performance were 
addressed by all activists in this study. 
• Board vulnerabilities prompted shareholder activists to attack them and employ 
tactics that are common practices and some of which were similar to all cases. 
The study found how corporate Boards made decisions and adapted their 
tactics during shareholder activism, which was the result of their interaction with 
shareholder activists. remove 
• Boards’ defence mechanisms in order to prevent or minimise the impact of 
shareholder activism. All Boards’ engaged with activists and applied various 
tactics that were relevant to their strengths such as media campaigns and 
tactical and legal defences.  
• A common pattern in all cases was the exploration of opportunities by the 
Boards. Under pressure from activism, all companies started to sell their assets 
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to reduce their debt or fund their expansion or increase their dividends to their 
shareholders.  
 
The impact of shareholder activism in the case companies displayed enabling 
conditions, enablers and inhibitors that can influence Boards when facing shareholder 
activism. These conditions vary depending on the approach that shareholder activists 
adopt and how resilient a company is. Based on the above discussion, the next chapter 
presents the conclusions of this study and provides several recommendations for 














CHAPTER NINE - CONCLUSION 
9.0 Introduction 
This chapter aims to bring together the findings reviewed by highlighting the 
contributions of this study and identifying areas for further research. The chapter 
begins by discussing the contributions this study makes to the ‘body of knowledge’. It 
then provides recommendations for researchers and for practitioners. It concludes by 
reflecting on the learning gained during the research process. In order to achieve the 
aim of the study, five main objectives were set and accomplished.  
 
1. The study reviewed the literature on corporate governance and on complexity 
theory and viewed corporate boards as complex co-evolving systems with their 
own agenda and supporting a function in the corporate governance ecosystem 
of each company. As complex co-evolving systems (CCES), Boards not only 
adapted to changes that occurred in their corporate governance ecosystem, but 
they also learnt and evolved from every change and therefore influenced their 
environment.  
2. This study constructed three cases of ‘offensive’ shareholder activism from the 
international hotel industry, examined the reaction of corporate boards and 
gauged the impact this had on the specific corporate governance ecosystem 
through the collection of online documentary information.  
3. The analysis of the findings was accomplished by using complexity theory and 
its principles. The study constructed a template framework and found that 
multiple interacting dimensions of the ‘new order’ were created by corporate 
boards because of the impact of shareholder activism.  
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4. The impact of ‘offensive’ shareholder activism led to the identification of 
enablers and inhibitors in the Boards’ trajectories that contributed to the 
creation of a co-evolving enabling environment which supports and encourages 
good governance practices. 
5. Finally, an integrated model of shareholder activism was proposed which allows 
corporate boards to comprehensively explore the impact of ‘offensive’ 
shareholder activism and enable them to withstand and prevent shareholder 
activism attacks. 
 
This study provides novel insights into and interpretations of the impact of ‘offensive’ 
shareholder activism on a company’s corporate governance ecosystem. By utilising a 
template framework as a methodological tool, it proposes an integrated model of 
shareholder activism that will enable corporate boards and corporate governance 
ecosystems to deal effectively with shareholder activism.  
 
9.1 Contributions of the Study 
This study makes three main contributions. The first relates to shareholder activism 
theory where an integrated model of shareholder activism is proposed and offers 
researchers and practitioners a comprehensive view of the impact of shareholder 
activism to corporate boards. The study also makes a methodological contribution 
through the development and application of a template framework which provides a 
dimension for the application of complexity theory in corporate governance and 
shareholder activism studies. The final contribution discusses the implications that this 
study has for practitioners who engage with shareholder activism. The following 
sections discusses these contributions.  
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9.1.1 Contribution to Shareholder Activism Theory 
The extant academic literature expressed the view that researchers have employed 
different theoretical perspectives to explore and explain corporate governance issues, 
including agency, resource dependency, stewardship and stakeholder theories. These 
theoretical approaches tend to evaluate a single aspect of the impact of shareholder 
activism, such as the share performance of a company or financial returns given to 
investors. Consequently, they reveal a gap in the corporate governance discipline and 
are unable to capture the complexity and the dynamics of a Board’s interactions with 
shareholder activists and other stakeholders.  
 
This study investigates the impact of ‘offensive’ shareholder activism comprehensively 
and examines the interactions of corporate boards with primary and secondary 
stakeholders in their companies. The analysis and discussion of the findings confirms 
the view that ‘offensive’ shareholder activism is disruptive for the Boards of publicly 
listed companies and influences their decision-making processes. The initial 
conditions that triggered the interest of shareholder activists and their resulting 
interventions can be viewed as a four-stage process: i) the identification of a Board’s 
vulnerabilities, ii) the attack of shareholder activists, iii) the defence mechanisms 
implemented by Boards and iv) the emergence of changes on every company.  
 
The analysis and discussion of the three case studies resulted in the development of 
an integrated model of shareholder activism. This model places shareholder activism 
– a corporate governance mechanism – at the core of corporate governance, and by 
adopting the complexity lens, it looks at the simultaneous interaction of the target 
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Board with shareholder activists, other shareholders and stakeholders that are part of 
a company’s social ecosystem. 
 
This is the first model that integrates shareholder activism theory and complexity 
theory in a corporate governance study. The model bridges the gap in the limited 
application of complexity theory to corporate governance and shareholder activism 
and provides avenues for further elaboration into other theoretical contexts such as 
risk and crisis management e.g. examining a company’s reactions when faced with a 
crisis and looking at the causes that create disturbance. It will allow a company to 
organise its corporate governance structure and processes when it has to engage with 
shareholder activists. Corporate boards will be able to understand the impact of 
shareholder activism and implement mechanisms that prevent or minimise the impact 
of activists’ interventions. The proposed integrated model of shareholder activism is 
distinctive in three ways:  
 
1. The primary elements of this model are the Boards and shareholder activists, 
whereas secondary elements include other shareholders and stakeholders who 
also influence the Board’s evolutionary trajectory. Over the course of 
shareholder activism period, the simultaneous interactions of the Board with 
shareholder activists, and in some cases with secondary elements, result in rich 
connections.   
2. The application of complexity theory and its principles with shareholder activism 
theory allow practitioners and researchers to identify and understand: i) a 
Board’s vulnerabilities, ii) shareholder activism attacks, iii) a Board’s defence 
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mechanisms and iv) strategic changes or outcomes that may occur in a 
company. 
3. The model adopts a comprehensive approach; it does not look at only one 
aspect to explore shareholder activism practices and tactics or defence 
mechanisms, but rather evaluates several aspects which comprise a 
company’s corporate governance ecosystem.  
 
9.1.2 Methodological Contribution 
The study adopted an exploratory research approach in order to provide novel insights 
into and interpretations of the impact of ‘offensive’ shareholder activism on a 
company’s corporate governance ecosystem. The main methodological contribution 
of this study is the development and application of a template framework. The template 
framework (See Table 4.3) allowed this study to view each case company 
comprehensively and not just focus on the relationship between the Board of Directors 
and shareholder activists. It uses complexity theory and its principles to develop four 
complexity stages – initial conditions, from near to far from equilibrium, edge of chaos 
and beyond and emergence of new order – that show the probable journey of a 
complex system such as the Board of Directors when it is under pressure by 
shareholder activists.  
 
The constructed template framework provides a new dimension for the application of 
complexity theory in corporate governance and shareholder activism studies. It can 
offer an in depth understanding of the behaviour of all agents and their interactions in 
a company’s corporate governance ecosystem at different stages of shareholder 
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activism interventions. The main advantages of the template framework are the 
following.  
 
• Wide application. The ability to explore in detail dynamic phenomena such as 
shareholder activism. With the exception of corporate governance studies, the 
template framework can be used to explore cases from disciplines such as 
meteorology (weather and climate events), military studies and finance 
(financial crises).  
• Flexibility in the way it can be designed. The template can give researchers the 
opportunity to construct questions with phrases such as ‘who’, ‘why’ and ‘what’ 
that will generate rich data and retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
social phenomena. Therefore, depending on the nature of the investigation it 
will allow researchers to identify key agents in a target company, their intentions 
and also outcomes that are likely to emerge from the interaction between 
shareholder activists and Boards.  
• Relevance to longitudinal studies. It is a methodological tool that investigates 
dynamic phenomena such as shareholder activism interventions that occurred 
over prolonged periods in the past and may extend in the present.  
• Specificity. The template’s structure follows a chronological order. Therefore, it 
explores the initial conditions that trigger the interest of shareholder activists in 
a company, what events occur during their presence and what are the 
outcomes that follow with their exit from the target company.  
• Enabling conditions. The template framework contributed to the identification 
and an understanding of the enabling conditions that emerged in each case 
company. As discussed in Chapter 3, complexity is useful for studying the 
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evolution of complex organisations and other conditions that add to the 
complexity of existing organisations (Begun et al., 2003). Apart from the 
relationship between the Board and different agents, this study looked at a set 
of social, legal, political and economic conditions that influenced the Board and 
eventually co-evolved with the external environment of each company.  
 
9.2 Implications for Practitioners 
This study has produced a template framework and an integrated model of 
shareholder activism that will help corporate managers and corporate boards of 
publicly listed hospitality companies to develop and implement robust and efficient 
mechanisms in the wake of shareholder activism.  
 
The template framework offers managers a tool to explore in a chronological order the 
impact of shareholder activism on corporate boards. Over the course of shareholder 
activism, managers will be able to view comprehensively the Boards’ interactions with 
shareholder activists and other primary and secondary stakeholders. The template 
framework can be used as a toolkit for managers by asking specific questions in 
different phases of shareholder activism, therefore gaining insights in the impact of 
shareholder activism by taking into consideration both the micro and macro 
environments of the target company.  
 
The application of the integrated model of shareholder activism will provide managers 
with an understanding of the impact of shareholder activism and the Board’s trajectory 
by looking at its interactions with various agents. As discussed previously, managers 
will be able to explore several factors that are associated with shareholder activism. 
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The analysis of the findings resulted in the development of a checklist (see Table 9.1) 
that Boards can adopt. The checklist is divided into three stages – assess risk, 
minimise risk/prevent risk and measurement of the impact of shareholder activism. It 
can prepare a Board for a shareholder activist attack or in the case that an intervention 
is in progress it can address certain aspects that may create robust defence 
mechanisms. Following the assessment and minimisation of risk, the checklist 
recommends measuring the impact that shareholder activism may have on corporate 
















Table 9.1 Board of Directors Checklist 
Task  Sub-Task Action Plan Questions 




Assess and evaluate 





e.g. monitoring share 
price performance. 
Identify challenges 
that may arise from its 
shareholder base 
(shareholder 
satisfaction of how the 
company is 
governed). Identify 
activists that are likely 
to consider the 
company a target. 
1. Is our portfolio undervalued?                           
 2. Do we have transparent governance practices 
and comply with corporate governance 
regulations?     
 3. How do we perform financially compared to 
previous periods? 
                4. What is the share price over a period 
and how does it compare with our competitors?   
 5. What are the views of our shareholders and 
stakeholders about governing the company?     
6. Which shareholder activists could be interested 
in the company?                            
7. How can we entrench our company?                    
8. How would we respond to a potential activist 
attack?                                     
9. How could an activist benefit our company?     
10. What macro-economic factors pose a threat 
for our company?        
Minimise / 










Conduct research on 
the activist's past 
interventions and 
tactics used to 
influence Boards and 
companies. 
1. What tactics do they use to influence a Board? 
2. Do we need to engage or ignore the initial 
demands? 
3. Which members will respond to the activists? 




members dealing with 
shareholder activism.  
1. What are the criteria for selecting Board 
members?                                                                           
2. How many members with previous relevant 









defence mechanisms.                                         
1. What defence mechanisms do we need to 
implement? 
2. Do we need to install a poison pill? 
3. What are the thoughts of our shareholders 
about the activist's intervention? 
4. Who will develop the defence mechanisms? 
5. Who will implement the defence mechanisms? 
The Board's 
options 
Available and relevant 
strategic options at 
the Board's disposal. 
1. Do we settle with activists to avoid a proxy 
contest? 
2. What strategic choices should we make e.g. 
company sale or part of it, merge with another 
company, reduce costs? 
3. Do we pay cash dividends to our shareholders 
or do we buy back our shares (share buyback)? 







On exiting the 
company, the Board 
must measure the 
impact of shareholder 
activism and evaluate 
its stance over this 
period. 
1. What losses did we have if any? 
2. How can we better prepare our company for a 
potential future attack? 
3. Are our shareholders satisfied with the way we 




This study suggests tactics that Boards can apply before and during shareholder 
activism that will enable them to prevent and withstand shareholder activism. Prior to 
the entry of shareholder activists in a company, Boards must assess and evaluate 
vulnerabilities that are likely to be influenced by internal and/or external factors and 
may trigger shareholder activism. In order to understand their vulnerabilities, Boards 
must have an objective view of their companies and the environment in which they 
operate. Vulnerabilities such as poor financial performance and operating loss 
(Chapters 4 and 6), CEO turnover (Chapter 6), transparent practices (Chapter 4) and 
undervalued portfolios (Chapter 5) act as a magnet for shareholder activists who are 
looking for targets that have the potential to improve their positions and generate 
returns on their investments. Boards should regularly assess their companies by 
commissioning consultants who will provide a thorough analysis of how the company 
is performing and how vulnerable it can be in the event of shareholder activism. In 
addition, the company must constantly scan the macro-environment to identify 
activism trends and be aware of shareholder activists’ attacks on any of their 
competitors.  
 
Boards need to understand the shareholder base of their companies – major and 
minor shareholders – and monitor and understand their intentions. They should assess 
the needs of its major shareholders, engage and build relationships with them outside 
formal annual shareholder meetings, e.g. informal meetings throughout the year. This 
will allow the Boards to strengthen their relationships with major shareholders who 
may have Board presence, can play an important role during voting processes, and 
may be able to support the Boards and their companies during shareholder activism. 
In addition, Boards must be aware of any changes (entry or exit) in the company’s 
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shareholder base. Investors that enter or exit a company may influence its ability to 
retain Board stability and may change the Board’s dynamics. Another point relates to 
the views of analysts, media and traders that exert influences to all publicly listed 
companies. Boards must constantly understand how these stakeholders perceive the 
company and accordingly they must engage and build relationships with them. These 
stakeholders can influence future investors who may consider investing or even 
customers who use or want to use the products of their companies. Engaging with 
these stakeholders will enable the Boards to be aware of challenges that the company 
has not noticed in the economic environment.  
 
Boards must investigate the activist’s history in previous and/or current targets and 
understand the tactics that they apply to exert pressure to companies. Thorough 
investigation will enable the Boards to understand what tactics to expect during 
shareholder activism. When a shareholder activist enters a company, the Boards must 
engage quickly and respond to the activist’s demand/s. Ignoring an activist’s demand/s 
will escalate the pressure and the activist will express their views publicly to generate 
interest from the company’s wider social ecosystem. The study showed that Boards 
should consider working together with shareholder activists. Discussions with the 
activist will allow Boards to be aware of the activist’s concerns and any plans they 
have for the company. The Boards must consider that an activist has conducted 
substantial preliminary work before attacking their company and sometimes they may 
have even discussed their thoughts with other shareholders. 
 
An open and objective view of all recommendations made by the activist may benefit 
Boards and their companies. Engaging with the activist requires experienced and 
255 
 
robust Boards with members who have sufficient experience in dealing with activist 
demands. Although, an experienced team is necessary for responding to an activist’s 
demands, the process must comprise the development and implementation of defence 
mechanisms that relate to the activist’s profile and how well the company performs 
prior or during a shareholder activism period e.g. financial and operating performance, 
robust governance procedures. Knowing a company’s strengths and weaknesses well 
can allow a company, to be assertive and object activists’ demands as happened in 
IHG’s case (See Chapter 5). Last but not least, during shareholder activism a Board 
will always have at its disposal strategic options that are directly linked to activists’ 
demands and may minimise the effect of activism.    
 
Measuring the impact of shareholder activism can benefit the Board and the company 
in the long term. This study has shown that shareholder activism may return to a 
company if it is likely to contribute to higher returns for their investment (See Chapter 
5). The measurement of losses or gains will enable the Board to keep or change its 
stance when engages with activists and may prove useful when exploring strategic 
options in the future. Equally important is the shareholders’ view on how the Board 
handles activism and whether the practices and tactics used were considered 
transparent and protective for their investments.  
 
This study also offers corporate governance practitioners the opportunity to act 
proactively and create an enabling environment that supports and encourages good 
governance practices. Managers and Boards may identify enablers and inhibitors that 
can withstand and prevent shareholder activists’ interventions and build a robust 
corporate governance structure. Although shareholder activism practices vary 
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depending on the target’s vulnerabilities, enablers can be a positive force for Boards 
to maintain their structure intact and minimise the impact of activism, while, prompt 
identification of inhibitors will allow managers to move to changes in the company’s 
structure and/or processes.  
 
This study has identified enablers and inhibitors that if adopted may be used as a 
blueprint for managers who encounter shareholder activism practices. Enablers 
include the Board’s openness and engagement towards shareholder activists 
demands. Managers and the Board may engage in dialogues with activists and 
consider their proposals for the future of their company, as it may be beneficial for 
them and other shareholders. In order to engage in constructive dialogues, the Board 
must display a structured approach and autonomy when responding to activists’ and 
stakeholder demands and public comments. Managers must ensure that the Board’s 
structure maintains stability over time and does not undergo changes that are likely to 
increase its vulnerability. Understanding and engaging with the company’s 
shareholders may generate support for the Board and any mechanisms implemented 
may be widely accepted. Finally, during shareholder activism managers must explore 
a range of opportunities available to them and consider the most appropriate.  
 
On the other hand, managers must identify and prevent the adoption of inhibitors that 
may increase the risk of shareholder activism interventions. Managers must ensure 
that the Board’s and company’s governance practices are transparent and meet the 
country’s corporate governance framework. Also, the managers must monitor the 
company’s financial performance as instability and underperformance compared to its 
peers may trigger shareholder activism and cause disruption to its shareholder base. 
257 
 
Finally, unstable leadership such as high CEO turnover indicates challenges in the 
Board’s structure and may send signals to the market for imperative changes.  
 
Finally, the integrated model will enable the Board and senior management to answer 
a number of questions which will be useful for the development of their own corporate 
governance mechanisms. These questions include: “What are the vulnerabilities of a 
Board which most appeal to shareholder activists?”, “How do shareholder activists 
attack Boards?”, “How do Boards resist shareholder activism?”, “Why do Boards resort 
to certain responses under shareholder activism pressure?” and “What can be the 
potential strategic outcomes of shareholder activism?” 
 
9.3 Implications for Researchers 
The lack of research in the combined theoretical areas of corporate governance, 
shareholder activism and complexity theory demonstrate an interesting although 
challenging area of research for this study. Despite the above, in the future 
researchers can investigate several unexplored areas associated with these topics 
and shed light on avenues that can be of further use for the body of knowledge.  
    
1. The study explored the impact of shareholder activism on corporate boards and 
among other factors, it identified shareholder activism attacks/tactics and Boards’ 
defence mechanisms. A future study could examine the motives (e.g. financial, 
strategic, publicity) that influence shareholder activism tactics and attacks and how 
activists would measure the effectiveness of their tactics. Although, most activists 
may focus on monetary rewards, there may be others who may measure their 
attacks by looking into the amount of time they hold shares in a company. In both 
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cases, they may compare the results of a target with other past holdings that they 
had in their possession. This study also found that Boards adopt various defence 
mechanisms to minimise and prevent the impact of shareholder activism. Future 
research could examine and measure the effectiveness of a Board’s mechanisms  
by focusing on the decline or increase in the company’s i) share price performance 
and ii) portfolio value by comparing the results prior and after shareholder activism.  
 
2. It was found that activist hedge funds play an important role in the international 
hotel industry and influence the practices of publicly listed companies by pushing 
them to return dividends to their shareholders, by making changes to their 
governance structure or demand their sale. It would be interesting for a study to 
investigate how mutual funds (have different motivations compared to hedge 
funds) make interventions in companies. Although, mutual funds usually take a 
long-term approach to their investments, Norton (2019) describes them as the new 
activist investors. Their tactics and strategies could provide a new insight into 
shareholder activism research and could be compared to those of hedge funds.  
 
3. This study explored shareholder activism cases from the international hotel 
industry and found similarities and differences from the activists interventions in 
the target companies. Future in depth research could investigate cases from other 
industries and sectors and compare the findings yielded from the international hotel 
industry.  
 
4. The shareholder activists in the case companies were all based in the U.S. A cross-
cultural research study could investigate shareholder activists from different 
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geographic regions and compare their approaches and tactics when they attack 
the Boards of publicly listed companies. 
 
5. The study has shed light on cases where shareholder activists invest and intervene 
in small cap (market capitalisation up to £2bn) and medium cap (market 
capitalisation up to £10bn) publicly listed companies. Future research could 
examine the impact of shareholder activism in large cap (market capitalisation over 
£10bn) companies and examine whether Board vulnerabilities, activism tactics and 
the outcome of shareholder activism have similarities or differences with the case 
companies explored in this study.  
 
 
6. This study proposes a model that integrates shareholder activism theory and the 
complexity lens in a Board’s corporate governance ecosystem. Complexity theory 
develops core concepts and ideas and as a metaphor its principles and language 
can facilitate an understanding of various activities in organisations. Research in 
the future could develop an integrated model that relies on the application of 
complexity lens and could be applied on disciplines other than corporate 
governance and shareholder activism. Therefore, proposed models could explore 
and analyse dynamic phenomena from a complexity lens that influence industries 
and companies at disciplines such as finance (e.g. the impact of financial crisis), 
on public health (e.g. the impact of Covid-19) and the food sector (e.g. the impact 





9.4 Reflections on the Study 
This study has been an exciting yet challenging experience and journey that 
contributed to the acquisition and exploration of knowledge. However, the researcher 
managed to gain insights into areas that extend beyond the body of knowledge. The 
aim of this study was to provide novel insights and interpretations of the impact of 
‘offensive’ shareholder activism on a company’s corporate governance ecosystem 
utilising a complexity theory lens. Without planning to view the study as a business 
history project, the research process led the researcher to become an ‘accidental 
historian’. The continuous research on the three cases enabled an understanding of 
the history of shareholder activism in each case by drawing connections between past, 
present and future. This process contributed to the acquisition of a cross-temporal 
perspective in understanding the impact of shareholder activism by using complexity 
principles and concepts.   
 
In addition, over the course of six years, this study has remained flexible as it tested 
different frameworks and developed a contingency plan that facilitated the research 
process. The initial aspiration of this study was to look at five cases from the 
international hotel industry that were subject to shareholder activism. The data 
collection from the first two cases resulted in rich information gathered from each case 
and led the researcher to focus on three cases as the amount of information in 
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Appendix 1 OC’s Letter to SHR’s Board of Directors  
Letter Copy: 
Board of Directors 
c/o Mr. Raymond Gellein 
Strategic Hotels & Resorts, Inc. 
200 West Madison Street 
Suite 1700 
Chicago, IL 60606 
February 1, 2013 
Dear Mr Gellein: 
Orange Capital, LLC ("Orange Capital" or "we") is a research driven investment firm 
based in New York. As of the date of this letter, we beneficially own 4,500,000 
shares in the aggregate of Strategic Hotels &Resorts, Inc. (“Strategic” or the 
"Company”) common stock. 
Orange Capital has carefully studied Strategic’s ongoing operations, growth 
prospects, and capital structure. We analysed a variety of strategic alternatives for 
the Company’s unique portfolio of luxury hotel properties, taking into account the 
cyclical nature of the lodging industry, the scarcity value of the Company's portfolio, 
possible changes in interest rates, private versus public market valuations for luxury 
hotel properties and the M&A environment for luxury real estate. 
In our view, the best alternative for the Company to maximize shareholder value is 
an immediate sale of the Company (with 100% of the net proceeds distributed to or 
otherwise being received by shareholders). 
The Company should retain a financial advisor to facilitate the sale process and 
publicly announce its intention to review strategic alternatives, including a potential 
sale, as soon as possible. 
We believe a sale of Strategic Hotels would likely result in proceeds in excess 
of $11 per share, or more than 49% above your last closing price. Our analysis 
is based on a property level valuation using cap rates, per key valuation metrics, and 
comparable M&A transactions. Our analysis suggests that on a weighted average 
basis, the portfolio is worth $590k-$675k per key. We believe that a sale for that 
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price is achievable and represents the best path to maximizing value for Strategic's 
shareholders for the following reasons: 
- Private market values for luxury hotel properties far exceed public market 
valuations.  
The demand for luxury real estate has never been greater and recent private market 
transactions for hotels are near to or above their previous highs. Private market 
buyers rely on value per key/replacement cost and discounted cash flows rather than 
current year EV/EBITDA multiples. We believe it is highly unlikely that Strategic’s 
replacement cost value would be reflected in the public markets, particularly given 
that the Company’s private market EV/EBITDA multiple would be higher than any 
publicly traded peers. Strategic’s public market valuation is also impaired by the lack 
of any comparable pure-play luxury hotels peer group. 
- There is a large pool of well-capitalized buyers for the Company’s luxury 
hotels.  
Sovereign wealth, pension, endowment, and insurance funds are natural owners and 
active buyers of luxury real estate. These buyers have outstanding access to global 
capital markets. In addition, absolute financing costs for highly rated real estate 
owners are at all-time lows. This is evidenced by low long-term interest rates and the 
tight credit spreads of well-capitalized REITs. 
- Strategic is burdened with material corporate overhead diluting shareholder 
returns. 
Strategic’s corporate overhead is approximately $30 million per year. There are 
meaningful synergies associated with a sale to an existing owner of hotel properties. 
In the event of a portfolio sale, the vast majority of this overhead would be 
eliminated. We assume $20 million of cost savings in a sale at 15-18x EBITDA. This 
would be worth $1.50 - $1.75 of value per share, or approximately 25% of your 
current market capitalization. 
- Strategic’s large portfolio of luxury hotels is unique and has outstanding 
scarcity value. 
We believe the bulk sale of Strategic’s hotel portfolio presents a rare opportunity for 
buyers of luxury properties. According to our industry research, it might take up to 
five years to accumulate a similar portfolio of trophy assets. As a result, we would 
expect a substantial premium in the event of a sale. 
- The Company has a material cost of capital disadvantage compared to other 
owners of luxury hotels. 
Strategic’s access to the capital markets is limited by the Company’s high leverage 
ratios relative to current cash flows. In addition, there is strong evidence that REIT 
stocks with high financial leverage trade at lower multiples of AFFO1 relative to their 
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peers. As a listed owner of property assets, Strategic’s value as a going concern 
rests on its ability to finance accretive acquisitions or pay dividends from current 
cash flows. Neither is likely in the near term in any meaningful amount. Strategic’s 
share price remains well below its intrinsic value, so any equity issuance would be 
highly dilutive for shareholders. 
- Strategic’s leveraged balance sheet offers few prospects for a return of 
capital to shareholders for the foreseeable future.  
The Company’s credit facility limits Strategic’s ability to repurchase common stock or 
pay dividends to common shareholders. Strategic’s high leverage impairs the 
Company’s access to new or amended financing agreements. 
- Strategic lacks brand value.  
There is no unique value associated with the “Strategic Hotels” brand. The Company 
is simply a listed fund with the highest cost of capital in the luxury hotel industry. 
- Management lacks a credible plan for creating shareholder value.  
Following the recent departure of your CEO, Strategic has failed to articulate a 
strategy to increase shareholder value. We do not believe wagering that EBITDA will 
return to its previous cyclical highs is a credible deleveraging strategy. Given the 
Company’s weak balance sheet and limited access to low cost capital, we see no 
viable alternative to a sale. 
We did not arrive at this conclusion without evaluating other possible alternatives. 
We also considered Strategic continuing on its present course with the expectation 
of improving industry conditions as well as a partial sale of the Company’s portfolio 
with proceeds used to retire debt. 
We do not believe that the status quo is in the best interests of shareholders. There 
are significant risks associated with the hotel cycle, changes in property values, 
capital markets conditions, and interest rates. This is especially the case when many 
prospective buyers of luxury assets are currently willing to buy assets at prices 
already reflecting a positive cyclical outlook. 
While a partial sale of the Company in a deleveraging transaction would likely allow 
for renewed access to the equity capital markets on more reasonable terms, we see 
this is as a poor alternative to a full sale. Strategic’s smaller pro-forma asset base 
would be sub-optimal for REIT investors in the public markets. In addition, there may 
be costs associated with the early repayment of indebtedness and the Company's 
stock would remain one of the less liquid names in the public REIT space. 
We would be pleased to discuss our views as expressed in this letter with you at 






Orange Capital LLC 






















Appendix 2 Orange Capital Issues Statement Regarding Strategic Hotels & 
Resorts 
     Deficiencies in its business strategy and corporate governance 
1. Six months have passed since the Company announced its intention to sell an 
asset from its portfolio to repay indebtedness. To date, no asset has been sold 
nor has an asset been publicly identified for sale. 
2. Strategic Hotels has yet to publicly announce that it has retained a financial 
advisor and is willing to explore a sale of the Company. For reasons stated in 
our previous releases, we believe a sale is by far the best path to realize the 
full value of      Strategic Hotel's scarce collection of luxury hotels and resorts. 
3. For three consecutive years, Institutional Shareholder Services has highlighted 
the    executive "pay-for-performance disconnect... due to guaranteed equity 
grants, increases in long-term equity incentive values, poor benchmarking 
practices and culmination of the Company's Value Creation Plan, which 
provides excessive awards unlinked from Company performance." 
4. Excessive corporate overhead costs that dilute shareholder returns. 
















Appendix 3 Orange Capital Reports Results of Potential Buyer Contacts for 
Strategic Hotels & Resorts 
Orange Capital LLC, holder of approximately 3.7% of Strategic Hotels & Resorts, 
Inc. (“Strategic Hotels”) (NYSE: BEE), has sent the following letter to the 
independent members of the Board of Directors of Strategic Hotels: 
July 16, 2013 
Independent Members of the Board of Directors 
Strategic Hotels & Resorts, Inc. 
200 West Madison Street, Suite 1700 
Chicago, Illinois 60606-3415 
Dear Members of the Board: 
As you know, Orange Capital LLC (“Orange Capital”) continues to strongly believe that 
a broad and thorough process to explore a potential sale of Strategic Hotels & Resorts, 
Inc. (“Strategic Hotels” or the “Company”) is imperative. Our reasons have been 
outlined in our prior letters to you. 
We were initially encouraged when both the Wall Street Journal and Reuters reported 
in mid-June that the Company hired Eastdil Secured to pursue a potential sale of the 
whole Company. Since these media reports surfaced, Strategic Hotels has failed to 
confirm or deny the media reports of a sale process and clarify what process, if any, 
is being conducted. By not doing so, the Company has created significant uncertainty 
as market participants continue to buy and sell Strategic Hotel’s shares with what we 
believe is neither reasonable transparency nor appropriate disclosure. We believe that 
it is the responsibility of the independent directors to ensure that shareholders are 
promptly informed of the scope of any process being pursued so that they are able to 
make responsible investment decisions. 
Given Strategic’s failure to respond to these media reports and the Company’s history 
of poor corporate governance, we felt compelled to retain our own financial advisor, 
Houlihan Lokey, to represent us. Houlihan Lokey’s mandate, among other services, is 
to assist us in evaluating potential interest in the Company. 
Houlihan Lokey has been in contact with more than ten of what it believes are logical 
“Tier A” buyers for the Company. In summary, Houlihan Lokey reported to us that there 
is a broad spectrum of interest in the Company. However, Houlihan Lokey also 
informed us that there is significant confusion by certain potential buyers as to: (i) 
whether any process is underway, (ii) whether or not the Company is seriously 
interested in a transaction for the Company as a whole, (ii) which advisor(s) has been 
retained by the Company and (iii) any specific process or schedule around a potential 
sale. 
In addition, based on Houlihan Lokey’s outreach to the most likely buyers, we believe 
that many of these potential buyers have not, even to their own surprise, been 
contacted by the Company or its advisor(s). As a result, assuming that the media 
reports of a “sale process” are true, we are highly concerned that Strategic Hotels may 
be embarking on a limited process, potentially for only select assets or only with certain 
types of buyers. We believe it is the responsibility of the independent directors to 




We again urge the Company to promptly (i) confirm or deny the reports from Reuters 
and The Wall Street Journal that it retained an advisor to pursue a sale, (ii) announce 
which firm or firms the Company has retained and the scope of their mandate and (iii) 
have the Company’s advisor(s) contact all logical buyers to inform them that a sale 
process for the whole Company will be conducted and when the dates that materials 
would be made available for review. 





About Orange Capital LLC 
Orange Capital, LLC is a New York based investment firm. The firm is a value-oriented 
investor in event-driven securities. The firm allocates across the capital structure on 
an opportunistic basis. Orange Capital was co-founded in 2005 by Daniel Lewis and 
Russell Hoffman. Prior to founding the firm, Orange Capital's portfolio manager, Daniel 
Lewis, was a director with Citigroup's Global Special Situations Group. 
About Houlihan Lokey 
Houlihan Lokey is an international investment bank with expertise in mergers and 
acquisitions, capital markets, financial restructuring and valuation. The firm serves 
corporations, institutions, and governments worldwide with offices in the United States, 
Europe, and Asia. Independent advice and intellectual rigor are hallmarks of our 
commitment to client success across our advisory services. Houlihan Lokey is globally 
ranked as the No. 1 restructuring advisor, the No. 1 M&A fairness opinion advisor over 
the past 10 years, and the No. 1 M&A advisor for U.S. transactions under $3 billion, 
according to Thomson Reuters.  
 













Appendix 4 Morgans Hotel Group IPO 
Morgans Hotel Group Co. is providing you with the following information in connection 
with its initial public offering. 
Morgans Hotel Group Co.  
$360,000,000 





































2,700,000 shares; option to purchase 
additional shares from Morgans Hotel 
Group Co. 
 




$20.00 per share 
 




























Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Incorporated, Citigroup Global Markets 
Inc., Banc of America Securities LLC 
Thomas Weisel Partners LLC, Jefferies 
& Company, Inc., JMP Securities LLC 
Blaylock & Company, Inc. 
E*Trade Securities LLC 
Susquehanna Financial Group, LLLP 
  
 
65 In security issues, a greenshoe option is an over-allotment option. In the context of an initial public offering, it is a provision 
contained in an underwriting agreement that gives the underwriter the right to sell investors more shares than originally planned 
by the issuer if the demand for a security issue proves higher than expected. 
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The following information updates the information describing our proposed 
indebtedness following this offering. 
Mortgage and Other Indebtedness Outstanding After This Offering 
Our $80.0 million management company term loan and our $125.0 million revolving 
credit facility were proposed to have been secured by pledges of equity interests in 
certain of our subsidiaries. Our ability to provide the requested pledges is subject to 
the satisfaction or waiver of certain conditions under the terms of our mortgage debt 
(including that we receive "no-downgrade" letters from the ratings agencies with 
respect to the securitization facilities in which our existing mortgage indebtedness 
has been included and that the maturity date of these new loans is later than the 
maturity date of the mortgage debt) and these conditions have not yet been satisfied 
or waived. Our lenders have agreed to make the loans on an unsecured basis. We 
and our lenders have agreed to use commercially reasonable efforts to satisfy the 
required conditions (or obtain relevant waivers) as soon as practicable. If we have 
not provided the requested pledges by April 1, 2006, the interest rate on the term 
loan and drawings on the revolving loan will increase from 200 basis points to 350 
basis points over LIBOR until we provide the requested pledges. An increase of 150 
basis points on our management company loan would increase our annual interest 
expense by approximately $1.2 million. We expect that our revolving credit facility 
initially will be undrawn. If that facility were fully drawn, an increase of 150 basis 
points on our revolving credit facility would increase our annual interest expense by 
approximately $1.9 million. 
To review a filed copy of our current registration statement, go to the following link: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342126/000104746906001676/a2166502z
s-1a.htm  
THE ISSUER HAS FILED A REGISTRATION STATEMENT (INCLUDING A 
PROSPECTUS) WITH THE SEC FOR THE OFFERING TO WHICH THIS 
COMMUNICATION RELATES. BEFORE YOU INVEST, YOU SHOULD READ THE 
PROSPECTUS IN THAT REGISTRATION STATEMENT AND OTHER 
DOCUMENTS THE ISSUER HAS FILED WITH THE SEC FOR MORE COMPLETE 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE ISSUER AND THIS OFFERING. YOU MAY GET 
THESE DOCUMENTS FOR FREE BY VISITING EDGAR ON THE SEC WEB SITE 
AT WWW.SEC.GOV OR BY GOING TO THE LINK ABOVE. ALTERNATIVELY, THE 
ISSUER, ANY UNDERWRITER OR ANY DEALER PARTICIPATING IN THE 
OFFERING WILL ARRANGE TO SEND TO YOU THE PROSPECTUS IF YOU 
REQUEST IT BY CALLING TOLL-FREE 1-800-584-6837 (RETAIL INVESTORS) 
OR 1-866-718-1649 (INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS) OR BY EMAILING 
PROSPECTUS@MORGANSTANLEY.COM. 
ANY DISCLAIMERS OR OTHER NOTICES THAT MAY APPEAR WITHIN THE 
EMAIL THAT DISTRIBUTED THIS DOCUMENT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS 
COMMUNICATION AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. SUCH DISCLAIMERS OR 
OTHER NOTICES WERE AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED AS A RESULT OF 
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